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Abstract
Recent developments in elliptic curve cryptography have heightened the need
for fast scalar point multiplication, specially when working on environments
with limited computational power. It is well known that point multiplication
on elliptic curves over Fqm (with m > 1) can be accelerated using Frobenius
expansions. In practice, the computation is much faster than the standard
double-and-add scalar multiplication.
An efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems can use a
Koblitz curve and convert integers into Frobenius expansions to perform
fast scalar multiplications. However, this conversion of integers to Frobenius
expansions would lead to extra code on the device (i.e., silicon area) and
extra computational cost.
According to N. Koblitz, H. Lenstra suggested that rather than choosing
a random integer n and then converting to a Frobenius expansion n(τ),
in certain cryptosystems it might be more efficient to generate a random
Frobenius expansion directly. The temptation then is to choose a relatively
short and/or sparse value for n(τ). If this is done then we must re-evaluate
the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem (and other computational
problems). A further issue is that the existing security proofs may not
directly apply. For some systems it may be necessary to develop bespoke
security proofs for the Frobenius expansion case.
In this thesis, we analyse the Frobenius expansion DLP and present algo-
rithms to solve it. Furthermore, we propose a variant of a well known iden-
tification scheme designed for public key cryptography on very restricted
devices. More precisely, we construct the Girault-Poupard-Stern (GPS)
identification scheme for Koblitz elliptic curves using Frobenius expansions.
The idea is to use Frobenius expansions throughout the protocol, so there
is no need to convert between integers and Frobenius expansions. We also
give a security analysis of the proposed scheme.
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“For thousands of years, kings, queens and generals have
relied on efficient communication in order to govern their
countries and command their armies. At the same time,
they have all been aware of the consequences of their
messages falling into the wrong hands, revealing precious
secrets to rival nations and betraying vital information to
opposing forces. It was the threat of enemy interception
that motivated the development of codes and ciphers:
techniques for disguising a message so that only the
intended recipient can read it.”
Simon Singh
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in environments with
limited computational power. It is well known that point multiplication on
elliptic curves over Fqm (with m > 1) can be accelerated using Frobenius ex-
pansions (a.k.a. τ -adic expansion). H. Lenstra suggested that rather than
choosing a random integer n and then converting to a Frobenius expan-
sion n(τ), in certain cryptosystems it might be more efficient to generate a
random Frobenius expansion directly. The temptation then is to choose a
relatively short and/or sparse value for n(τ).
The GPS identification protocol was the starting point of our entire
project. At the beginning, we were tempted to use Frobenius expansions
with short exponents in the GPS protocol, which would lead to smaller
parameters, compared with the usual integer case, because we believed,
at that point, that low-memory counterparts for the Frobenius expansions
discrete log problem (which we called τ -DLP) did not exist, or at least, did
not have a square-root behaviour.
By studying the τ -DLP and with some suggestions by Tanja Lange, we
16
1. Introduction
discovered that low memory algorithms with square root complexity for the
τ -DLP do exist, although with non-optimal constants hidden in the O( ).
1.1 Road map
We begin this thesis with a background chapter, in that we review some
topics that we judged important for a better understanding of our work. The
notations (standard notations, whenever possible) introduced in Chapter 2
are used throughout the thesis.
The next stop of our thesis is also a background chapter, but we de-
cided to present it separately, with more details, due to its relevance in
relation to our work. In Chapter 3 we study the elliptic curve discrete log
problem (ECDLP) and present the standard algorithms to solve them. We
briefly review the exhaustive search algorithm and the Shanks’ baby-step
giant-step (BSGS) algorithm. Then we focus on the low memory algorithms
to solve the ECDLP, when we analyse the Pollard-rho and the Pollard-
kangaroo methods, as well as their parallel counterparts. The understand-
ing of Pollard-kangaroo method will be paramount for the study of a low
memory algorithm for the τ -DLP.
In Chapter 4 there is also some review, as well as new material. We revise
the concept of Koblitz curves and Frobenius expansions, the latter being the
actor in a leading role of this thesis. We show how to efficiently compute
a scalar point multiplication using Frobenius expansions, some subtleties of
the arithmetic with τ -adic expansions and also that every Frobenius expan-
sion can be mapped down to x + yτ , for integers x, y of certain size. As
far as we know, we are the first to prove the bounds for x and y and also
17
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conjecture that such bounds can be shortened, based on the distribution of
τ -adics. The use of this property will be the main tool to solve the τ -DLP. In
this chapter, we also present an algorithm for adding two τ -adic expansions,
and show that we needed to include a randomisation step in order to avoid
a statistical attack in the τ -GPS protocol.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the Frobenius expansion DLP. We observed
that a deep study of the τ -DLP was necessary, in order to guide the use of
Frobenius expansions in cryptosystems. We introduce three computational
problems, namely, the general τ -DLP, the τ -NAF DLP and the weight-w
τ -DLP. Similarly with what we have done in Chapter 3, we briefly present
the exhaustive search and BSGS algorithms for the three computational
problems and then we concentrate on a low-memory algorithm. The solution
was to use the Gaudry-Schost 2-dimensional algorithm and use the property
that a τ -adic can be written as x+ yτ , for integers x, y. We give a complete
description of Gaudry-Schost algorithm and analyse it, trying to fill some
gaps in the work of Gaudry and Schost.
After a better understanding of the τ -DLP, the next stop of our thesis
is to present an application of a real protocol using Frobenius expansions
in the place of integers. In Chapter 6 we study the GPS identification
scheme and propose a counterpart using Frobenius expansions, which we
called τ -GPS. Since the study of τ -DLP showed that we cannot use shorter
parameters, the main advantage of using Frobenius expansions is that it does
not require conversion between integers and Frobenius expansions, being
useful to applications with limited oﬄine computation time and limited
code area. We give a security analysis of τ -GPS and also some hints of
how to choose the right protocol for constrained devices, according to the
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application.
In Chapter 7 we define parameters sizes needed for efficient and secure
applications of Frobenius expansions, based on the results of Chapters 5
and 6.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes our work and present some open problems
and suggestions of future work.
1.2 Contributions
Now we highlight the main contributions of this thesis, in sequential order.
- [Section 4.2.2] Let L be a parameter which represents the length of a τ -
adic expansion
L−1∑
i=0
αiτ
i with coefficients αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The number
of possible τ -adic expansions is clearly 3L. However, we have many
P -equivalent τ -adics in this set, i.e., Frobenius expansions a and b
such that [a]P = [b]P for some point P ∈ E(F2m), which results in
a much smaller number of equivalence classes. We compute a bound
for the number of P -equivalence classes of Frobenius expansions. We
experimentally show that this number is bounded by O˜(2L);
- [Sections 4.2.4, 4.2.6 and 4.2.6.2] Any τ -adic expansion of the form
L−1∑
i=0
αiτ
i can be mapped down to x+yτ , for integers x and y of certain
size. We prove bounds on x and y and also we give some pictures of
the distribution of random τ -adics and random τ -NAFs. From these
pictures, we conjecture optimal bounds on x and y;
- [Section 4.3] We propose the use of a randomisation step in the al-
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gorithm to add and multiply τ -adics, in order to avoid a statistical
attack in the τ -GPS protocol;
- [Section 5.2] We introduce three new computational problems, namely,
the general τ -DLP, the τ -NAF DLP and the weight-w τ -DLP;
- [Section 5.5.2] We fill some gaps in the analysis of the Gaudry Schost
algorithm, giving an estimate of how many steps are likely to be out-
side of the search box and analysing the success probability of the
algorithm;
- [Section 6.5] We propose a GPS protocol which uses Frobenius expan-
sions throughout (and we call it τ -GPS). This will lead to fast and
simple oﬄine operations while still keeping the online operation fast,
being useful to applications with limited oﬄine computation time and
limited code area;
- [Section 6.6] We give a security analysis for the proposed τ -GPS;
- [Section 6.6.3.1] We describe a statistical attack on the τ -GPS protocol
if the randomisation step proposed in Section 4.3 is not used;
- [Section 7.5] Let C be the length of the τ -adic which represents the
challenge in the GPS protocol and let S be the length of the τ -adic
which represents the private key. We compute the number of possible
τ -adic expansions of degree less than C, Hamming weight w and at
least S − 1 zero coefficients between each pair of nonzero coefficients,
which will be useful if one wants to use the Girault-Lefranc trick with
τ -GPS.
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In this chapter we present a review of topics which are important for
the comprehension of the thesis. Any reader with some basic knowledge of
the topics presented here can skip this chapter without any risk of loss of
understanding, since nothing original will be presented. We also give some
references for those who want to obtain further knowledge about the topics
presented in this chapter.
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2.1 Complexity
The first step of our review is to present some notation and definitions well
known in the literature, which will be used throughout this thesis. The
term or expression to be defined will be written in bold. The definitions
are based on those given in [17, 37, 54].
Definition 1. An algorithm is a finite sequence of steps to solve a problem.
Let n be the input size of an algorithm A and let f(n) be a function
which represents the running time of A in its worst case (in other words,
the running time of A is upper bounded by f(n)).
Definition 2. We say that f(n) ∈ O(g(n)) (a.k.a. big-O notation) if
there exists some constant c > 0 and some integer n0 such that 0 6 f(n) 6
cg(n) for all n > n0.
Definition 3. We say that f(n) ∈ O˜(g(n)) (read soft-O notation) if f(n) =
O(g(n) logk(g(n)) for some k. In other words, it means that logarithmic
factors are ignored in the big-O notation.
Definition 4. We say that f(n) ∈ Ω(g(n)) if there exists some constant
c > 0 and some integer n0 such that 0 6 cg(n) < f(n) for all n > n0.
Definition 5. Informally speaking, we say that algorithm A runs in:
• polynomial time if there exists some constant k such that f(n) ∈
O(nk);
• sub-exponential time if for all k, we have f(n) ∈ Ω(nk) and for all
constants a > 1 we have f(n) ∈ O(an);
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• exponential time if there exists some constants a, b > 1 such that
f(n) ∈ Ω(an) and f(n) ∈ O(bn).
For constants c and v, we have:
Lp(v, c) = exp
(
c(lg p)v(lg lg p)1−v
)
,
where if: 
v = 1, Lp is exponential in lg p;
v = 0, Lp is polynomial in lg p;
0 < v < 1, Lp is sub-exponential in lg p.
Definition 6. A parameter (for example, a probability) ε : N→ R is neg-
ligible if for any nonzero polynomial P, there exists m such that
∀n > m, |ε(n)| < 1P(n) .
On the other hand, a probability Pr is overwhelming if 1−Pr is negligible.
Definition 7. For inputs of size n, if no polynomial time adversary can,
with non-negligible probability, successfully solve some problem, we call this
problem hard.
2.2 Cryptography
The term cryptography – derived from Greek cryptos (hidden) and the verb
graphein (to write) – means “secret writing”. According to [54], “the fun-
damental objective of cryptography is to enable two people to communicate
over an insecure channel in such a way that an adversary cannot understand
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what is being said”.
In order to establish a secure communication, we need to provide the
following services [37, 52]:
Confidentiality (a.k.a. privacy) means to ensure that all information
(stored or transmitted) has been revealed only to authorised users;
Authenticity means to ensure that all parts involved in a communication
have been correctly identified;
Integrity means to ensure that all information (stored or transmitted) has
not been altered by any unauthorised user.
Non-Repudiation means to ensure that neither the sender nor the receiver
of some information can deny, later, that he or she has transmitted or
received such information.
Access Control means to ensure that any resource cannot be accessed by
unauthorised users.
Availability means to ensure that any resource be available to authorised
users whenever they need it.
2.3 Public Key Cryptography
For centuries, cryptography has been used to provide privacy of commu-
nication. Besides privacy, it is also important to authenticate one part to
another. Before 1976, privacy and mutual authentication were achieved with
Symmetric Cryptography , where each pair of users share a secret key. The
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main problems of symmetric cryptography are the great number of keys
needed in a communication among n users and the need of a secure channel
to transmit the secret keys. Furthermore, symmetric cryptography does not
provide the non-repudiation service.
The concept of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) first appeared in 1976,
in Diffie and Hellman’s paper “New Directions in Cryptography”[20]. In
that paper, the authors proposed an asymmetric cryptography model in
that, unlike symmetric cryptography, each user has a key pair, say (Sk, Pk),
where Sk, called the private key, is a secret known only by his owner and the
other key Pk, known as the public key, is kept in a public domain. Usually,
each user generates his own key pair, one of them random (Sk) and the
other (Pk) computed as a function of Sk. It is well known, nowadays, that
a public key must be associated to a digital certificate issued by a trusted
authority, which links the key to its owner.
As usual, we ask for the help of two well-known characters in cryp-
tography, named as Alice and Bob to exemplify the concept of public key
cryptography. Let (SA, PA) and (SB, PB) be, respectively, the key pairs of
Alice and Bob. We assume that both PA and PB have a valid digital cer-
tificate, signed by a trusted authority. If Alice wants to send a message m
(a.k.a. plaintext) to Bob using public key cryptography, she first finds Bob’s
public key in a public domain, then she encrypts m using PB and finally,
she sends the resultant ciphertext c to Bob. After receiving c, Bob uses his
private key and recovers m. It is easy to notice that any person could play
the role of Alice (this is known as impersonation). If Bob needs to ensure
that the person who sent him a message is, in fact, Alice, a digital signature
is needed. We will see digital signature in detail in Section 2.8.
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Let Mk be the space of all possible messages; PKk be the space of all
possible public keys; SKk be the space of all possible private keys; and Ck be
the space of all possible ciphertexts. Public key encryption can be formally
defined under a security parameter k with the following algorithms:
KeyGen a randomised algorithm which takes k as input and outputs pk ∈
PKk and sk ∈ SKk;
Encrypt a randomised algorithm which takes pk and m ∈Mk as input and
outputs c ∈ Ck in polynomial time in 2k;
Decrypt an algorithm (usually deterministic) which takes sk and c ∈ Ck
as input and outputs either m ∈Mk or ⊥ (invalid ciphertext symbol)
in polynomial time in 2k.
The key pair (pk, sk) is a valid key pair if:
Decrypt(Encrypt(m, pk), sk) = m.
We now present the security properties for an encryption scheme:
One way encryption (OWE): An adversary is not able to compute m if
he has access only to the corresponding ciphertext c;
Semantic security: An adversary learns no information at all about m
(except possibly its length) from the corresponding ciphertext c;
Indistinguishability (IND): An adversary is not able to distinguish the
encryption of two messages m0 and m1 of the same length.
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Precisely, an indistinguishability adversary is an algorithm A which in
the first stage takes pk as input and outputs messages m0 and m1 of the
same length. In the second stage, A receives the challenge ciphertext c
(where c = Encrypt(mb), with b ∈ {0, 1} randomly chosen) as input and
outputs b′.
Let Pr[b=b′] be the probability that an adversary outputs b = b′ and
let |Pr[b=b′] − 12 | be the advantage of an adversary. If no adversary has
non-negligible advantage an encryption scheme is said to have the indistin-
guishability property.
The following attack models are known in public key encryption:
Passive attack An adversary has access to the public key only.
Lunchtime attack (CCA1) An adversary has access to the public key
and can also ask for decryptions of his chosen ciphertexts (before re-
ceiving the challenge ciphertext).
Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) An adversary has access
to the public key and to a decryption oracle which outputs decryptions
of any chosen ciphertext, except the challenge ciphertext.
We define standard model as the model of computation in which the
adversary is only limited by the amount of time and computational power
available. The strongest notion of security for encryption schemes is known
to be indistinguishability under a CCA2 attack in the standard model.
We refer to [20, 37, 54] for further knowledge about public key cryptog-
raphy.
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2.4 Hash Functions and Random Oracles
A hash function is a mathematical function which maps an entry x of any
size to an output y of fixed size. In order to be used in cryptography, a hash
function ideally must satisfy the following properties:
1. Compression - h maps an input x of any size to an output y of fixed
size;
2. Ease of computation - given x, one can compute y = h(x) in poly-
nomial time;
3. Preimage resistance - given y, it should be hard to compute x such
that h(x) = y;
4. Second preimage resistance - given x, it should be hard to compute
z 6= x such that h(x) = h(z);
5. Collision resistance - it should be hard to find any values x and z
such that h(x) = h(z).
See Definition 6 in Section 2.1 for a precise explanation of “hard”.
Many cryptographic schemes make use of hash functions. However,
sometimes it is difficult to write a formal proof of security for protocols
using a real hash function. Thus, many authors suggest the use of an ideal
(theoretical) computational model, in which they can ignore the internal
structure of hash functions and can concentrate in the protocol itself. In
such an ideal model, the hash functions are replaced by random oracles,
defined by [7] as follows:
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“A Random Oracle R is a map from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}∞ chosen
by selecting each bit of R(x) uniformly and independently, for
every x. Of course, no actual protocol uses an infinitely long
output, this just save us from having to say how long ‘sufficiently
long’ is.”
In other words, the random oracle models a hash function as a random
function. In a proof of security, we simulate the output of a random oracle
using binary sequences which are indistinguishable from a random sequence.
Cryptographic schemes which can be proven secure using only complex-
ity assumptions are said to be secure in the standard model, whereas schemes
which use random oracles are said to be secure in the random oracle model
(ROM).
We refer to [37, 54] for further details about hash functions.
2.5 Elliptic Curves
We review here only some of the most important facts about elliptic curve
cryptography. More details can be found in [2, 9, 23, 37, 38, 48, 49, 54].
Let p > 2 be a prime number and let q = pm, for some m ∈ N. Let Fq
(also written as GF (q)) be a finite field of q elements. If q is prime, we can
think of Fq as the set of integers modulo q (Zq). Let a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ Fq.
We say that the elliptic curve over Fq is the set of solutions (x, y) ∈ Fq ×Fq
for the Weierstrass equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1)
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together with a special point O, called the point at infinity.
After a change of variables, Equation (2.1) can be simplified to the fol-
lowing forms (known as simplified Weierstrass form for curves of char-
acteristic p):
E :

y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b if p = 2
y2 = x3 + ax2 + bx+ c if p = 3
y2 = x3 + ax+ b if p > 3
When p = 2 we need b 6= 0, when p = 3 we need a2(b2 − 4ac) − b3 6= 0
and when p > 3 we need 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 to ensure that E has no multiple
roots, so it is possible to draw a tangent line in any point of the curve.
It is well known that the points of an elliptic curve define a group law,
with O as the identity element.
We now define some useful concepts in elliptic curves:
• point multiplication (a.k.a. scalar point multiplication): let s be an
integer and P an elliptic curve point. We define [s]P as the sum of
P with itself s times. There are well defined formulae for adding two
points P and Q of an elliptic curve (R = P + Q) or for computing
the scalar point doubling. We refrain to give such formulae here, but
they can be easily found in the references we gave in the beginning of
this section. We remark that [s]P can be efficiently computed (i.e.,
computed in polynomial time) using double-and-(add or subtract) al-
gorithm (see Section 4.2.3 and also [54, pg 266]).
• curve order (#E): is the number of points of a given curve E;
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• order of a point P : is the smallest integer d such that [d]P ≡ O.
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP) will be treated sep-
arately in Chapter 3.
2.6 Zero Knowledge
The concept of Zero knowledge (ZK) was introduced by Goldwasser et
al [30]. According to Goldreich [29]: “zero knowledge proofs are proofs
that are both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the
assertion being proved”. In other words, anything that can be extracted
(computed) from a zero knowledge proof, can also be computed from the
assertion itself.
We begin this section giving a mathematical example which illustrates a
zero-knowledge proof. Let G(V,E) be a graph simple and connected. Let n
be the number of vertices of G. We say that a G is 3-colourable if there is a
map φ : V → {A,B,C}— where {A,B,C} represent three different colours
(e.g., A = Red, B = Blue, C = Green) — such that every two adjacent
vertices are assigned different colours. In other words, for each (u, v) ∈ E,
we have φ(u) 6= φ(v). Finding φ is equivalent to partitioning the set of
vertices of G into three independent subsets, V1, V2 and V3, such that each
subset contains no adjacent vertices. See Figure 2.1 for an example of a
3-coloured graph.
We suppose that a prover, say Peggy, claims to a verifier, say Victor,
that she knows how to 3-colour G. Peggy wants to convince Victor that she
really knows it, without revealing to Victor how to 3-colour G. We assume
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Figure 2.1: The graph above is 3-coloured. Notice that the map φ divides the set of
vertices into 3 independent subsets: V1 = {v1, v4}, V2 = {v2, v5} and V3 = {v3, v6} .
that Peggy has n boxes, labelled with the integers 1, 2, 3, . . . , n and each box
has a lock with a corresponding and unique key.
Peggy and Victor run the following protocol:
• Peggy chooses at random a permutation of {A,B,C} (i.e., if Peggy,
without loss of generality, chooses {B,C,A}, vertices in subset V1 are
coloured with blue, vertices in V2 are coloured with green and vertices
in V3 are coloured with red), fills each of the n boxes with the assigned
colour (i.e., if vertex vi is coloured blue, Peggy will put a “blue card”
inside box i), locks all the boxes and sends them (without keys) to
Victor;
• Victor chooses at random a pair of adjacent vertices (vj , vk) in G (the
challenge) and sends it to Peggy;
• Peggy verifies if (vj , vk) are adjacent vertices in G and sends the keys
corresponding to boxes j and k to Victor. If (vj , vk) are non adjacent
vertices, Peggy does nothing;
• Victor opens the boxes j and k and verifies if they contain two dif-
ferent colours, among {A,B,C}. In case Victor finds a colour not
in {A,B,C} (e.g., Victor finds a yellow card in box vj), or the same
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colour in the two boxes or even if the keys sent by Peggy do not open
the corresponding box, Victor rejects the proof and stops the protocol.
Of course, if Peggy correctly guesses Victor’s challenge (i.e, (vj , vk)), she
succeeds even if she does not know how to 3-colour G. However, if they
repeat this protocol many times, her chance of successfully anticipating all of
Victor’s requests becomes vanishingly small, and Victor should be convinced
that she knows the secret.
Now, after giving an idea of a zero-knowledge protocol, we continue with
some definitions:
A proof of knowledge is defined as an interactive proof in which the
prover successfully convinces a verifier that he knows some secret. A proof
of knowledge, among many other applications, can be used to construct
identification protocols or signature schemes.
A zero-knowledge proof (a.k.a. zero-knowledge protocol) is a proof of
knowledge in that no information at all about the secret is revealed to the
verifier (except the fact that the prover really knows such secret). For in-
stance, the verifier (after being convinced that the prover does know the
secret) cannot convince a third party the he or she knows the secret as well.
Back to the 3-colouring example, Victor is convinced that Peggy knows the
secret, but he learns nothing else except that Peggy is telling the truth.
Furthermore, despite being convinced that Peggy knows φ, Victor has no
means to convince a third party that he knows how to 3-colour G.
We define a prover as honest if he or she knows the secret and dishonest
otherwise; we say that a verifier is honest if he or she runs the protocol
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properly and dishonest if otherwise (in this case, the dishonest verifier cheats
during the protocol, trying to obtain some information about the secret). A
zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties:
• Completeness: an honest prover always1 succeeds to convince an
honest verifier that he or she (the prover) knows the secret.
• Soundness: A dishonest prover can only convince an honest verifier
that he or she (the prover) knows the secret with negligible probability.
• Zero-knowledge: a prover, when interacting with any verifier (honest
or not) does not leak any information about the secret, except the fact
that he or she does know the secret. This is formalized by showing
that there exists some simulator (a polynomial time algorithm) that,
given only the statement to be proven (and no interaction with the
prover), outputs an answer which is indistinguishable from the answer
given by an interaction between the verifier and the real prover.
The first two of these are properties of more general interactive proof sys-
tems. The third is what makes the proof zero-knowledge.
Depending on what “indistinguishable from the answer given by an inter-
action between the verifier and the real prover” really means, some variants
of zero-knowledge can be defined:
Perfect zero-knowledge if the distributions produced by the simulator
and the real protocol are exactly the same.
1To be precise, we can say that the prover convinces the verifier with overwhelming
probability
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Statistical zero-knowledge if the distributions are not necessarily ex-
actly the same, but they are statistically close, meaning that their
statistical difference is a negligible function. Formally, it means that
no algorithm which given a polynomial number of outputs of both dis-
tributions (simulator and real interaction with the prover) can distin-
guish, with non-negligible advantage, which of the two distributions
an output belongs to, even when unlimited computational power is
available.
Computational zero-knowledge if no efficient algorithm can distinguish
the two distributions, i.e., an adversary (with computationally bounded
power) cannot distinguish between the simulation and runs of the real
protocol.
Further knowledge can be found in [22, 37].
2.7 Identification Protocols
We recall from Section 2.2 that the authentication service requires that all
parties involved in a communication have been correctly identified. Some au-
thors (for example, [37, 54]) interchangeably use the terms identification or
entity authentication when talking about the authentication service. How-
ever, it can be found in the literature that these terms may have a different
meaning, in that authentication is a process which involves identification
plus verification, where identification is the answer to the question “Who
are you ?” and verification is the answer to the question “Can you prove
it ?”. In this thesis, we use the former definition, i.e., we use identification
and entity authentication as synonyms.
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We will see in Section 2.8, for example, that Alice can prove her identity
using her private key to sign a message. Digital signatures provide message
authentication. However, Alice’s identification can be done with an opera-
tion known as identification (or entity authentication) protocol. According
to Menezes et al [37]:
“A major difference between entity authentication and message authen-
tication (as provided by digital signatures) is that message authentication
itself provides no timeliness guarantees with respect to when a message was
created, whereas entity authentication involves corroboration of a claimant’s
identity through actual communications with an associated verifier during
execution of the protocol itself (i.e., in real-time, while the verifying entity
awaits). Conversely, entity authentication typically involves no meaningful
message other than the claim of being a particular entity, whereas message
authentication does.”
Roughly speaking, we can say that identification protocols are performed
in “real time” (i.e., the presence of the prover is required during the proto-
col), whereas message authentication, such as digital signatures, can be done
any time after the message has been signed (i.e., the signature verification
is usually performed without the presence of the signer).
We refer Menezes et al [37] again to define the main objectives of iden-
tification protocols:
1. If A and B are honest parties, the protocol between A and B is always
successful, i.e., B will accept the authentication of A;
2. (transferability) B, after successful authenticating A, cannot reuse any
knowledge to impersonate A to a third party C;
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3. (impersonation) A third party C 6= A carrying out the protocol with
B and playing the role of A is only accepted by B with negligible
probability (we recall that a formal definition of “negligible” was given
in Section 2.1);
According to [37], “The previous points remain true even if: a (poly-
nomially) large number of previous authentications between A and B have
been observed; the adversary C has participated in previous protocol exe-
cutions with either or both A and B; multiple instances of the protocol,
possibly initiated by C, may be run simultaneously”.
See also D. Sitnson [54] for more details.
2.8 Digital Signatures
We remember from Section 2.3 that, when Bob receives a message m en-
crypted with his public key, he cannot be sure that m was sent by Alice,
unless she uses her private key to sign m before encrypting and sending it
to Bob. In this case, Bob will reverse the process, using his private key to
decrypt the ciphertext and then using Alice’s public key to verify her signa-
ture. We recall that Bob can verify Alice’s signature without her presence.
Alice can also choose to encryptm first and then she signs the correspondent
ciphertext and send it to Bob. In this case, Bob first uses Alice’s public key
to verify her signature and then he uses his own private key to decrypt the
ciphertext and obtains m.
A signature scheme consists of two main steps:
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Sign A randomised algorithm which takes as input a private key (Sk) and
a message (m) and outputs a signature (s).
Verify A (usually deterministic) algorithm which takes as input the pub-
lic key (Pk) associated with signer’s private key, a message (m), a
signature (s) and outputs either “accept” or “reject”.
Now we describe the main adversarial goals for digital signatures:
Total Break An adversary can obtain the private key, so he is able to forge
a signature on any message.
Selective Forgery An adversary, with non-negligible probability, can cre-
ate a valid signature on a chosen message.
Existential Forgery An adversary can create a valid pair (m, s), where s
is the signature of m.
The following attack models are known in digital signatures:
Passive attack An adversary has access to the public key only.
Known message attack An adversary has access to a (finite) number of
valid message-signature pairs.
Adaptive chosen-message attack An adversary has access to a signing
oracle, which generates valid signatures for messages of his choosing
(except the one which he is trying to forge a signature).
So, security against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message
attack can be defined as the strongest notion of security for signatures.
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We point out that the security of a signature scheme depends on the
hardness of some mathematical problem. For example, the RSA-signature
depends on the hardness of integer factorization.
2.9 Schnorr Identification and Signature
Now that we have revised the concepts of zero knowledge, identification pro-
tocols and signature schemes, we use the Schnorr scheme [46] as an example
of the evolution of such concepts:
Previously, a trusted third party T chooses an element g ∈ Z∗q of prime
order r dividing q−1. Alice holds a valid key pair (s, I), where s : 1 6 s < r
is her private key and I = g−s (mod q) her public key.
Suppose that Alice wants to convince Bob that she knows s. Obviously,
she could show s to Bob, but Alice does not want to reveal her secret. Then,
she starts the following protocol with Bob:
In the three step protocol, Alice generates a secret random r : 1 6 r < r,
computes the commitment X = gr (mod q) and sends X to Bob. Note
that many “X” can be pre-computed by Alice. Then, Bob generates a
random challenge c : 1 6 c 6 2t and sends it to Alice. The parameter
t is called the security parameter. After receiving c, and checking its size,
she computes the response y = r + sc (mod r) and sends y to Bob. The
computation of y is the only online step. Finally, Bob checks whether or
not X ≡ gyIc (mod q). If X 6≡ gyIc (mod q), Bob rejects the proof. This
round can be repeated l times to convince Bob that Alice is not only a lucky
girl, she really knows s.
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More precisely, the verification step is:
X = gyIc (mod q)
= gr+scg−sc
= gr+sc−sc
= gr
Since the only value generated by Alice in the verification step is y =
r + sc (mod r) (g and I are public), only if Alice knows s she can respond
correctly to Bob with non-negligible probability (the probability that Alice
correctly ‘guesses’ s in each round is 1/r, where one expects r to be of
similar size to q), otherwise, if s′ 6= s, in the verification step Bob will get
gr+c(s
′−s) 6= gr 6= X and will reject the proof. After l runs of the protocol,
Bob is convinced that Alice knows s but no other information about Alice
leaks to Bob.
Therefore, the Schnorr identification is an example of a zero knowledge
proof of the Discrete Log Problem (DLP). Note that Alice convinces Bob
that she knows the discrete log of her public key I in respect to q without
revealing any information to Bob about the discrete log s.
We saw in Section 2.8 that the security of a digital signature relies on the
hardness of some mathematical problem. We can use the zero knowledge
proof of discrete log, described above, to produce signatures assuming only
that the DLP is hard. The trick is to replace interaction from the identifica-
tion protocol with the output of a hash function h, which can be represented
by a random oracle for a formal proof.
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In the Schnorr signature, if Alice wants to sign a message m, she chooses
a random r, computes u = gr (mod q), c = h(m||u) and y = r+sc (mod r).
Then, Alice’s signature of m is (y, c). Notice that the interactive challenge
was replaced with a hash value. This is known as “applying the Fiat-Shamir
transform”.
To verify Alice’s signature, Bob (after checking if the public information
is authentic) computes z = gyIc (mod q) and c′ = h(m||z). He accepts
Alice’s signature if and only if c = c′.
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This chapter continues presenting background topics. We present meth-
ods to solve the Discrete Log Problem on Elliptic Curves, with emphasis
on low-memory methods, since such methods are adapted to solve related
problems later in this thesis.
42
3. Computing Discrete Logs on Elliptic Curves
We begin the chapter defining the elliptic curve discrete log problem
(ECDLP), then we briefly present a time/memory tradeoff algorithm to
solve it, namely, the baby-step-giant-step algorithm. In the main part of
this chapter, we present and discuss low-memory algorithms to solve the
ECDLP.
3.1 Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP)
Definition 8. Let q be a prime power and E/Fq an elliptic curve defined
over the finite field Fq. We define E(Fq)[r] to be {P ∈ E(Fq) : [r]P = O}.
In other words, it is “the group of points of order r in an elliptic curve E
over Fq”.
Definition 9. Let r | #E(Fq) be a prime such that E(Fq)[r] is cyclic.
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is: given P,Q ∈
E(Fq)[r], find n ∈ Z/rZ such that Q = [n]P .
This is a fundamental computational problem with applications in ellip-
tic curve public key cryptography (ECC).
The naive way to solve the ECDLP is by using exhaustive search over
all possible values n 6 r. In other words, this naive approach takes O(r)
steps (if r has k bits, the running time is O(2k) and therefore, exponential
in k). However, it is well-known that one can compute n in O(
√
r) =
O(2k/2) group operations using Shanks’ baby-step-giant-step algorithm [16],
or Pollard’s [41, 42] low-memory randomised algorithms. As remarked by
Galbraith [23]: “due to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm (which reduces the
problem to subgroups of prime order) we always restrict to the case where
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the point P has large prime order. Then the only algorithms which are
applicable for all elliptic curves are the methods of Shanks and Pollard, and
these methods have exponential complexity.”.
Definition 10. Let N be the number of group operations one needs to per-
form to solve a computational problem using exhaustive search. According
to E. Teske [55] we call an algorithm a square-root algorithm if it finds
the solution in (expected)
√
N group operations. See also [2, Chapter 19].
Now we review the main details of BSGS and Pollard methods. See also
[16, 37, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55] for further details.
3.2 Shanks’ Baby-Step Giant-Step Method
Let P have prime order r. Let m = d√r e. There exists integers i and j,
where 0 6 i, j < m, such that n = i+ jm. So, Q = [i+ jm]P .
Basically, Shanks’ algorithm precomputes a table T (“baby steps”) which
consists of pairs (i, Q − [i]P ) for 0 6 i < m. Notice that T has size ∼ √r.
After sorting all values in T by the second component (i.e. Q − [i]P ), we
compute the “giant steps”, which consist of pairs (j, [jm]P ) for 0 6 j < m,
and check if [jm]P is equal to any of the second components of T . When
a match is found, we have Q − [i]P = [jm]P , so we get the corresponding
value i and the discrete log is solved, since n = i+ jm.
Now we analyse the running time of Shanks’ algorithm. We may assume
that logarithmic factors are negligible; the construction of T (baby steps)
takesO(
√
r) group operations; sorting elements in T by its second coordinate
can be done efficiently in O(
√
r(lg r)) bit operations (see, for example, [17]
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for sorting algorithms); the giant steps compute O(
√
r) group operations
and finally, searching [jm]P in T can be done in logarithmic time, since T
is sorted by its second component (see also [17] for searching algorithms).
Therefore, the running time is O˜(
√
r). Note that we still have an ex-
ponential running time, but now the exponent is about one half of the ex-
haustive search case, i.e. O(
√
r) = O(2k/2). However, in this method the
memory required to store T is O(
√
r(lg r)) bits, which becomes prohibitive
due to memory restrictions. This method is known as a time/memory trade-
off algorithm.
3.3 Pollard-rho Method
We have seen that the BSGS method has running time bounded by O˜(
√
r)
and it needs to store O˜(
√
r) elements, which quickly restricts its use. How-
ever, a natural question arises: “Is it possible to keep the square root run-
ning time but with a much smaller storage requirement ?”. The answer
to this question is “yes, it is!”. We accomplish this using Pollard’s algo-
rithms [41, 42], but at the cost of an expected square root running time
instead of an absolute bound.
3.3.1 The Birthday Paradox
Before discussing the Pollard-rho method, we revise a concept which will be
useful in the analysis of Pollard-rho and Pollard-kangaroo algorithms. The
reason for the name “Birthday Paradox” comes from the surprisingly large
probability of two people sharing the same birthday in a room with only 23
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people. At the end of this section we calculate this probability.
Consider the following example: let us say we have m balls in a box,
each one with a different colour. We pick up one ball at a time, write down
its colour and replace the ball in the box. Then we continue picking up balls
until we get a match, i.e., a colour that was already written down.
We now prove the probability of obtaining at least one repeated colour
and the expected number of balls that have to be taken out of the box before
a repetition, following [58]:
Lemma 3.3.1. In a box of m balls, each of them of a different colour, the
probability, after k balls have been taken out of the box with replacement,
that we have obtained at least one matching colour (or coincidence) is
Pr ≈ 1− e−k2/2m.
Proof. We first determine the probability of choosing k balls which all have
different colours. We havem possible colours for the first ball, m−1 possible
colours for the second ball and so on. For the kth ball we have (m− k + 1)
possible colours. We define:
m(k) = m · (m− 1) · (m− 2) · · · (m− k + 1).
Therefore, the probability, after k balls have been taken out of the box, that
a repeated colour will not occur is
Pr =
m(k)
mk
= (mm)(
m−1
m )(
m−2
m ) . . . (
m−(k−1)
m ) = (1− 1m)(1− 2m) . . . (1− k−1m ).
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which we can rewrite as
Pr =
k−1∏
i=1
(1− i
m
) (3.1)
By definition, the Taylor series expansion of the exponential function e−x is
e−x = 1− x+ x
2
2!
− x
3
3!
+ . . .
which can be approximated to
e−x ≈ 1− x
when x is small.
Assuming m large, 1/m in Equation (3.1) is small, so, Equation (3.1)
becomes:
Pr ≈
k−1∏
i=1
e−i/m = e−
∑k−1
i=1
i
m = e−
k(k−1)
2m .
And finally, we approximate to:
Pr ≈ e−k2/2m
Therefore, the probability that a collision will occur in the first k steps
is the complement of Pr:
Pr ≈ 1− e−k2/2m
And now we state a Theorem:
Theorem 3.3.2. As m becomes larger the expected number of balls we have
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to take out of the box before we obtain the first collision is asymptotic to
√
pim
2
.
Proof. Let X be the random variable for the number of elements of a set of
sizem that must be selected at random with replacement before any element
is selected twice. Then, the expectation of X is
E(X) =
∞∑
k=1
k.Pr(X = k) =
∞∑
k=1
k.
(
Pr(X > k − 1)−Pr(X > k)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
.
Expanding (∗), we have:
1 · (Pr(X > 0)−Pr(X > 1)) + 2 · (Pr(X > 1)−Pr(X > 2)) + . . .
which is equal to
Pr(X > 0) +Pr(X > 1) +Pr(X > 2) + . . .
and therefore:
E(X) =
∞∑
k=0
Pr(X > k).
From Lemma 3.3.1:
Pr(X 6 k) = (1−1/m)(1−2/m)(1−3/m) . . . (1−(k−1)/m) ≈ 1−e−k2/2m.
Hence
E(X) ≈
∞∑
k=0
e−k
2/2m ≈
∫ ∞
0
e−k
2/2mdk =
√
pim/2.
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According to [58], since e−k2/2m is a monotonically decreasing function
and its maximum value is 1, the error in approximating the sum with the
integral is at most 1, which completes the proof.
Now, back to the room with 23 people, the probability of at least two
people having the same birthday is 1 − 365(23)
36523
≈ 1 − e−(23)2/2(365), which
exceeds 1/2.
3.3.2 The Idea of Pollard-rho
Now we outline the Pollard-rho method to find discrete logs. We recall that
our problem is: given P,Q ∈ E(Fq), find n ∈ Z/rZ such that Q = [n]P .
Roughly speaking, the basic idea of Pollard is to define a pseudorandom
walk on the cyclic group. The sequence will look like a “rho” (i.e., it will
have a tail followed by a cycle). The next step is to find a collision and when
the collision is found we have the DLP solved.
Now we give the details of each phase.
3.3.2.1 A Pseudorandom Walk
For Pollard methods, it is essential to define a walk (R0, R1, . . .) according to
a deterministic pseudorandom rule. The trick to simulate a pseudorandom
walk is to choose each step of the walk as a function of the current posi-
tion. We partition the group into s sets and define the walk in a piecewise
way. As a result, we construct a deterministic walk which behaves like a
pseudorandom walk.
49
3. Computing Discrete Logs on Elliptic Curves
There are a number of ways to compute an index i from an elliptic curve
point R. For example, i can be the x-coordinate of R reduced modulo s.
Definition 11. Let R be a point in the walk. Let E(Fq) be a cyclic group
and let s be the number of disjoint subsets in which E(Fq) is divided. Let xR
be the x-coordinate of R. We define a function φ : E(Fq)→ N as follows:
φ(R) = xR mod s .
Let s = 3, Si = {R ∈ E(Fq) : φ(R) = i} for i = 0, 1, 2. We assume that
S0, S1 and S2 have approximately the same size.
Definition 12. Given a point R0 and a0, b0 ∈ Z, such that R0 = [a0]P +
[b0]Q, we define a pseudorandom walk (R0, R1, . . .) as follows:
(Ri+1, ai+1, bi+1) = f(Ri, ai, bi) =

(Ri + P, ai + 1, bi) if φ(Ri) = 0
(Ri +Ri, 2ai, 2bi) if φ(Ri) = 1
(Ri +Q, ai, bi + 1) if φ(Ri) = 2
We stress that all ai+1 and bi+1 are computed modulo r. For each triple
(Ri, ai, bi), we have Ri = [ai]P + [bi]Q. In the serial case, we start our pseu-
dorandom walk with R0 = P , a0 = 1 and b0 = 0.
3.3.2.2 The Rho-shape of the Pseudorandom Walk
Since E(Fq) is finite, eventually we will get a collision, i.e., a pair of indices
1 6 i < j such that Ri = Rj . We assume j is the smallest integer with this
property. So,
Ri+1 = f(Ri) = f(Rj) = Rj+1
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and the sequence becomes cyclic. If we “draw” the pseudorandom sequence,
it is easy to see a tail followed by a cycle. In other words, it will look like
the Greek letter rho, i.e.
ρ .
Now, our goal is to find a collision. According to [49], in such sequences, the
tail and the cycle have expected length
√
pir/8. However, it might happen
that the length of the cycle is much longer, so it will take more time for the
first collision.
If we store every Ri and try to find the first index j such that Rj = Ri for
some i (which means that the “tail” finished and the “cycle” is beginning)
we will need a large storage space (i.e., ≈ √r, since the expected tail length
is
√
pir/8). In other words, this would give no advantage over the BSGS
method.
3.3.2.3 Finding Cycles
Since after the first collision the sequence becomes cyclic, we can use any
cycle finding method, for example, Floyd’s method or Brent’s method [11].
We remark that R. Brent [11] claims that, on average, his cycle finding
algorithm runs around 36% more quickly than Floyd’s and that it speeds up
the Pollard-rho algorithm by around 24%. We also remark that Sedgewick,
Szymanski, and Yao [47] showed that a collision can be found approximately
three times earlier if we store a small number of values from the Ri sequence.
That approach requires that we have memory space greater than O(1), but,
certainly, much smaller than O(
√
r).
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Despite being less efficient, Floyd’s method is simpler to understand,
and since in real life we use parallelised versions where finding cycles is
not necessary, we give the details of Floyd’s method only: given the pair
(xi, x2i) we compute (xi+1, x2i+2) =
(
f(xi), f(f(x2i))
)
and stop when we
find xm = x2m.
It is easy to check that xm = x2m will occur for some m < j. Let xi−1 be
the last point in the tail, before the cycle begins. Hence xi is the first point
in the cycle. If xj−1 is the point in the cycle that immediately precedes xi,
then xj = xi (i.e., the first collision occurred), which means that the cycle
has length l = j − i (see Figure 3.1). Let k = di/le. Any point xm in the
cycle coincides with x(m+kl). Since the cycle is endless, when m = kl we
have xkl = x(2kl). Note that m < (i/l + 1)l = i+ l = j.
Figure 3.1: Here we can see a tail and a cycle in a rho-shape walk.
Using Floyd’s method, the required memory is O(1) group elements,
therefore, this is a low memory method.
3.3.2.4 Solving the ECDLP
In every step of the walk we compute triples (Ri, ai, bi) and (R2i, a2i, b2i)
and check if Ri = R2i. Notice that at each “step” we compute three group
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operations (see lines 23, 24, 25 in Algorithm 1). When a collision is found,
we have [ai]P + [bi]Q = [a2i]P + [b2i]Q and we can compute the discrete log
(as long as (b2i − bi) 6≡ 0 mod r) as follows:
n = (ai − a2i)(b2i − bi)−1 mod r (3.2)
Since r is large, we can assume that the probability that b2i ≡ bi mod r is
small enough to be ignored.
Note that in the Pollard-rho method, the probability of success is well
defined (i.e., a collision will occur if the sequence is sufficiently large), but
the running time is expected, rather than absolutely bounded.
3.3.3 Analysis
In this section we summarise the Pollard-rho method more formally, pre-
senting the algorithm and the running time analysis.
3.3.3.1 Pollard-rho Algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents the Pollard-rho method described above. Note that we
needed to assume that f behaves like a truly random function for the com-
puting implementation. In the analysis, however, we define f as a random
function from 〈P 〉 ×Z/rZ×Z/rZ to itself.
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Algorithm 1 Pollard-rho discrete log
Input: group E(Fq); points P,Q ∈ E(Fq); integers a0, b0; point R0 =
[a0]P + [b0]Q
Output: integer n, such that Q = [n]P
1: function φ(R)
2: φ = xR mod 3
3: Return φ
4: end function
5:
6: function f(R, a, b)
7: if φ(R) = 0 then
8: f ← (R+ P, a+ 1, b)
9: else
10: if φ(R) = 1 then
11: f ← ([2]R, 2a, 2b)
12: else
13: f ← (R+Q, a, b+ 1)
14: end if
15: end if
16: Return f
17: end function
18:
19: main
20: (R, a, b)← f(P, 1, 0)
21: (R′, a′, b′)← f(R, a, b)
22: while R 6= R′ do
23: (R, a, b)← f(R, a, b)
24: (R′, a′, b′)← f(R′, a′, b′)
25: (R′, a′, b′)← f(R′, a′, b′)
26: end while
27: if (b′ − b) ≡ 0 (mod r) then
28: Output “failure”
29: else
30: Output n = (a− a′)(b′ − b)−1 (mod r)
31: end if
32: end main
3.3.3.2 Running time
Notice that Algorithm 1 will either output “failure” or “n” (the solution for
the DLP) after a while-loop. We use the Birthday Paradox to conclude that
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the expected running time of the Pollard-rho algorithm is O˜(
√
r).
Theorem 3.3.3. Suppose the pseudorandom walk in Algorithm 1 is replaced
by a truly random function. The expected number of group operations in
Algorithm 1 using Floyd’s cycle finding method is at most 3
√
pir/2.
Proof. From the Birthday Paradox (Theorem 3.3.2), the expected length of
the rho is
√
pir/2. Using Floyd’s cycle finding method, in each “step” we
compute 3 group operations. The number of steps is at most the length of
the rho. Therefore, the expected number of group operations in Pollard-rho
algorithm using Floyd’s cycle finding method is at most 3
√
pir/2.
3.4 Pollard-kangaroo Method
This method is a variant of the previous one when we know in advance that
n lies in a short interval1. In other words, we have n ∈ [a, b] for known a, b
and w = b − a (i.e., w is the length of the interval). Our problem remains
the same: let E(Fq) be a cyclic group of order r, given P,Q ∈ E(Fq), find
n ∈ [a, b] such that Q = [n]P .
3.4.1 The Idea of Pollard-kangaroo
Here follows the basic idea, according to Pollard [41]: “we want to catch
a [wild] kangaroo W which is travelling along a known path in a series
of what appear to be unpredictable bounds; in reality, their lengths are a
function of the state of the ground at the point of take-off. We suppose
1See Section 3.5 for an analysis of Pollard-kangaroo when w = r.
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that this function takes values at random from an integer set S, of mean α
and largest member L. We require the services of a second tame kangaroo
T of identical jumping behaviour. We cause T to start at some point T0
and take N bounds, arriving at TN . A hole dug at this point, and suitably
camouflaged, will catch the wild kangaroo W if he lands on any points
T0, T1, . . . , TN”.
Now, unlike Pollard-rho, it is possible that the wild kangaroo never
touches any of the points followed by the tame kangaroo. In this case,
W will not fall in the trap and will not be caught. Hence, in the Pollard-
kangaroo method, the running time is well defined, but the probability of
collision is expected, rather than absolutely bounded.
The Pollard-kangaroo method is also known as the “Pollard-lambda
method” (actually, its author prefers the former [42], because the parallel
version of Pollard-rho has a lambda-shape, rather than a rho-shape). Now
unlike Pollard-rho, we use two pseudorandom walks instead of one. If there
is a collision, the pseudorandom sequences will look like the Greek letter
lambda, i.e.
λ .
Now we outline the kangaroo method following [49]. Basically, we define
a pseudorandom walk, then we discuss how to compute the DLP if the wild
kangaroo lands in any of the footprints of the tame kangaroo.
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3.4.1.1 The Pseudorandom Walks
Let E(Fq) be a cyclic group of order r. Let s be the number of partitions of
the group and let S = {s0, s1, . . . , ss−1} be a set of non-decreasing integers.
Let α be the mean of the elements of the set S, let β be a parameter to be
defined later and let integers N = αβ and M be respectively the number of
steps taken by the tame and the wild kangaroos. We can view each element
of the set S as the length of a “jump”. We define a pseudorandom walk
using a similar principle as in Section 3.3.2.1. We recall that φ(R) maps the
x-coordinate of a point R to an integer modulo s.
Tame kangaroo: T starts at some known point T0 = [c0]P , where c0 is to
be defined later. He jumps according to the following pseudorandom
walk:
Ti+1 = Ti + [sφ(Ti)]P for i = 0, . . . , N ,
which is efficiently calculated if the values [si]P are precomputed. We
also set ci+1 = ci+sφ(Ti), so that Ti = [ci]P . Notice that ci− c0 is the
distance travelled. We then store TN . Notice that at this point, we
know the discrete logarithm of TN with respect to P , i.e., TN = [cN ]P .
Wild kangaroo: W starts at Q and jumps according to the following pseu-
dorandom walk:
Wi+1 =Wi + [sφ(Wi)]P for i = 0, . . . ,M .
We also set d0 = 0 and di+1 = di + sφ(Wi), where di is the distance
travelled from Q = [n]P to Wi. Notice that we have Wi = [n+ di]P .
57
3. Computing Discrete Logs on Elliptic Curves
3.4.1.2 Solving the ECDLP
If the wild kangaroo W at some point meets the path followed by the tame
kangaroo T , then W will continue in the path originally followed by T until
he reaches Wm = TN for some m 6M . Hence:
[cN ]P = TN =Wm = [n+ dm]P .
Thus, we have the solution to the DLP, since
n = cN − dm .
If the distance travelled by W (i.e., dm ≈ Mα) exceeds cN − a we can
stop W , because he passed the trap.
In case we do not find a collision we can start another wild kangaroo at
a new point, e.g., Q′ = Q+ [z]P , for a known integer z.
3.4.2 Choice of Parameters
• Set S - It is usual to choose si as powers of two, such that the mean
step size is g
√
w, for some constant g (according to [42], this a good
choice, but he does not claim that it is the best choice).
• s - If si = 2i for 0 6 i < s, the mean α is 2s−1s , so we can choose
s ≈ 12 log2 (w).
• Starting point of tame kangaroo (T0) - N. Smart [49] and many authors
choose [b]P as the starting point, but other choices are possible, for
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instance, [a]P or [(a+ b)/2]P . Taking T0 = [b]P makes c0 = b;
• M and N - We will prove below that a collision is expected after
approximately
√
w steps (remember that w is the length of the interval
in which the discrete logarithm n is known to lie), so we set the number
of steps of the tame kangaroo to be N ≈ d√w e. If we set the starting
point of T as [b]P , clearly we need M > N , so we choose M = γN for
some positive constant γ to be defined later. The precise choice for γ
will be presented in Section 3.4.4.
The number of steps is at most N +M = (1 + γ)d√w e, so the running
time is O˜(
√
w). As we only store the final position of the tame kangaroo
(TN ), the memory required is O(1) group elements so this is also a low
memory method.
Figure 3.2 is a sketch of a successful collision, using parameters discussed
in this subsection.
Figure 3.2: Tame kangaroo T starts at [b]P and takes N jumps, stopping at TN . At
this point, the distance travelled by T is cN (from the origin O). Wild kangaroo starts
at Q and if he meets the path followed by T at some Y , he continues the same path and
finally lands at the trap TN =WM . The distance travelled by W is n+ dM .
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3.4.3 Analysis
Now, like we have done with Pollard-rho, we present a formal analysis of
Pollard-kangaroo.
3.4.3.1 Algorithm
Algorithm 2 presents the Pollard-kangaroo method described above.
3.4.3.2 Probability of Success
Now we compute the probability that the wild kangaroo will be caught (i.e.,
the probability of successfully solving the DLP), according to [58].
Lemma 3.4.1. LetM and N be the number of steps taken respectively by the
wild and the tame kangaroos. Let α be the mean of the pseudorandom steps
in set S and let β be an integer such that N = αβ. Let Pr[λ] be the proba-
bility that the wild kangaroo, after passing [b]P and taking about αβ jumps
from [b]P , will meet the path followed by the tame kangaroo and therefore,
be caught in the trap. Under the assumption that the pseudorandom walk
behaves the same as a random walk, then
Pr[λ] ≈ 1− (1− 1/α)αβ ≈ 1− e−β
Proof. Since the mean of the steps in set S is α, once the wild kangaroo
has passed the starting point of the tame kangaroo, each jump of the wild
kangaroo has a heuristically independent probability of about 1/α of touch-
ing a point already followed by the tame kangaroo. Since the number of
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Algorithm 2 Pollard-kangaroo discrete log
Input: group E(Fq), points P,Q ∈ E(Fq), integers a, b
Output: integer n such that a 6 n 6 b and Q = [n]P .
1: Choose number of partitions s
2: Choose starting point of tame kangaroo T0 = [c0]P
3: Choose steps si /* Usually, si = 2i */
4: Choose walk lengths M,N ∈ N Sj , 0 ≤ j < s.
5: function φ(R)
6: φ = xR mod s
7: Return φ
8: end function
9:
10: Precompute Si = [si]P for 0 ≤ i < s
11: [Tame Kangaroo]
12: T ← T0
13: c← c0
14: for i = 1 to N do
15: Compute j = φ(T )
16: T ← T + Sj
17: c = c+ sj
18: end for
19: [Wild Kangaroo]
20: W ← Q
21: d← 0
22: i← 0
23: repeat
24: Compute j′ = φ(W )
25: W ←W + Sj′
26: d← d+ sj′
27: i← i+ 1
28: until (T =W ) or (i > M)
29: if T =W then
30: Output n = (c− d)
31: else
32: Output “failure”
33: end if
steps taken by T is N = αβ, thenW has approximately (1−1/α)αβ chances
of avoiding the footprints of T . Therefore, the probability of success is
Pr[λ] ≈ 1− (1− 1/α)αβ ≈ 1− e−β
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Notice that for β = 1, 2, 3, 4 the probability of success is respectively
0.63, 0.86, 0.95, 0.98, which means that the size of N defines the probability
of success.
3.4.3.3 Running Time
We also follow [58] to prove the running time of Pollard-kangaroo.
Theorem 3.4.2. Consider β as defined in Lemma 3.4.1. The expected
number of group operations in Pollard-kangaroo algorithm in the average
case is 2
√
βw and in the worst case is 2
√
2βw .
Proof. It is easy to see that the number of group operations in Algorithm 2 is
Set+N+M , where Set represents the construction of set S (i.e., computing
Si = [si]P for 0 6 i < s). Assuming that Set can be precomputed, we can
simplify the running time to be N +M .
We recall that n ∈ [a, b] for known a, b and w = b − a (i.e., w is the
length of the interval). The tame kangaroo T starts at b and jumps N = αβ
steps. Since the mean of set S, which represents each step, is α, T stops at
average distance w + α2β from a.
The wild kangaroo W starts at n (unknown) and after it passes b, W
takes about αβ jumps to reach T . Since the average starting point ofW is at
w/2, the expected number of steps of W in the average case is w/(2α)+αβ.
Therefore, the total running time is approximately
N +M = αβ + w/(2α) + αβ = 2αβ + w/(2α).
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If we choose S such that its mean α is gd√we for some positive constant g
and set N = αβ, we get a total of
(
2gβ
√
w + 1/2g
)√
w =
(
4g2β + 1
2g
)√
w (3.3)
group operations.
Now we want to minimise f(x) = 4x
2β+1
2x . We get f
′(x) = (8xβ).2x−(4x
2β+1).2
4x2
.
Taking f ′(x) = 0⇒ 8x2β − 2 = 0 ∴ x2 = 14β ⇒ g = 12√β .
Replacing the value of g in Equation (3.3), it follows that the number of
group operations in the average case is 2
√
βw.
In the worst case, the wild kangaroo will start in the beginning of the
interval (i.e., [a]P ), so the expected number of steps is w/α + αβ and the
total running time is
N +M = αβ + w/α+ αβ = 2αβ + w/α.
Taking α = gd√we, we get
2βg
√
w + w/g
√
w =
(
2g2β + 1
g
)√
w (3.4)
group operations.
Minimising f(x) = 2x
2β+1
x , we get f
′(x) = (4xβ).x−(2x
2β+1).1
x . Taking
f ′(x) = 0⇒ 2x2β − 1 = 0 ∴ x2 = 12β ⇒ g = 1√2β .
Replacing the value of g in Equation (3.4), it follows that the number of
group operations in the average case is 2
√
2βw.
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3.4.4 Bounding the Running Time
Notice that the result of Theorem 3.4.2 gives a running time, which succeeds
with probability ≈ 1− e−β, as defined above. We remark that van Oorschot
and Wiener [58] instead of giving a running time which outputs the solu-
tion with some probability, calculated the average running time in that the
algorithm runs as many times as needed until a collision is found. At each
new round of the algorithm, one uses another wild kangaroo, starting from
Q+ [z]P , for a known integer z. We sketch their approach:
1. Tame kangaroo takes N = αβ steps;
2. From Lemma 3.4.1, the expected number of trials for a success to
occur is 1/(1 − e−β). So, the wild kangaroo is expected to succeed
once and to fail 1/(1 − e−β) − 1 times, which means that the total
number of steps of all wild kangaroos necessary for a collision occur is
(w/α+ αβ)(1/(1− e−β)− 1) + w/(2α) + αβ.
So, the total running time is the number of steps of the tame kangaroo
plus the total number of steps of all wild kangaroos
αβ︸︷︷︸
N
+(αβ + w/α)/(1− e−β)− w/(2α),
which is minimized when α =
√
w(1 + e−β)/(2β(2− e−β)). According
to [58], using numerical techniques, we get β = 1.39 and α = 0.51
√
w,
and therefore, N = αβ ≈ 0.7089√w, M ≈ 2.57√w = γN , γ ≈ 3.62 and the
total running time is 3.28
√
w group operations.
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Notice that if we use the value of β above (β = 1.39) in the result of
Lemma 3.4.1, the probability of success is around 0.75.
3.5 Pollard-rho vs. Pollard-kangaroo
By studying the Pollard-rho and the Pollard-kangaroo methods, we see that
there is a conceptual difference in terms of running time and probability
of success. In the Pollard-rho method, the algorithm will always output a
solution (unless (b′−b) ≡ 0 mod r, which occurs with small probability if r is
large) and we have an expected number of steps, and therefore, an expected
running time. On the other hand, in the Pollard-kangaroo method, we have
a fixed running time (i.e., a fixed number of steps) and the algorithm can
either output the solution “n” or “failure” with some probability.
Usually, Pollard-kangaroo is more appropriate when we know in advance
that the discrete log lies in some interval, [a, b] (i.e., the solution n is such
that a 6 n 6 b). However it is also possible to use Pollard-kangaroo when
w = r. Pollard [42] states that if w = r, although the running time is
asymptotically the same as in Pollard-rho method, the constants will be
greater in the kangaroo method, thus the “rho” method is preferred. We
proved that if Floyd’s cycle finding method is used, the expected running
time of Pollard-rho in a serial computer is around 3
√
pir/2 ≈ 3.76d√w e.
Using the best known cycle finding algorithm for Pollard-rho (Brent’s), we
get an improvement of around 24% in the running time, thus ≈ 2.86d√w e,
which is better than the expected running time of Pollard-kangaroo on a
serial computer, 3.28d√w e (and even better if we have enough memory
space to use the idea of Sedgewick, Szymanski, and Yao [47]).
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In practice, many processors are used in parallel to find a discrete log
(see next section). In this case, van Oorschot and Wiener [58] showed that
when w = r and parallel collision search is used, Pollard-rho is around 1.60
times faster than Pollard-kangaroo.
3.6 Parallelised Pollard Methods
In real life, we use many processors in parallel to try to solve a discrete
logarithm problem. The naive way to parallelise Pollard-kangaroo methods
is to divide the interval in which the discrete log lies (i.e., w) into P equal
parts and use each of the P processors to search one part. The running time
is O((w/P)1/2).
However, both Pollard-rho and kangaroo methods can be parallelised
achieving linear speedup. According to van Oorschot and Wiener [58] the
running times are respectively O(r1/2/P) and O(w1/2/P) with P processors.
The idea is to use each processor starting a deterministic random walk
from a different starting point, but using the same function to compute
the next point in the walk. When a collision is found by two processors
(or even by the same processor) we have the discrete log solved. As usual,
the challenge is to detect collisions. The solution is to store only points
which satisfy some condition (otherwise, if all points were stored, the storage
requirements would be of the order of O(
√
w) or O(
√
r)). Such points are
called distinguished points. We now sketch this approach, called “Parallel
Collision Search”. The proofs can be found in [58].
We now define a distinguished point, according to [58]:
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Definition 13. “A distinguished point is one that has some easily checked
property such as having a fixed number of leading zero bits. During the
pseudorandom walk, points that satisfy the distinguishing property are stored.
Repetition can be detected when a distinguished point is encountered a second
time. The distinguishing property is selected so that enough distinguished
points are encountered to limit the number of steps past the beginning of the
repetition, but not so many that they cannot be stored”.
We stress that the distinguished points found by the processors are stored
by a server who coordinates the solution of the problem.
It is possible that a random walk falls into a loop such that no dis-
tinguished point is reached. This problem can be overcome by setting a
maximum walk length and abandoning any walk which has length greater
than the maximum walk length. Let θ be the proportion of points which sat-
isfy the distinguishing property. Let Top = c/θ for some positive constant c
be the maximum walk length. We stress that, in the running time analysis,
we can consider the average number of steps needed to reach a distinguished
point as 1/θ and not c/θ, since most of the time, the distinguished point
will be reached in 1/θ steps, so the very few cases when it takes at most c/θ
steps to reach (or not) a distinguished point do not have much effect in the
total running time.
Now we analyse the average running time, according to [58]. LetP be the
number of processors used in the parallel search. Let Top be the maximum
walk length to find a distinguished point and let Tρ and Tλ be respectively
the Pollard-rho and Pollard-kangaroo running time of each individual pro-
cessor using parallel collision search. When processors hit a distinguished
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point, they send information to the server. In the rho method, after hit-
ting a distinguished point, the processor starts a new walk from a random
point. In the kangaroo method, the processor continues in the same walk.
Note that in the kangaroo method a processor can reach many distinguished
points during its walk. At some time there is a collision, in the sense that
two processors visit the same point. The server does not detect this un-
til it receives the same distinguished point twice. Hence, each processor is
expected to take 1/θ further steps after the collision has occurred.
First we analyse the Pollard-rho case. From the Birthday Paradox, a
collision is expected after
√
pir/2 steps have been made in total. Hence
Tρ =
√
pir/2/P+ 1/θ.
We remark that in the parallel version of Pollard-rho there is no need to
use cycle finding methods.
In the Pollard-kangaroo case, van Oorschot and Wiener [58] use the mean
step size in their analysis. Let α be the mean step size. We launch P/2
tame kangaroos around the middle of the interval and P/2 wild kangaroos
around Q at the same time and store the distinguished points that each
kangaroo reaches. Initially, the groups of tame and the wild kangaroos are
separated by some distance between 0 and w/2. The average separation
is w/4 and each trailing kangaroo takes approximately T1 = w/(4α) steps
to cover this distance. After that, each trailing kangaroo covers a region
where about (P/2)/α points have been visited by leading kangaroos. The
probability that one of the P/2 trailing kangaroos hits one of the footprints
of a leading kangaroo at each step is about (P/2)2/α. Hence the expected
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number of steps for each kangaroo before a collision occurs is T2 = 4α/P2.
The minimum of T1 + T2 is 2
√
w/P when α = (P/4)
√
w. Now we add
the further 1/θ steps required to reach the next distinguished point after a
collision, and the total running time for each processor is:
Tλ = 2
√
w/P+ 1/θ
group operations.
When a processor reaches a distinguished point already stored by the
server, say, point D1, the server checks if D1 was reached by kangaroos of
the same type (i.e., Tame-Tame or Wild-Wild). If “yes”, the processor is told
to move the trailing kangaroo some random distance forward, so as not to
follow the very same path of the leading kangaroo. If “not”, a good collision
was found and the server solves the discrete log. J. Pollard [42] presented a
different version for the parallel algorithm of [58], in that collisions between
kangaroos of the same type are not possible. We remark that [56] shows that
the expected number of Tame-Tame or Wild-Wild collisions in this setting
is at most 2, so they are not a serious problem.
We remark that van Oorschot and Wiener [58] compared their parallel
version of Pollard-rho and Pollard-kangaroo and concluded that when w = r
the kangaroo method is approximately 1.60 times slower.
Note that [58] does not give an analysis for the success probability of
the Parallel Pollard-kangaroo algorithm. This is because the processors
always keep running even if they reach a distinguished point. They are only
supposed to stop when the server tells them to stop. Hence, whenever the
algorithm terminates the result is correct.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we revised the elliptic curve discrete log problem and some
methods to solve it.
We first presented a time/memory tradeoff algorithm, baby-step giant-
step, which solves the discrete log in O˜(
√
r) group operations, but needs
the same amount in memory space. For large r, the memory consumption
shortly becomes prohibitive.
Then, we presented and analysed low-memory algorithms with a heuris-
tic rather than an absolute running time of O˜(
√
r). In other words, Pollard-
rho and Pollard-kangaroo methods are expected to solve the DLP with cer-
tain probabilities of success.
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In this chapter, we briefly review some properties of Koblitz elliptic
curves and Frobenius Expansions and how we can perform point multi-
plication efficiently using Frobenius expansions. We will see also that the
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arithmetic of Frobenius expansions has a non-standard behaviour when we
require that all coefficients be only in {−1, 0, 1}. In addition, we experimen-
tally estimate the number of equivalence classes of Frobenius expansions.
We explore the property that a τ -adic can be mapped to x + yτ for
integers x, y of certain size and we give a proof for the bounds of x and y.
We plot the the distribution of τ -adics and τ -NAFs. From these pictures,
we conjecture that we can shorten the bounds for x and y.
We finish the chapter by studying an algebraic computation required for
our τ -adic version of GPS (Girault-Poupard-Stern) identification protocol.
In order to avoid a statistical attack in the τ -GPS protocol, we propose a
randomisation step in the algorithm used to add and multiply τ -adics. We
also state two heuristics that will be used in the proof of security of τ -GPS.
4.1 Koblitz Curves
We open this chapter defining Koblitz curves as follows. For further details
see [33, 34, 50, 51]:
Definition 14. A Koblitz curve is an elliptic curve E defined over a small
finite field Fq such that the group E(Fqm) is suitable for cryptography for
some m > 1.
Definition 15. Let f(x) ∈ Zq[x] be an irreducible polynomial of degree m,
and consider the finite field Fqm = Zq[x]/(f(x)). We say that f(x) is a
normal polynomial if the set {x, xq, xq2 , . . . , xqm−1} forms a basis for Fqm
over Zq. Such a basis is called normal basis.
The most popular choice for Koblitz curves is curves over F2 and so we
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give the details in this case only.
Definition 16. Let a ∈ {0, 1}. Let E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1, with
a ∈ {0, 1} be an elliptic curve defined over F2. Denote by O the point at
infinity. Let E(F2m) be the group of F2m-rational points on E. We assume
that m is a prime and that #E(F2m) has a large prime factor. In such
curves, if P = (x, y) ∈ Ea(F2m), then Q = (x2, y2) also belongs to the same
curve. The 2-power Frobenius map is defined as
τ : E(F2m) → E(F2m)
(x, y) 7→ (x2, y2)
O 7→ O.
Let F¯2 be the algebraic closure of F2, i.e., F¯2 is a field which contains
the fields F2n for any n. Let t = (−1)1−a. Then τ satisfies the quadratic
characteristic polynomial τ2(P )− tτ(P )+[2]P = O for all points P ∈ E(F¯2)
(see [33]). In other words,
[2]P = tτ(P )− τ(τ(P )). (4.1)
Let xP and yP be the m-bit long coordinates of P . Notice that the τ
operation maps each coordinate of P to its square. If F2m is represented by
a normal basis, squaring (i.e., the operation τ(P )) can be implemented by
shifting each bit of xP and yP one bit to the left. This shifting is circular,
which means that the most significant bit shifted one-bit to the left becomes
the least significant bit and so on. For example, if 1001 and 1101 respectively
represents xP and yP in binary, when multiplying P by powers of τ we
get: τ(P ) = (0011, 1011); τ2(P ) = (0110, 0111); τ3(P ) = (1100, 1110);
τ4(P ) = (1001, 1101).
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Notice that when we multiply by τm, each m-bit of xP and yP rotates
m bits to the left, returning to their original state, which means that:
τm(P ) = P for all P ∈ E(F2m). (4.2)
4.2 Frobenius Expansions
Definition 17. Let C be the coefficient set for the τ -adic expansions (we
always assume 0 ∈ C). For L ∈ N we define the set of Frobenius expansions
of length L to be
TL =
{
x0 + x1τ + x2τ2 + · · ·+ xL−1τL−1 | xj ∈ C
}
. (4.3)
For x ∈ TL let i 6 L− 1 be the largest index such that xi 6= 0. We say that
x has degree i, denoted deg(x) = i. The number of nonzero coefficients xj
is called the weight.
We emphasize that we treat elements of TL as polynomials and not as en-
domorphisms. We interchangeably use the terminology Frobenius expansion
and τ -adic expansion for such polynomials.
We stress that in this chapter we assume C to be {−1, 0, 1}. This is the
most popular choice, since one can benefit from the fact that the cost of
addition and subtraction of points on elliptic curve are roughly the same.
As a result, one can efficiently perform scalar multiplication using a “τ -and-
(add or subtract)” algorithm (see Section 4.2.3).
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4.2.1 τ-adic NAF Expansions
The concept of τ -NAF was introduced by J. Solinas in [50].
Definition 18. An element
L−1∑
i=0
xiτ
i is called a τ -adic NAF (where NAF
stands for Non-Adjacent Form) if
xixi+1 = 0 for all i.
We will call a τ -adic NAF as τ -NAF for short.
In other words, there are no consecutive terms which are both nonzero.
An important fact about τ -NAF expansions is that, unlike standard τ -
adics, we have a unique τ -NAF representation (of degree less than m) for
an integer [51]. See Section 4.2.2 for a better understanding of uniqueness.
4.2.1.1 Number of τ-NAF of Degree less than L
It will be useful later in this thesis to know the number of τ -NAF of length
less than L. So we use the following theorem (first stated by [50, 51]):
Theorem 4.2.1. Let L ∈ Z be the length of a τ -NAF expansions. Let NL
be the number of possible τ -NAF with degree less than L. The number of
possible τ -adic NAF expansions of degree less than L is
NL =
4
3
2L − 1
3
(−1)L = 4
3
2L +O(1) (4.4)
Proof. For any τ -NAF expansion with degree less than L, either the coeffi-
cient of τL−1 is equal to zero (in which case it is a τ -NAF of length L− 1)
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or the coefficient of τL−1 is nonzero (in which case the coefficient of τL−2 is
zero and the remaining polynomial is a τ -NAF of length L− 2). Hence
NL = NL−1 + 2NL−2.
Solving the recurrence relation (see for example [13]) givesNL = c1αL1+c2α
L
2
for some constants c1, c2 ∈ Q where αi are the roots of x2 − x− 2 = 0, i.e.,
α1 = 2 and α2 = −1. Taking N0 = 1 and N1 = 3 leads to c1 = 4/3 and
c2 = −1/3 and the proof is complete.
4.2.2 Equivalence Classes of τ-adic Expansions
Definition 19. We call two Frobenius expansions a, b equivalent if [a]P =
[b]P for all P ∈ E(F¯2) and write a ≡ b.
It is easy to note that Frobenius expansions are not unique. Let T1
be a random Frobenius expansion. Let Z be the characteristic polynomial
2− tτ + τ2 = 0 (see Section 4.1). If we compute T1 + Z we get a Frobenius
expansion T2 ≡ T1. For example, 1 ≡ −1 + tτ − τ2.
We now give a different definition of equivalence.
Definition 20. Two Frobenius expansions a′ and b′, such that a′ ≡ b′
(mod τm − 1), are equivalent with respect to a point P , which we call
P -equivalent for short, if [a′]P = [b′]P for any point P defined over F2m.
Note that this definition depends on the point P . From Equation (4.2),
it follows that O = (τm − 1)P . Then, for some k we can write:
[a′]P = [b′]P + k(τm − 1)P = [b′]P + [k]O = [b′]P.
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It is easy to check that all equivalent τ -adics are also P -equivalent, since
the equivalence notion holds for all P ∈ E(F¯2). On the other hand, it is not
true that all P -equivalent τ -adics are also equivalent. For instance, let P be
any point defined over F2m . Clearly, τm is P -equivalent to 1 but τm 6≡ 1.
The drawback of using a random τ -adic lies in the fact that τ -adic ex-
pansions are not unique, so when one chooses a random τ -adic, there are
several equivalent τ -adic expansions.
There are typically many different τ -adic expansions of degree less than
some bound in any given equivalence class. An heuristic formula given
in [21] for the average number of τ -adic representations of length at most
L + 2 of a τ -NAF of length L is the integer closest to 0.9786
(
3
2
)L
. If all
equivalence classes had this many elements then there would be at least
3L/(0.9786(3/2)L−2) ≈ (2.3) · 2L different equivalence classes.
Experimentally, we used MAGMA [10] to compute all τ -adics of length
6 L over E(F2m). For each τ -adic, it was easy to check if it is a τ -NAF.
Furthermore, we computed Q = [n(τ)]P for some point P and stored the
points Q. Hence, after generating all τ -adics (i.e., 3L) we have not only the
total number of τ -NAFs of length 6 L (i.e., ≈ 432L, see Section 4.2.1) but
also the number of P -equivalence classes that can be represented as a τ -adic
of maximum length L. Another way to count the number of P -equivalence
classes would be to convert each τ -adic expansion to an integer, using the
eigenvalue of Frobenius (see Section 4.2.7) and store the integer. Our ex-
periments (see Table 4.1) suggest that the number of P -equivalence classes
of τ -adic expansions of length L is bounded by c(2L), for some positive
constant c, or simply O˜(2L).
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The graphic on fig. 4.1 is based on Table 4.1 and shows the logarithm in
base 2 of number of τ -adics, number of τ -NAF and number of P -equivalence
classes. One can check that the number of τ -NAF and the number of P -
equivalence classes are represented by parallel lines.
Table 4.1: Number of τ -adics, τ -NAFs and P -equivalence classes
L # of τ -adics
(3L)
# of τ -NAF
(≈ 4
3
2L)
# of distinct
P -equivalence
classes
3 27 11 23
4 81 21 53
5 243 43 119
6 729 85 257
7 2187 171 534
8 6561 341 1133
9 19683 683 2335
10 59049 1365 4777
11 177147 2731 9711
12 531441 5461 19653
13 1594323 10923 39655
14 4782969 21845 79809
15 14348907 43691 160359
We now give a short motivation which justifies our interest for Frobenius
expansions.
4.2.3 Efficient Point Multiplication Using Frobenius Expan-
sions
In many applications of elliptic curve cryptography we need to compute
point multiplication. Let P be a point of order r of an elliptic curve defined
over a cyclic group G. The natural way to compute the point multiplication
[n]P is to use the “double-and-add” algorithm (see Algorithm 3 and also
[54, pg 265–266] for details).
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Figure 4.1: This graphic is based on the second, third and fourth columns of Table 4.1
and shows the logarithm in base 2 of each value.
If we work over a Koblitz curve, we have G = F2m and the order r of
P (and therefore, n as well) has size approximately 2m. Basically, we start
with a point Q being the point at infinity, write n in binary and move along
each bit, from the left to the right (i.e., the first bit to be considered is the
most significant bit of n). For each bit of n, we double Q, and if the bit
is “1”, we add P . We remark that a variant called “double-and-(add or
subtract)” algorithm can also be used when n is written in a binary signed
representation (i.e., n = bm, bm−1, . . . , b1, b0, for bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}). In that
case, if the bit is “−1” we subtract P instead of adding it.
The total cost of [n]P is m doublings plus w additions (or additions
and subtractions if double-and-(add or subtract) is used), where w is the
number of nonzero bits of n. We can simplify that, assuming that the cost
of doublings and additions is roughly the same. So the total cost of [n]P is
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Algorithm 3 Double-and-Add Algorithm
Input: point P,Q ∈ G; integer n
Output: point Q = [n]P
1: Compute the binary representation of n (n = bm, bm−1, . . . , b1, b0)
2: Q← O
3: for i = m downto 0 do
4: Q← 2Q
5: if bi = 1 then
6: Q← Q+ P
7: end if
8: end for
9: Output Q
m+ w group operations.
However, when working over Koblitz curves, we can speed-up even more
point multiplication using a trick proposed by N. Koblitz [33], in that we
replace the integer n by its corresponding Frobenius expansion n(τ) (see
also [36, 38, 50]):
n(τ) =
L−1∑
j=0
njτ
j
where the integers nj lie in {−1, 0, 1}.
Since E(F2m)[r] is cyclic it follows that τ(P ) = [λ]P for some λ ∈ Z/rZ.
If n =
∑L−1
j=0 njλ
j (mod r) then Q = [n]P can be efficiently computed as
Q = [n(τ)]P =
L−1∑
j=0
[nj ]τ j(P ).
From Equation (4.1) we see that doubling a point (or any scalar mul-
tiplication by powers of 2) can be performed using the 2-power Frobenius
map on E, denoted by τ . Basically, to compute [n]P , instead of represent-
ing n in binary and computing [n]P using a “double-and-(add or subtract)”
80
4. Koblitz Curves and Frobenius Expansions
algorithm, we represent n as a τ -adic expansion, and compute the scalar
point multiplication using a “τ -and-(add or subtract)” algorithm, thereafter
called only “τ -and-add” for simplicity. In other words, the “τ -and-add” al-
gorithm, is based on the well known “double-and-add” algorithm, but the τ
map (which has almost negligible cost if the field is represented in normal
basis) replaces doublings. Hence, the total cost of [n]P using the τ -and-
add algorithm is w′ group operations, where w′ is the number of nonzero
coefficients in the τ -adic representation of n.
Since the cost of [n(τ)]P roughly represents the cost of additions, the
smaller the number of nonzero coefficients in n(τ) is, the more efficient
[n(τ)]P will be performed. R. Avanzi, C. Heuberger and H. Prodinger [4]
showed that the number of nonzero coefficients in τ -NAF expansions is min-
imal among all the representations with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
J. Solinas [50, 51] gave an algorithm in the case of anomalous binary
curves to transform an integer n into a τ -NAF (this algorithm was gener-
alised in [31, 48]). The output of the algorithm proposed by Solinas is about
twice as long as the ordinary NAF of n, but we can use the idea of Meier
and Staffelbach [36] to reduce the τ -NAF expansion modulo (τm − 1) or
modulo (τm−1)/(τ−1), which is called reduced τ -NAF by Solinas (see also
Section 4.2.7). In the reduced τ -NAF, the number of nonzero coefficients
(i.e., w′) is L/3, where L is the length of the (reduced) τ -NAF of n (see [4]).
If we use the NAF binary representation of n in the double-and-add
algorithm, the number of nonzero bits (i.e., w) is approximately m/3 (see,
for example, [54, pg 267]).
As a result, the total cost of [n]P using the (binary) NAF representation
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of n in the double-and-add algorithm is m+m/3 = 4m/3 and when L ≈ m,
the total cost of [n]P using the reduced τ -NAF representation of n in the
τ -and-add algorithm is m/3 group operations (under the assumption that
τ operation is cost-free), which means that in practice, the computation
of [n(τ)]P can be 4 times faster than the standard double-and-add scalar
multiplication.
W. Meier and O. Staffelbach [36] propose an algorithm for anomalous
curves E defined over F2 and regarded as curves over the extension field F2m
which computes multiples of arbitrary points on E and takes m/2 group
operations. If we use the reduced τ -NAF representation of n in the τ -and-
add algorithm we get the result of [n]P 50% faster.
It is also possible to use point halving to perform fast scalar multiplica-
tions on generic elliptic curves over binary fields. However, although point
halving is faster than doubling, it is more expensive than applying τ map.
R. Avanzi, M. Ciet, and F. Sica [1] combined Frobenius operations with one
point halving to compute scalar multiplications on Koblitz curves using on
average 14% less group additions than with the usual τ -and-add method
without increasing memory usage. Later, Avanzi et al. [4] improved that
result, obtaining a scalar multiplication which requires on average 25% less
group operations than the Frobenius method (i.e., using only τ -and-add).
See also [3, 5, 6] for recent developments in the arithmetic of Koblitz
curves, specially regarding sublinear complexity scalar multiplication meth-
ods with essentially no precomputation.
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4.2.4 Writing a general τ-adic as x+ yτ for x, y ∈ Z
Since τ satisfies a quadratic characteristic polynomial it follows that every
Frobenius expansion of length L is equivalent to one of the form x+ yτ for
some uniquely determined x, y ∈ Z. For our applications it is necessary to
bound the sizes of x and y. In the following sections, we compute bounds
for x and y using different techniques. The reader will notice that we start
with a crude estimation and then we go towards sharper bounds.
4.2.4.1 a = 3.7 and b = 2.6
First we need the following Lemma, originally stated by Solinas [51]:
Lemma 4.2.2 Given the recurrence:
Ui+1 = tUi − 2Ui−1 where U0 = 0, U1 = 1 , (4.5)
we have:
τ i ≡ Uiτ − 2Ui−1 for all i > 0 (4.6)
Proof. We prove by induction in i.
1. Base:
i = 1. We have τ1 = U1τ − 2U0.
2. Inductive step:
We suppose that Equation (4.6) is true for i = n− 1 (that is: τn−1 =
Un−1τ − 2Un−2) and prove that the result holds for i = n (that is:
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τn = Unτ − 2Un−1).
τn−1 = Un−1τ − 2Un−2 induction hypothesis
τn = Un−1τ2 − 2Un−2τ multiplying induction hypothesis by τ
= (tτ − 2)Un−1 − 2Un−2τ since τ2 ≡ tτ − 2
= (tUn−1 − 2Un−2)τ − 2Un−1 grouping terms
= Unτ − 2Un−1 from Equation (4.5)
Let n ∈ N. Then there exist bounds a, b ∈ N such that for all α(τ) =∑n
i=0 αiτ
i, αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} it is always possible to write:
α(τ) ≡ x+ yτ ,
for some x, y ∈ Z such that |x| < a and |y| < b. We now give values for a
and b as functions of n.
Solving the recurrence relation (see [13]) in Equation (4.5), we get:
Uk = 1√−7
(
t+
√−7
2
)k − 1√−7 ( t−√−72 )k ,
for an integer k > 0.
Using the statement that the modulus of a complex number x + yi is√
x2 + y2, we have:
|Uk| 6 1√
02+
√
7
2
√
( t2)
2 + (
√
7
2 )
2
k
+ 1√
02+
√
7
2
√
( t2)
2 + (
√
7
2 )
2
k
6 1√
7
√
2
k
+ 1√
7
√
2
k
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Hence:
|Uk| 6 2
√
2k√
7
(4.7)
We want to prove that: |x| < 3.7(√2)n and |y| < 2.6(√2)n. We prove it
by induction in n.
1. Base:
n = 0. We have
∑0
i=0 αiτ
i = α0τ0 = α0.
So, α0 = |x| < a = 3.7(
√
2)0, since αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
n = 1. We have
∑1
i=0 αiτ
i = α0τ0 + α1τ1 = α0 + α1τ .
So α0 = x < 3.7(
√
2)0 and α1 = y < 2.6(
√
2)1, since αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
2. Inductive step:
We take
∑n−1
i=0 αiτ
i = x′ + y′τ . By hypothesis, it is true that:
|x′| < 3.7
√
2n−1 (4.8)
And:
|y′| < 2.6
√
2n−1 (4.9)
So, we need to prove that the result holds for n. First, we add another
term to
∑n−1
i=0 αiτ
i, as follows:
∑n
i=0 αiτ
i = x′ + y′τ + αnτn
= x′ + y′τ + αn
(
Unτ − 2Un−1
)
= (x′ − 2αnUn−1) + (y′ + αnUn)τ = x+ yτ
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First, for x (using (4.7) and (4.9)):
|x| = |x′ − 2αnUn−1|
6 |x′|+ 2|αn||Un−1|
6 3.7
√
2n−1 + 22
√
2n−1√
7
=
(
3.7√
2
+ 2( 2√
2
√
7
)
)√
2n
< 3.7
√
2n
Now, for y (using (4.7) and (4.8)):
|y| = |y′ + αnUn|
6 |y′|+ |αnUn|
6 2.6
√
2n−1 + 2
√
2n√
7
=
(
2.6√
2
+ 2√
7
)√
2n
< 2.6
√
2n
The values of a, b can be slightly improved when we treat z =
n∑
i=0
αiτ
i
as a complex number, following the idea proposed by James McKee.
4.2.4.2 a = 3.65 and b = 2.59
We know that τ satisfies the characteristic polynomial τ2 − tτ + 2 = 0, for
t = ±1. One can interpret τ as the complex number:
τ =
t±√−7
2
.
Hence, the norm of τ is:
|τ | =
∣∣∣∣∣ t±
√
7i
2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
√
t2 +
√
7
2
4
=
√
1 + 7
4
=
√
2. (4.10)
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Let z =
n∑
i=0
αiτ
i be a complex number. The norm of z is:
|z| =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
αiτ
i
∣∣∣∣∣ 6
n∑
i=0
|αi||τ | 6
n∑
i=0
√
2
i
Using the formula for the sum of n+1 first terms of a geometric progression,
we have:
|z| 6
n∑
i=0
√
2
i
=
√
2
n+1 − 1√
2− 1
and
|z|2 <
( √
2
n+1
(
√
2 + 1)
(
√
2− 1)(√2 + 1)
)2
= 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2. (4.11)
Now, we use the fact that z can be written as x+ yτ :
z = x+ y
(
t±√−7
2
)
=
(
x± y
2
)
±
√−7
2
y.
And hence:
|z| =
√
x2 ± xy + 2y2.
Which leads to:
|z|2 = x2 ± xy + 2y2. (4.12)
From Equations (4.11) and (4.12) we have:
x2 ± xy + 2y2 < 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2.
Completing the squares, we have:
x2 ± xy + 2y2 = 2
(
y ± x
4
)2
+
7x2
8
< 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2.
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Since the first term on the left hand side of the inequality (i.e., 2
(
y ± x4
)2)
is a square and hence > 0, we can write:
7x2
8
< 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2.
Therefore:
|x| <
√
8
72
n+1(
√
2 + 1)2
< 3.65
√
2n.
Now, completing the squares in a different way, we have:
x2 ± xy + 2y2 =
(
x± y
2
)2
+
7y2
4
< 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2.
Again, since the first term on the left hand side of the inequality (i.e.,(
x± y2
)2) is a square and hence > 0, we can write:
7y2
4
< 2n+1(
√
2 + 1)2.
Therefore:
|y| <
√
4
72
n+1(
√
2 + 1)2
< 2.59
√
2n.
Note that the values for a and b are slightly smaller than the ones we
had found before.
However, it is possible to get even smaller values for a and b by pairing
consecutive terms in the τ -adic expansion together and using a worst-case
bound for the sum of two terms. Similarly, one can group the terms together
in threes, fours, fives etc. to get even smaller values for a, b. We also thank
James McKee for that idea.
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4.2.4.3 a = 3.03 and b = 2.14
We begin by writing z = α0 + α1τ + α2τ2 + α3τ3 + . . .+ αnτn.
a) n ≡ 1 (mod 2)
Pairing consecutive terms, leads to
z = (α0+α1τ)+(α2+α3τ)τ2+(α4+α5τ)τ4+ . . .+(αn−1+αnτ)τn−1.
There is a bound B ∈ N such that |αi + αi+1τ | 6 B for all i.
Hence, we can rewrite as:
|z| 6 B(1 + |τ2|+ |τ4|+ |τ6|+ . . .+ |τn−1|).
From Equation(4.10), the norm of τ is
√
2, so:
|z| 6 B(1+2+22+. . .+2n−12 ) = B
(
2
n−1
2
+1 − 1
2− 1
)
= B(2
n+1
2 −1) < B(2n+12 ).
Therefore
|z|2 < B2(2n+1). (4.13)
Now we compute the worst-case bound for B, which occurs when αi =
αi+1 = 1 and τ = 1+
√−7
2 :
B = |(αi+αi+1τ)| 6
∣∣∣∣1 + 1 +√−72
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣3 +√−72
∣∣∣∣ =
√
32 +
√
7
2
4
= 2.
Using the bound B in Equation (4.13):
|z|2 < 4(2n+1). (4.14)
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From Equations (4.12) and (4.14):
x2 ± xy + 2y2 < 4(2n+1).
Now, completing the squares in the same way we did in the last section,
we end up with:
|x| <
√
4(872
n+1)
< 3.03
√
2n.
and
|y| <
√
4(472
n+1)
< 2.14
√
2n.
b) n ≡ 0 (mod 2)
We rewrite:
z = a0 + z′τ.
Where
z′ = (α1 + α2τ) + (α3 + α4τ)τ2 + ...+ (αn−1 + αnτ)τn−2.
So
z′τ = z − α0.
We call
z′′ = (z − α0). (4.15)
It follows that
|z′||τ | = |z − α0| = |z′′|.
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And since |τ | = √2, it follows that
|z′′| 6
√
2|z′| (4.16)
Since z′ has degree n− 1, by the previous case it follows that:
|z′| < 2
√
2n.
Then using the above result with Equation (4.16):
|z′′| < √2(2√2n) = 2(2n+12 ).
Now, using the fact that z′′ = x′′ + y′′τ , it follows from the previous
result that:
|x′′| < 3.03√2n
|y′′| < 2.14√2n.
Finally, since z = x+ yτ , from Equation (4.15) we have
x′′ + y′′τ = x+ yτ − α0 = (x− α0) + yτ.
Since αi = {−1, 0, 1} for any i, it follows that |x| and |x′′| differ by at
most 1. Therefore:
|x| < 1 + 3.03√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 3.03
)√
2n
|y| < 2.14√2n.
Now we group the terms in threes, to get even smaller bounds.
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4.2.4.4 a = 2.81 and b = 2
We begin by writing z = α0 + α1τ + α2τ2 + α3τ3 + . . .+ αnτn.
a) n ≡ 2 (mod 3)
Pairing three consecutive terms, leads to
(α0+α1τ+α2τ2)+(α3+α4τ+α5τ2)τ3+. . .+(αn−2+αn−1τ+αnτ2)τn−2.
There is a bound C ∈ N such that |αi+αi+1τ +αi+2τ2| 6 C for all i.
Hence, we can rewrite as:
|z| 6 C(1 + |τ3|+ |τ6|+ |τ9|+ . . .+ |τn−2|).
From Equation(4.10), the norm of τ is
√
2, so:
|z| 6 C(1 +√23 +√26 +√29 + . . .+√2n−2)
= C(1 + 23/2 + (23/2)2 + (23/2)3 + . . .+ (23/2)
n−2
3 )
= C
(
(23/2)
n−2
3 +1−1
2
√
2−1
)
= C
(
2
n+1
2 −1
2
√
2−1
)
< C
2
√
2−12
n+1
2
Therefore
|z|2 < C
2
(2
√
2− 1)2 2
n+1. (4.17)
Now we compute the worst-case bound for C, which occurs when αi =
−1, αi+1 = αi+2 = 1 and τ = 1+
√−7
2 :
C = |(αi + αi+1τ + αi+2τ2)| 6
∣∣∣−1 + 1+√−72 + (1+√−72 )2∣∣∣ = | − 2 +√−7|
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Hence
C 6
√
(−2)2 +
√
7
2
=
√
11.
Using the bound C in Equation (4.17):
|z|2 < 11
(2
√
2− 1)2 (2
n+1). (4.18)
From Equations (4.12) and (4.18):
x2 ± xy + 2y2 < 11
(2
√
2− 1)2 (2
n+1).
Now, completing the squares in the same way we did in the last section,
we end up with:
|x| <
√
8
7
11
(2
√
2−1)2 (2
n+1)
< 2.75
√
2n.
and
|y| <
√
4
7
11
(2
√
2−1)2 (2
n+1)
< 1.94
√
2n.
b) n ≡ 1 (mod 3)
We can rewrite:
z = α0 + α1τ + z′τ2.
Where
z′ = (α2+α3τ+α4τ2)+(α5+α6τ+α7τ2)τ3+. . .+(αn−2+αn−1τ+αnτ2)τn−4.
So
z′τ2 = z − α0 − α1τ.
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Then, we call
z′′ = (z − α0 − α1τ). (4.19)
It follows that
|z′||τ |2 = |z − α0 − α1τ | = |z′′|.
And using the fact that |τ | = √2:
|z′′| 6 2|z′| (4.20)
Since z′ has degree n− 2, by the previous case it follows that:
|z′| <
( √
11
2
√
2− 1
)
2
n−1
2 .
Then using the above result with Equation (4.20):
|z′′| < 2
( √
11
2
√
2−1
)
2
n−1
2 =
( √
11
2
√
2−1
)
2
n+1
2
Now, using the fact that z′′ = x′′ + y′′τ , it follows from the previous
result that:
|x′′| < 2.75√2n
|y′′| < 1.94√2n.
Finally, since z = x+ yτ , from Equation (4.19) we have
x′′ + y′′τ = x+ yτ − α0 − α1τ = (x− α0) + (y − α1)τ.
Since αi = {−1, 0, 1} for any i, it follows that |x| and |x′′| differ by at
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most 1. The same occurs between |y| and |y′′|. Therefore:
|x| < 1 + 2.75√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 2.75
)√
2n
|y| < 1 + 1.94√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 1.94
)√
2n.
c) n ≡ 0 (mod 3)
We can rewrite:
z = α0 + z′τ.
Where
z′ = (α1+α2τ+α3τ2)+(α4+α5τ+α6τ2)τ3+. . .+(αn−2+αn−1τ+αnτ2)τn−3.
So
z′τ = z − α0.
We call
z′′ = (z − α0). (4.21)
It follows that
|z′||τ | = |z − α0| = |z′′|.
Taking |τ | = √2:
|z′′| 6
√
2|z′| (4.22)
Since z′ has degree n− 1, by the previous case it follows that:
|z′| <
√
11
(
(2
√
2)
n
3
2
√
2− 1
)
=
( √
11
2
√
2− 1
)
2
n
2 .
Now, using the fact that z′′ = x′′ + y′′τ , it follows from the previous
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result that:
|x′′| < 2.75√2n
|y′′| < 1.94√2n.
Finally, since z = x+ yτ , from Equation (4.21) we have
x′′ + y′′τ = x+ yτ − α0 = (x− α0) + yτ.
Since αi = {−1, 0, 1} for any i, it follows that |x| and |x′′| differ by at
most 1. Therefore:
|x| < 1 + 2.75√2n
|y| < 1.94√2n.
Finally, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.2. Let n > 8 and let α(τ) =
∑n
i=0 αiτ
i, for αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
It is always possible to write:
α(τ) ≡ x+ yτ ,
for some x, y ∈ Z such that |x| < a = 2.81√2n and |y| < b = 2√2n.
Proof. From the results of items a), b) and c) above, the worst-case bounds
for x and y are:
|x| < 1 + 2.75√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 2.75
)√
2n
|y| < 1 + 1.94√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 1.94
)√
2n.
Since 1√
2n
< 0.06 when n > 8, the proof is complete.
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We remark that one could try to prove even smaller values for a and b,
following the idea above and grouping the terms together in fours, fives, etc.
In Section 4.2.6 we conjecture smaller values for a and b (namely a =
2.28
√
2n and b = 1.8
√
2n). Our conjecture is motivated by experimental
results.
4.2.5 Writing a τ-NAF as x+ yτ for x, y ∈ Z
We can use the same idea to give more precise values for the bounds a, b
when dealing with τ -NAFs.
We recall that z = α0 + α1τ + α2τ2 + α3τ3 + . . .+ αnτn.
a) n ≡ 1 (mod 2)
Pairing consecutive terms, leads to
(α0 + α1τ) + τ2(α2 + α3τ) + τ4(α4 + α5τ) + . . .+ τn−1(αn−1 + αnτ).
Note that, since z is a τ -NAF, either αi or αi+1 is zero. There is a
bound D ∈ N such that |αi + αi+1τ | 6 D for all i. As a result, the
bound D will be smaller than B, which will lead to smaller bounds.
We can rewrite as:
|z| 6 D(1 + |τ2|+ |τ4|+ |τ6|+ . . .+ |τn−1|)
Now we compute the worst-case bound for D, which occurs when αi =
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0, αi+1 = 1 and τ = 1+
√−7
2 :
D = |(αi+αi+1τ)| 6
∣∣∣∣0 + 1 +√−72
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣1 +√−72
∣∣∣∣ =
√
12 +
√
7
2
4
=
√
2.
It follows that:
|z|2 < 2(2n+1). (4.23)
Using Equations (4.12) and (4.23):
x2 − xy + 2y2 < 2(2n+1).
Now, completing the squares in the same way we did in the last section,
we end up with:
|x| <
√
2(872
n+1)
< 2.14
√
2n.
and
|y| <
√
2(472
n+1)
< 1.52
√
2n.
b) n ≡ 0 (mod 2)
We rewrite:
z = a0 + z′τ.
Where
z′ = (α1 + α2τ) + (α3 + α4τ)τ2 + ...+ (αn−1 + αnτ)τn−2.
So
z′τ = z − α0.
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Then, we call
z′′ = (z − α0). (4.24)
It follows that
|z′||τ | = |z − α0| = |z′′|.
Recall that |τ | = √2. Hence:
|z′′| 6
√
2|z′| (4.25)
Since z′ has degree n− 1, by the previous case it follows that:
|z′| < (
√
2)2
n
2 .
Then using the above result with Equation (4.25):
|z′′| < (√2)(√2)2n2 = √2(2n+12 )
Now, using the fact that z′′ = x′′ + y′′τ , it follows from the previous
result that:
|x′′| < 2.14√2n
|y′′| < 1.52√2n.
Finally, since z = x+ yτ , from Equation (4.24) we have
x′′ + y′′τ = x+ yτ − α0 = (x− α0) + yτ.
Since αi = {−1, 0, 1} for any i, it follows that |x| and |x′′| differ by at
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most 1. Therefore:
|x| < 1 + 2.14√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 2.14
)√
2n
|y| < 1.52√2n.
Finally, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.3. Let n > 8 and let α(τ) =
∑n
i=0 αiτ
i, for αi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
be a τ -NAF expansion. It is always possible to write:
α(τ) ≡ x+ yτ ,
for some x, y ∈ Z such that |x| < a = 2.20√2n and |y| < b = 1.52√2n.
Proof. From the results of items a), b) above, the worst-case bounds for x
and y are:
|x| < 1 + 2.14√2n =
(
1√
2n
+ 2.14
)√
2n
|y| < 1.52√2n.
Since 1√
2n
< 0.06 when n > 8, the proof is complete.
Now we conjecture smaller values for a, b based on the distribution of
random τ -adics and random τ -NAFs.
4.2.6 Using the Distribution of Random τ-adics to obtain
Smaller Bounds
We recall that in Theorems 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 we proved bounds for x and y.
Now, based on experimental results, we conjecture that such bounds can
be improved to smaller values. We experimented in MAGMA [10] gener-
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ating 10,000 random τ -adics (and random τ -NAFs) of length L and then
we converted each one to x + yτ using the algorithm presented in [12]. By
analysing the pictures of each distribution, we could state a more restrictive
conjecture for the bounds of a and b.
4.2.6.1 Distribution of Random τ-adics as x+ yτ expressions
Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show the distribution of 10,000 random τ -adics,
for L respectively equal to 30, 40, 50 and 160. In all figures, the values in
x go from −a to a, using a = 3
√
2L and the values in y go from −b to b,
using b = 2
√
2L. Note that such values for a and b are an approximation to
integers of the values proved in Theorem 4.2.2.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of 10,000 random τ -adics for L 6 30. The bounds for axis x
and y are respectively (−a, a) and (−b, b), for a = 3
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L.
Notice that the distribution is centered in a region of smaller area than
4ab and it seems to be close to uniform away from the edges. Furthermore,
the symmetry under (x, y)→ (−x,−y) (i.e., 180 ◦ rotation) is obvious. For
L = 30, we can check that for both x and y positive or both negative,
there is no point after certain size of x and y (note the the picture looks
like a “sausage”). This can be explained when we convert points in this
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of 10,000 random τ -adics for L 6 40. The bounds for axis x
and y are respectively (−a, a) and (−b, b), for a = 3
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of 10,000 random τ -adics for L 6 50. The bounds for axis x
and y are respectively (−a, a) and (−b, b), for a = 3
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L.
empty region back to a τ -adic with coefficients only in {−1, 0, 1} (using
Algorithm 4). For example, take x = 50000 and y = 30000. Check in
Figure 4.2 that point (x, y) is empty. When we convert 50000 + 30000τ
to a τ -adic with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1} using Algorithm 4, we get τ31 −
τ30 − τ29 − τ24 + τ22 + τ21 − τ15 − τ13 + τ12 + τ10 + τ7 − τ4 which explains
why the region is empty, since we are using L = 30. The same occurs with
x = −50000 and y = −30000. For L = 40 and L = 50 this behaviour does
not occur and the distribution is centered. Note that for L = 160 the same
“sausage-behaviour” occurs.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of 10,000 random τ -adics for L 6 160. Each value is divided
by 260. The bounds for axis x and y are respectively (−A,A) and (−B,B), for A = 3
√
2L
and B = 2
√
2L. Note that the axes have been rescaled by a factor 260.
A possible explanation for the ‘sausage-shape’ comes when we plot the
distribution for L = 29. The picture looks more centered (similar to L = 40).
Going from the picture for L = 29 to the picture for L = 30 is equivalent
to shift the original picture to the positions τ30 and −τ30. It happens that
when we convert τ30 and −τ30 to coefficients in Z we get 17282 − 24475τ
and −17282+24475τ respectively. Note that the new points (τ30 and −τ30)
are in the right-bottom and left-top corners of the original picture. Hence,
when we shift the original picture to the new points, we got Figure 4.2, with
its ‘sausage-shape’. Doing the same for L = 39, when we plot τ40 and −τ40
we get 49138− 753027τ and −49138+753027τ . Since those points are close
to the y axis, we do not get a ‘sausage-shape’ for L = 40.
An alternative explanation for the ‘sausage’ forms, according to Roberto
Avanzi: On the Gauss plane, going from τ -adics of length L to τ -adics of
length L + 1 is a multiplication of the previous graph by τ and addition
some detail corresponding to the least significant digit. This can be viewed
as added detail to the pictures. So we essentially get a rotating figure, once
the size has been normalised. Now, going from the Gauss plane to (1, τ)-
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coordinates is just a linear transformation of the plane.
Now we state the following conjecture, based on the pictures:
Conjecture 1. Let n(τ) =
∑L
i=0 αiτ
i, for α ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Let x, y be inte-
gers. For practical values of L it is always possible to write:
n(τ) ≡ x+ yτ ,
with |x| < a = 2.28
√
2L and |y| < b = 1.8
√
2L.
Evidence for the conjecture - From the distributions of random x+yτ
(see Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) we observed that the maximum point is <
0.76∗a in the x-direction and < 0.9∗b in the y-direction. As a result, we can
define new bounds a and b, namely a = 0.76 ∗ (3
√
2L) and b = 0.9 ∗ (2
√
2L).
We observe that a better choice would not be a box but some curve that
fits better the region of distribution. The most obvious choice would be
an ellipse. Alternatively, one can change coordinates to give a box that is
aligned with the major axis of the ellipse. We leave this as an open problem.
4.2.6.2 Distribution of Random τ-NAFs as x+ yτ expressions
We repeated the same experiment, but now generating random τ -NAFs.
We could observe that we can take even smaller bounds when working with
τ -NAFs. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of 10,000 random τ -NAFs.
So we state the following conjecture:
Conjecture 2. Let n(τ) =
∑L
i=0 αiτ
i, for α ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be a τ -NAF ex-
pansion. Let x, y be integers. For practical values of L it is always possible
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of 10,000 random τ -NAFs for L 6 30. The bounds for axis x
and y are respectively (−a, a) and (−b, b), for a = 3
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L.
to write:
n(τ) ≡ x+ yτ ,
with |x| < a = (0.51) × 3
√
2L = 1.53
√
2L and |y| < b = (0.62) × 2
√
2L =
1.24
√
2L.
Again, we observe that the best choice would be an ellipse instead of a
box or even a box aligned with the major axis of the ellipse.
4.2.6.3 About Distributions
We remark that one cannot use the picture of τ -adic distributions to estimate
the number of equivalence classes by just counting the number of points in
the box in which the distribution lies. The quantity 4ab only gives an upper
bound and it is clear from the pictures that the actual number of equivalence
classes can be a lot smaller than that. As we observed before, the best choice
would not be a box, but some curve which fits better in the distribution
region. Note that not every point (x, y) (even in the most dense central part
of the picture) necessarily arises from a τ -adic expansion. In other words,
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the picture is not solid, it has holes in it. This is clearly seen in the L = 30
and L = 160 distributions, which look like a “sausage”, but it also occurs in
the L = 40 and L = 50 distributions. Obviously, the holes can be explained
due to the simulation, because we generated 10, 000 random τ -adics and the
number of equivalence classes is much bigger (i.e., O˜(2L)). Note that we
can see some holes close to the centre of the region. This is because if we
take x+ yτ for very small x and y, the resultant τ -adic with coefficients in
{−1, 0, 1} has small degree and therefore, it is unlikely to occur unless we
generate a sufficiently large number of random τ -adics.
However, there are also theoretical holes as we get closer to the edges of
the region. For example, take the point P1 = 48950 − 7193τ in Figure 4.2.
It can be seen that P1 lies inside the bounds of the region of points. If we
convert P1 to coefficients in {−1, 0, 1} using Algorithm 4, we obtain τ31, so
P1 does not arise when we take L = 30.
Furthermore, we remember from Table 4.1 in Section 4.2.2 that the num-
ber of P -equivalence classes for L = 15 is 160359. Using the bounds for τ -
adic distribution, we compute a = (0.76)3
√
215 ≈ 413 and b = (0.9)2
√
215 ≈
326 (we also repeated the experiment by choosing 10, 000 random τ -adics
of length L = 15 and drew a picture, and we could check that the bounds
hold). Hence, we have 4ab ≈ 538552, which is more than 3 times greater
than the correct number of P -equivalence classes. Note that the pictures
show the number of equivalence classes whereas Table 4.1 shows the num-
ber of P -equivalence classes, which naturally is smaller than the number of
equivalence classes (see Definitions 19 and 20), but we believe that the main
reason for the difference is the presence of holes, i.e., points that do not
arise from a τ -adic of certain length. We leave as a open problem a better
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understanding of the distribution of τ -adics.
4.2.7 Converting Integers to Frobenius Expansions and Vice-
Versa
Since point multiplication can be efficiently performed when one uses a
Frobenius expansion instead of an integer, a common practice to improve ef-
ficiency is to use a Koblitz curve and convert integers into τ -adic expansions.
We now briefly mention the algorithms to convert integers into Frobenius
expansions.
J. Solinas [50, Algorithm 4, pg. 364] proposed an algorithm that converts
n = x+yτ for some integers x, y into a Frobenius expansion in non-adjacent
form (τ -NAF) equivalent to n. It is easy to see that when y = 0, the
algorithm converts an integer (n = x) into a τ -NAF. That algorithm only
involves elementary integer operations. One problem is that the resulting
Frobenius expansion typically has degree much larger thanm, so in the same
paper there is an algorithm ([50, Algorithm 5, pg. 365]) which reduces the
τ -NAF of n modulo τm− 1 or modulo (τm− 1)/(τ − 1), following an idea of
Meier and Staffelbach [36] (Solinas call that output “reduced τ -NAF”). This
latter algorithm requires many integer divisions and hence, can be costly.
According to N. Koblitz [33], H. Lenstra suggested that, instead of choos-
ing a random integer and afterwards, convert it to a τ -adic for efficient pur-
poses, one can start a protocol choosing a random τ -adic expansion. If a
random τ -NAF is chosen, since it is unique, one can use it without caring
which integer it represents.
For some applications, it may be necessary to convert a Frobenius expan-
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sion
∑
i niτ
i to an integer n (for example, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) requires both the integer and the scalar multiple). For
such applications, it is necessary to revise the concept of eigenvalue of Frobe-
nius.
Definition 21. The Frobenius map in a cyclic group of order r has some
eigenvalue λ, so that τ(P ) = [λ]P . This eigenvalue is a solution to the
characteristic polynomial modulo r.
Once we compute the eigenvalue λ on 〈P 〉, it follows that n = ∑i niλi
(mod r), where r is the order of P . In other words, this algorithm requires
arithmetic modulo a large prime.
B. Brumley and K. Ja¨rvinen[12] propose a more efficient algorithm which
takes a τ -adic of length L as input and computes the equivalent element
x + yτ , for some x, y ∈ Z. Once x + yτ is computed, the equivalent inte-
ger n modulo r is easily obtained using n = x + yλ (mod r). A hardware
implementation is provided in the paper and the authors claim that “the
results suggest significant computational efficiency gains over previously doc-
umented methods”.
4.2.8 Bit Representation of Frobenius Expansions
One can store a τ -adic expansion as a bitstring using Huffman encoding
(see [54, pg 56–58]): for example coefficient 0 is represented as 0, coefficient
1 as 10 and coefficient −1 as 11. Hence a τ -adic expansion of length L
and weight w requires L + w bits (hence, we typically require ≈ 5L/3 bits
for a random τ -adic). We remark that with bounds given by Solinas [50]
and an elementary counting argument, one can check that generally shorter
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representations are not possible, except by a fixed, small, additive constant.
However, if a τ -NAF is used then this can be shortened to L + 1 bits.
For example, we represent coefficient 0 as 0, pair 01 as 01 and pair 01¯ as 11,
where “1¯” means “−1”.
For instance, the length 9 τ -NAF expansion τ8 − τ6 − τ4 + 1 (i.e.,
[0101¯01¯0001]) could be represented as [0111110001].
4.3 Adding and Multiplying τ-adics
We will see in Chapter 6 an application of the use of Frobenius expansions
with the GPS identification scheme [26, 43]. In that protocol we will need
to add and multiply Frobenius expansions. The subtlety is that we require
the result to have coefficients only in {−1, 0, 1}. Any coefficients which are
outside this set must be reduced using the relation 2 = tτ − τ2, and this can
lead to an increase in the degree of the expansion. There are two options
for performing arithmetic:
1. Compute with coefficients in Z and reduce to coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}
at the end;
2. Perform the basic arithmetic operations so that all values have coeffi-
cients in {−1, 0, 1} at all times.
Algorithm 4 presents an efficient addition algorithm of the second type.
Note that this algorithm can also be used to convert any given τ -adic ex-
pansion with arbitrary integral coefficients into τ -adic expansions with co-
efficients in {−1, 0, 1} when we add zero to the input (and compare with
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the algorithm proposed by Solinas, in that any given τ -adic expansion with
arbitrary integral coefficients is converted into a τ -NAF expansion).
The important feature of this algorithm is that, although the carry values
c0, c1 are integers, the arrays a, b and d only ever contain entries in the set
{−1, 0, 1}. Hence this algorithm may be suitable for implementation on
smart cards.
We remark that multiplication of τ -adics expansions can be done by
treating the expansions as polynomials and performing a polynomial mul-
tiplication and then reducing the final result to coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
However, one must take into account the sizes of the integer coefficients,
which can be very large when we use τ -adic expansions of large degree.
Hence, it may be necessary large memory space to store coefficients of such
size.
An alternative to perform multiplication of τ -adics is to do repeated
calls to Algorithm 4. This option, although we did not evaluate the impact
of repeated shift-add to the performance protocols, seems to be the most
suitable for restricted devices, like smart cards.
4.3.1 The Optional Randomisation Step
The optional randomisation step in line 12 (Algorithm 4) will be needed
in the protocol (see Chapter 6 for details). It is the following: if i is less
than some parameter K′ then generate a uniform random b ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and
arrange that x = b by adding (b−x)(τ i− τm+i). This corresponds to taking
an equivalent representation for the sum. Note that this operation may
increase the degree of the result by m and requires storing a ‘carry’ to be
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Algorithm 4 Efficient τ -adic addition
System Parameters: Frobenius polynomial τ2 − tτ + 2 where t = ±1.
Input: τ -adic expansions a and b.
Output: d ≡ (a+ b).
1: deg = max(deg(a), deg(b))
2: c0 = 0, c1 = 0, i = 0 and d = 0
3: while (i 6 deg) or (c0 6= 0) or (c1 6= 0) do
4: x = a[i] + b[i] + c0
5: c0 = c1 and c1 = 0
6: if (x < −1) or (x > 1) then
7: q = sign(x)× (|x| div 2)
8: x = x− 2q
9: c0 = c0 + tq
10: c1 = c1 − q
11: end if
12: [Optional randomisation step]
13: d[i] = x
14: i = i+ 1
15: end while
16: Return d
included when computing the (m+i)-th term1. Note that the randomisation
method of Ebeid and Hasan [21] does not give uniform output of the low-
degree coefficients and so it is not sufficient for our protocol.
Even with the non-randomised version, one sees that the degree can
increase significantly if the carry values c0, c1 take nonzero values of large
enough absolute value. Indeed, from Algorithm 4 one can derive a non-
deterministic method to construct, given a τ -adic a, a τ -adic b such that
deg(a + b) > deg(b) > deg(a) (note that the difference deg(a + b) − deg(b)
is bounded for fixed a). For example, given a = 1 + τ3 − τ5 one can choose
b = −τ5 + τ7 so that the result of computing a + b using Algorithm 4 is
1 + τ3 − tτ6 + tτ8 − τ9. Indeed, it is clear that one can choose the first
deg(a) coefficients of b at random, so there are at least 3deg(a) such choices
1We are using the polynomial 1− τm, but could use any polynomial equivalent to zero
and with constant coefficient 1.
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for b (due to the choices available when constructing b there are many more
choices for b, see heuristic 1 below). Similarly, one can choose b such that
deg(a+ b) < deg(a) (for example, for the above a take b = −τ3+ τ5 so that
a+ b = 1); again there are about 3deg(a) possible choices.
4.4 Arithmetic Required for τ-GPS Protocol
Our variant of the GPS protocol will require computing y = r+sc where r, c
and s are all Frobenius expansions. The multiplication s×c can be performed
by repeated shifting and addition using Algorithm 1 (possibly combined with
a Karatsuba2 approach). Note that the arithmetic coming from Algorithm 4
is not associative (for example (1+1)+−1 6= 1+(1+−1)) though all results
are equivalent. There are several natural algorithms for computing sc and,
due to lack of associativity, they will generally give different results. For the
analysis of the protocol in Section 6.6 we assume that a fixed algorithm is
used for computing sc in the protocol and in the proof of Theorem 6.6.2.
Clearly, the product sc can have degree larger than deg(s)+deg(c) but in
practice it is not much bigger. We have performed a number of experiments
using MAGMA [10] in order to check the degree of sc for random s and c
of certain size. We define C, S and R respectively the maximum lengths
for the challenge, the secret key and the commitment source. We will see
in Section 6.6 that we need C > 32 such that the challenge cannot be easily
guessed by the prover and we need S > 150 such that the private key
be resistant to DLP algorithms. Therefore, taking (C,S) = (32, 150) and
2Divide-and-conquer algorithm discovered by A. Karatsuba in 1960, used for quickly
multiplying large n-digit numbers. The time complexity is O(nlog23), which is faster than
the classical O(n2).
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randomly chosen c ∈ TC and s ∈ TS , we could observe that after 240 random
pairs (s, c) we never found deg(s× c) > deg(s) + deg(c) + 5.
Definition 22. For S, C ∈ N, we define
Φ = (S − 1) + (C − 1) + 5 = S + C + 3
and
TΦ,R =
{
y ∈ TR : yn 6= 0 for some n such that Φ 6 n < R
}
.
Our protocol will compute r + sc where deg(r) is much bigger than
deg(s)+deg(c) and it is important to ensure that the degree is not likely to
increase. For a given choice of sc of degree Φ there seem to be 6 3Φ× 2K−1
values for r satisfying deg(r) < Φ+K and deg(r+ sc) > Φ+K. Hence, the
probability that deg(r + sc) > Φ+K can be estimated as
3Φ2K−1
3Φ+K
=
2K−1
3K
=
1
3
(
2
3
)K−1 =
1
3(3/2)K−1
=
1
31+(K−1) log3(3/2)
≈ 1
30.63+0.37K
.
IfK is sufficiently large then the probability of this event for randomly chosen
r is negligible. Our experiments showed that for (C,S,K) = (32, 150, 20),
the probability of deg(r + sc) 6= deg(r) over random c ∈ TC , s ∈ TS and r ∈
TΦ+K is approximately 0.00004 6 1/30.37×20+0.63 ≈ 0.0001. For (C,S,K) =
(32, 150, 50) we never found an example with deg(r + sc) 6= deg(r).
The security proof will require a stronger statement about the probability
of deg(r + sc) being large for some choice of c ∈ TC . We have performed
experiments and the results seem to be comparable to the previous case.
Hence we propose the following heuristic. We assume that negligible is
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defined according to Definition 6.
Heuristic 1. Fix s ∈ TS . Suppose K ∈ N is sufficiently large and let
R = Φ+K. Then the probability over r ∈ TR that there exists some c ∈ TC
such that deg(r + sc) > R is negligible. More precisely,
#{r ∈ TR : ∃ c ∈ TC with deg(r + sc) > R} = O(3Φ2K) = O˜(3Φ+0.63K).
We also need to know how likely it is that deg(r + sc) 6 Φ. The above
arguments indicate there should be at most 3Φ such choices for r. Thus, we
can state the following heuristic:
Heuristic 2. Fix s ∈ TS . Suppose K ∈ N is sufficiently large and let
R = Φ + K Then the probability over r ∈ TR that there exists some c ∈ TC
such that deg(r + sc) < Φ is negligible. More precisely,
#{r ∈ TR : ∃ c ∈ TC with deg(r + sc) < Φ} = O(3Φ).
A further subtlety of our basic (i.e., without randomisation) addition
algorithm is that there is not necessarily a unique τ -adic solution x to the
equation a + x = b. For example, it is easy to check that −1 + x = 1 + τ
has no solution in T3. Similarly, one can check that −1 + x = −τ + τ2
has the two (necessarily equivalent) solutions x = 1 − τ + τ2 and x = −1
when τ2 − τ + 2 = 0. The extra randomisation in line 12 of Algorithm 4 is
included precisely to ‘smooth out’ this issue. In particular, it greatly reduces
the probability that an equation of the form a+ x = b cannot be solved in
the important case when deg(a) < deg(b).
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter we revised the main properties of Koblitz curves and Frobe-
nius expansions (a.k.a. τ -adic expansions). We remarked that the most
popular choice for Koblitz curves are curves over F2m for some prime m > 1.
We saw that if an integer n is replaced by its equivalent Frobenius expansion,
the point multiplication [n]P can be performed, in practice, approximately
4 times faster than the standard double-and-add scalar multiplication, or
about 50% faster than any previous known point multiplication method.
We used the fact that Frobenius expansions are not unique, i.e., if we
look for expansions of degree less than some bound, we find many different
(although equivalent) expansions which represent the same integer modulo
r, where r is the order of P . We also stated that in case we need a unique
representation for a given equivalence class of integer, we can use a τ -NAF
expansion of degree less than m.
Furthermore, we explored the property that a τ -adic can be mapped to
x+yτ for integers x, y and we proved bounds for x and y. We also analysed
the distribution of random τ -adics and random τ -NAFs and conjectured
that we can shorten the bounds for x and y based on the distribution.
Finally, we presented the non canonical arithmetic of Frobenius expan-
sions, specially when we require that all coefficients be in {−1, 0, 1}. We
checked that the arithmetic is not associative, and when we add τ -adics
a and b, we can get many different results (e.g. different degrees for the
resultant expansion), but all of them are equivalent. We also proposed a
randomisation step in the algorithm used to add and multiply τ -adics in
order to avoid a statistical attack in the τ -GPS protocol.
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In this chapter we define three variants of the Frobenius expansion DLP
and present algorithms to solve each of them.
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We begin the chapter introducing three new computational problems,
namely, the general τ -DLP, the τ -NAF DLP and the weight-w τ -DLP.
Then we concentrate on low-memory algorithms, and propose the use of
the Gaudry-Schost algorithm for solving the τ -DLP. We analyse this algo-
rithm and also fill some gaps in its previous analysis.
5.1 Motivation
We recall that the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is:
given P,Q ∈ E(Fqm)[r] to find n ∈ Z/rZ such that Q = [n]P . We discussed
in Chapter 4 that one can represent n as a Frobenius expansion n(τ) in
order to perform point multiplications more efficiently. We also recall from
Section 4.2.4 that a Frobenius expansion n(τ) = n0+n1τ+n2τ2+ . . .+nLτL
can be mapped to x+yτ , for integers x, y of certain sizes. Evidently, to solve
the ECDLP of Q to the base P it is sufficient to compute either the integer
n ∈ Z/rZ or the coefficients nj of a Frobenius expansion of n or alternatively
the integers x and y. The main aim of the chapter is to present algorithms
to solve the ECDLP when n is a Frobenius expansion of length L. Under the
assumption that the standard DLP (i.e., computing the integer n) is hard,
we will show that for some cases it is better to compute the coefficients nj
and for other cases it is better to compute x and y. We are particularly
interested in expansions of relatively small length L, i.e. L < m.
The motivation behind this research is two-fold. The first motivation is
to analyse the security of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Solinas [51], following
an idea of H. Lenstra, suggested that rather than choosing a random integer
n and then converting to a Frobenius expansion n(τ), in certain cryptosys-
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tems it might be more efficient to generate a random Frobenius expansion
directly. The temptation then is to choose a relatively short and/or sparse
value for n(τ). If this is done then we must re-evaluate the difficulty of the
discrete logarithm problem (and other computational problems). A further
issue is that the existing security proofs may not directly apply (see Lange
and Shparlinski [35] for results on the uniformity of distribution of the re-
sulting points). For some systems it may be necessary to develop bespoke
security proofs for the Frobenius expansion case (see Chapter 6 and [8] for
an example of this).
The suggestion of Solinas leads to the following problem: determine
the most efficient way to generate ECDLP instances Q = [n]P of a given
difficulty. For example, one could choose random integers n of a certain
bitlength, or random Frobenius expansions of a certain degree, or random
sparse Frobenius expansions of a certain degree, etc. We do not attempt
to answer this question (the solution will depend delicately on the relative
costs of doubling, addition and q-powering; which in turn depend on the
finite field in question, the curve equation, and what sort of coordinate
system is being used). However, it is clear that a necessary prerequisite
to answering this question is a study of algorithms to solve the DLP in all
these situations. Note that one approach to this problem is using product
exponents, see [14, 19, 32]. Also see [18] for a solution if P is fixed and
sufficient memory is available.
The second motivation is more philosophical. Recall that there are nu-
merous computational problems which admit exhaustive search algorithms
in time O˜(N) (for some measure N of the size of the problem) and time/
memory tradeoff algorithms in time and space O˜(
√
N). Van Oorschot and
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Wiener [57] show that such problems can also be solved with low mem-
ory randomised methods (called parallel collision search) in expected time
O˜(N3/4). For distributed computing using P processors the above complex-
ities generically become O˜(N/P), O˜(
√
N/P) and O˜(N3/4/P) respectively.
For some of the above problems (e.g., the discrete logarithm problem)
there also exist low memory randomised algorithms (Pollard-rho and kan-
garoo [41]) which run in expected time O˜(
√
N) (respectively O˜(
√
N/P),
see [58]). It is natural to ask whether every time/memory tradeoff algo-
rithm has a randomised low-memory counterpart with the same asymptotic
complexity (possibly with worse constants). There are examples of compu-
tational problems with a good time/memory tradeoff algorithm (i.e., time
and space complexity O˜(
√
N) for problem space of N elements) but for
which there is no known low-memory algorithm with complexity O˜(
√
N)
(for example, the low Hamming weight DLP [53], small CRT RSA private
exponents [44] and the product DLP [14, 19]).
In this chapter, we divide the Frobenius expansion DLP into three com-
putational problems, namely the general τ -DLP, the τ -NAF DLP and the
weight-w τ -DLP (see Section 5.2). For the first two, it is natural to use an
efficient time/memory tradeoff algorithm to solve them, and we use Gaudry-
Schost [25] 2-dimensional approach to transform it into a low-memory ran-
domised algorithm. For the the weight w τ -DLP, it can also be efficiently
solved by a time/memory tradeoff algorithm, but we do not know any low-
memory algorithm with complexity better than van Oorschot and Wiener’s
O˜(N3/4).
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5.2 The Frobenius Expansion DLP
Given P,Q ∈ E(Fqm) the standard discrete logarithm problem is to find
n ∈ Z (if it exists) such that Q = [n]P . In the most common case, using
Koblitz curves, it is enough to use m = 163 for the standard DLP to be
intractable. The distributed Pollard-rho method using equivalence classes
in E(F2163) needs ≈
√
pi2163
4(163) ≈ 277.6 group operations.
We now introduce the problems of interest in this chapter. In order to
construct more efficient schemes for restricted environments, we need to use
Frobenius expansions of length not chosen in the range [0,m], but in [0, L],
where usually L < m.
Definition 23. General τ-DLP. Given inputs P,Q ∈ E(Fqm)[r], L ∈ N,
find n(τ) ∈ TL (if it exists) such that Q = [n(τ)]P .
Definition 24. τ-NAF DLP. Given inputs P,Q ∈ E(Fqm)[r], L ∈ N, find
a τ -NAF n(τ) of length L (if it exists) such that Q = [n(τ)]P .
Definition 25. Weight w τ-DLP . Given inputs P,Q ∈ E(Fqm)[r], L,w ∈
N, find n(τ) ∈ TL of weight w (if it exists) such that Q = [n(τ)]P . We are
particularly interested in small w.
Remark 1: We stress that n(τ) having low degree does not imply that
n ≡ n(λ) (mod r) is a small integer (remember, λ is the eigenvalue of
Frobenius, see Definition 21). Hence the above problems are not special
cases of the problem of solving the discrete logarithm problem in a short
interval.
Remark 2: Although the τ -NAF and the weight-w τ -DLP are related
(we expect that both have a small number of nonzeros, but note that the
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weight bound on the τ -NAF is proportional to the length of the expansion
and on the weight-w DLP the bound is fixed), here we state the latter as
a separate problem (note that n can have a low Hamming weight, e.g.,
n = 10000000000110000000001, but not necessarily, n is a NAF) because
there are some attacks which can be applied when n has low Hamming
weight, regardless whether n is a τ -NAF or not.
Remark 3: The goal is to have a special algorithm for the low Hamming
weight DLP which performs better than general discrete log algorithms.
However, from some value of w there is a crossover when it is better to use
a general algorithm.
5.3 Solving the τ-DLP
We now consider the standard methods for solving the DLP (exhaustive
search, baby-step-giant-step) in our new setting. Let C be the coefficient
set for the τ -adic expansions (we always assume 0 ∈ C) and let c be the
number of elements of C (i.e., c = #C). We analyse each method for a
general coefficient set C and then we give some examples when c = 3 (i.e.
C = {−1, 0, 1}), since this is the most popular choice.
5.3.1 Exhaustive Search
An obvious method to solve the τ -DLP is by exhaustive search.
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5.3.1.1 General τ-DLP.
When solving the general τ -DLP, we need O
(
cL
)
group operations to find n.
Note that, when C = {−1, 0, 1}, we need to exhaustive search over 3L
possibilities, although we have showed in Section 4.2.2 that the number of
equivalence classes is only O˜(2L).
However, it is possible to solve the general τ -DLP in O˜(2L) by using
the fact that every τ -adic expansion can be mapped down to x + yτ , for
x, y ∈ Z and |x| < a = 2.81
√
2L, |y| < b = 2
√
2L (see Theorem 4.2.2). Using
exhaustive search over x and y, we need < 22.48(2L) group operations.
Furthermore, if we use the results of the τ -adics distribution (see Con-
jecture 1, Section 4.2.6) then we have a = 2.28
√
2L and b = 1.8
√
2L and
therefore, the exhaustive search needs < 16.42(2L) group operations.
5.3.1.2 weight w τ-DLP.
We must list all Frobenius expansions of length L and weight w. To do this
one first generates all binary strings of weight w and length L. This can
be efficiently done by using Algorithm 5 below. Once all binary strings are
generated, to get a τ -adic expansion one replaces the w ones in the binary
number by every combination of the nonzero elements of C. The number of
such expansions is clearly (c− 1)w(Lw).
Therefore, the exhaustive search algorithm for the weight w τ -DLP re-
quires O˜((c− 1)w(Lw)) group operations.
Table 5.1 shows the number of group operations for L = 160 and some
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Algorithm 5 Generating all binary strings of weight w and length L
Input: length L, weight w
Output: all binary strings of weight w and length L
1: Initialise a length L array with all bits 1 in the rightmost w positions;
2: output array;
3: repeat
4: i← position of leftmost bit 1;
5: if i is not leftmost position then
6: Move leftmost bit one position to left;
7: else
8: j ← position of leftmost bit 1 which can be moved to left;
9: Move bit at position j one position to left and bring all 1 bits to
the left of j to the positions immediately before j;
10: end if
11: output array;
12: until all bits 1 in the first w positions of the array
values of w. We can see that for w 6 38 we can solve the DLP with fewer
group operations than the exhaustive search for the general case.
Table 5.1: Number of group operations for L = 160 and weight w.
w Group Operations
5 234.61
10 261.01
20 2103.57
30 2137.76
37 2158.09
38 2160.78
39 2163.43
5.3.1.3 τ-NAF DLP.
If one wants to exhaustive search over τ -NAFs, she needs to know how
to generate all τ -NAFs of length < L. This can be efficiently done using
Algorithm 5 to obtain all binary expressions of weight w and length L′ =
L − w, for w = 1 to dL/2e. We then replace each bit ‘1’ in the binary
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expression with a pair ‘0x’ of elements in C where x is a nonzero element
of C. Finally, we discard the leftmost bit of each resultant expression (which
is always zero when expressions are generated that way).
We remember from Section 4.2.1.1 that the number of τ -NAF expansions
with degree less than L is NL = 432
L − 13(−1)L = 432L + O(1). Notice that
this formula only holds for a coefficient set C = {−1, 0, 1}. Theorem 5.3.1
presents a similar formulae for a general coefficient set C. The proof is
analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.2.1.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let L ∈ Z. Let c ∈ N be the number of elements of
the coefficient set C and c′ = c − 1. The number of possible τ -adic NAF
expansions of degree less than L is
NL = c1
(
1 +
√
1 + 4c′
2
)L
+c2
(
1−√1 + 4c′
2
)L
= O˜
((
1 +
√
1 + 4c′
2
)L)
(5.1)
for some c1, c2 ∈ Q.
Note that, when C = {−1, 0, 1}, it follows that
NL =
4
3
2L − 1
3
(−1)L = 4
3
2L +O(1).
From (5.1), the total number of τ -NAF is NL = O((1+
√
1+4c′
2 )
L) where
c′ = c−1, so, one needs to compute NL group operations to find the discrete
log n. When C = {−1, 0, 1}, we have a O˜(2L) algorithm to solve the τ -NAF
DLP.
Note that if we use the fact that we can map a τ -adic to x+yτ , for integers
x, y and use the τ -NAF distribution (see Conjecture 2, Section 4.2.6.2), we
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can use exhaustive search over x < a = 1.53
√
2L and y < b = 1.24
√
2L and
we end up with an algorithm which requires 6 7.59(2L) group operations.
We still have a O˜(2L) algorithm, but in this case, the constant implicit in
the O˜( ) is bigger.
5.3.2 Baby-Step Giant-Step
One could also try to find n by using Shanks’ baby-step giant-step (BSGS)
algorithm [16]. Without loss of generality we assume that L is even.
5.3.2.1 General τ-DLP.
A naive way to solve the general τ -DLP using Shanks’ baby-step giant-step
would lead to an algorithm with running time and memory requirements
O
(√
cL
)
. Notice that when c = 3, we have complexity O
(√
3L
)
, which is
not optimal, since we have O(2L) equivalence classes. However, we can do
better than this and find an algorithm with complexity O(2L/2) as expected.
The idea is to try to find the discrete log as x+yτ , for integers x, y of cer-
tain size. When C = {−1, 0, 1} we recall (see Theorem 4.2.2, Section 4.2.4)
that there exist integers i, j where |i| < a = 2.81
√
2L and |j| < b = 2
√
2L
such that n(τ) = i+ jτ .
Therefore, one computes a sorted list L (the baby steps) which consists
of pairs {([j]τ(P ), j) | j ∈ [−2
√
2L . . . 2
√
2L] and then computes the giant
steps, which consist of pairs x, {(Q − [i]P, i) | i ∈ [−2.81
√
2L . . . 2.81
√
2L]
checking if Q− [i]P appears in L. When a match is found, the discrete log
is solved, since n = i+ jτ . The running time and memory requirements are
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O
(√
2L
)
. The constant hidden in the O( ) is 9.62 for the running time, since
we require 4
√
2L group operations to compute the baby steps and 5.62
√
2L to
compute the giant steps. For the memory requirements, the hidden constant
is 4 since we require 4
√
2L group elements to store the baby steps.
If we use the τ -adic distribution (see Conjecture 1), then a = 2.28
√
2L
and b = 1.8
√
2L and the hidden constant becomes 8.16 for the running time
and 3.6 for the memory requirements.
In the case of another coefficient set C, once one has determined the
bounds a and b, the same algorithm can be used. As always with baby-
step-giant-step methods, if the memory is constrained then one can split
the problem unevenly to give lower memory cost but larger time cost.
5.3.2.2 τ-NAF DLP.
We know there exist τ -NAFs i, j of length L/2 such that n = i + τL/2j.
Hence the natural algorithm follows. The complexity is twice as the exhaus-
tive search algorithm for τ -NAFs of length L/2, since we need to compute
4
32
L/2 baby steps and approximately the same number of giant steps. So the
required number of group operations is 832
L/2 ≈ 2L/2+1.42. In addition, we
need 432
L/2 group elements to store the baby steps.
We remark that over all choices for τ -NAF i, j some values i+ τL/2j are
not in non-adjacent form, but this does not seriously affect our analysis.
If we use the τ -NAF distribution and use BSGS over integers x, y, then
we need to compute 3.06
√
2L baby steps and 2.48
√
2L giant steps, resulting
in 5.54
√
2L ≈ 2L/2+2.47 group operations and store 2.48
√
2L group elements.
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Therefore, the hidden constants in the O( ) are smaller if we use the algo-
rithm over τ -NAFs.
5.3.2.3 Weight-w τ-DLP.
It is straightforward to extend Coppersmith’s baby-step-giant-step algo-
rithm (see [38, 53]) for the low Hamming weight DLP to solve the weight-
w τ -DLP . We recall that c′ = #C − 1 = c − 1. Coppersmith’s deter-
ministic algorithm needs O˜(L
(L/2
w/2
)
) group operations (according to [37],
this is achieved by dividing the exponent into two equal pieces, each one
with Hamming weight w/2). The randomised version of Coppersmith’s
algorithm needs O˜(
√
w
(L/2
w/2
)
) group operations. Stinson’s generalisation
(see [53]) of Coppersmith’s deterministic method leads to an algorithm re-
quiring O(w3/2(logL)
(L/2
w/2
)
) group operations.
For the weight-w τ -DLP , we replace the w ones in the binary number by
every combination of the nonzero elements of C. Therefore, the complexities
for Coppersmith’s deterministic algorithm, its randomised version and Stin-
son’s generalisation are respectively O˜((c′)w/2L
(L/2
w/2
)
), O˜((c′)w/2
√
w
(L/2
w/2
)
)
and O((c′)w/2w3/2(logL)
(L/2
w/2
)
) group operations.
Table 5.2 shows the number of group operations for the Stinson’s gen-
eralisation of Coppersmith’s deterministic method, when we use L = 160,
c′ = 2 and some values of w.
We can see that for w 6 31 we can solve the DLP with fewer group
operations than the BSGS for the general case.
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Table 5.2: Number of group operations for L = 160 and weight w using BSGS.
w Group Operation
5 220.48
10 237.37
20 259.94
30 277.79
31 278.36
32 280.95
5.4 Low-Memory Algorithms for Weight-w τ -DLP
Let N = (c − 1)w(Lw) be the number of τ -adic expansions of length L for
E(Fqm) with coefficient set C. We recall that the BSGS algorithm requires
time and memory O(
√
N). However, if the adversary has a limited amount
of memory available, the number of steps required to find the DLP must
be increased. For example, if only w words of memory are available for the
adversary, the number of steps required for BSGS becomes O(N/w), with
O(N/w) memory accesses (if one can only store w group elements, then
he does w baby steps and N/w giant steps. This gives an algorithm with
storage w group elements and running time N/w group operations). Hence,
only w times faster than the exhaustive search case. Ideally we would like
a low-memory algorithm to solve the weight-w DLP in time O˜(
√
N), but
finding such an algorithm in general remains an open problem.
Using the methods of van Oorschot and Wiener [57] one can use a meet-
in-the-middle attack to obtain a low memory algorithm with complexity
O˜(N3/4) for the weight-w DLP, with O(
√
N) memory accesses. We briefly
give the details of this method. We assume without loss of generality that
L is even.
The starting point is the same as the time/memory tradeoff: Let Q =
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[n(τ)]P where n(τ) is a τ -adic of length L. We write n = i + τL/2j where
i and j are τ -adics of length L/2. We want to find a match [i]P = Q −
[j]τL/2(P ).
The first step of the method in [57] is to construct an easily computed
function
g1 : E(Fqm) −→ S
where S is the set of all τ -adics of length L/2. We also need a function
g2 : E(Fqm) → {0, 1}. Define f0(n(τ)) = [n(τ)]P and f1(n(τ)) = Q −
[n(τ)]τL/2(P ). Finally, we obtain
f : E(Fqm) −→ E(Fqm)
as f(R) = fg2(R)(g1(R)).
The method of [57] is to iterate f from randomly chosen starting points
R until a distinguished point is hit, in which case the start and end points are
stored. This process is repeated many times. Once collisions are detected
one can traverse the walks to find the exact collision points. There will be
many ‘useless’ collisions; these are inevitable since the map g1 is from a big
set to a much smaller set and so we can have a collision from
g1(R1) = g1(R2) and g2(R1) = g2(R2)
for points R1, R2 ∈ E(Fqm). Eventually one expects to find a useful collision
arising from the desired relation Q − [j]τL/2(P ) = [i]P (in other words,
f0(i(τ)) = f1(j(τ))) and we are done.
According to [57], the number of steps is 7n3/2/
√
w and the number of
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memory access are 9n, where n = 2w/2
(L/2
w/2
) ≈ √N . Therefore, for the
weight-w DLP, the number of steps is approximately (c−1)w/2 7(
L/2
w/2)
3/2
√
w
and
we need to access the memory approximately 9((c− 1)w/2(L/2
w/2
)
) times.
When C = {−1, 0, 1}, since the number of τ -adics of length L/2 and
weight w/2 is O(2w/2
(L/2
w/2
)
) the main result of [57] implies that the number
of steps of this algorithm is 2w/2
7(L/2w/2)
3/2
√
w
. Taking N = 2w
(
L
w
)
we end up
with O˜(N3/4). The number of accesses to the memory is therefore O˜(
√
N).
Table 5.3 shows the number of group operations of van Oorschot and
Wiener’s generalisation of Coppersmith deterministic method, when we use
L = 160, c′ = 2 and some values of w.
Table 5.3: Number of group operations for L = 160 and weight w using van Oorschot
and Wiener.
w Group Operations
5 221.58
10 242.92
20 271.52
23 276.92
24 281.18
We can see that for w 6 23 the method is better than the distributed
Pollard-rho in the whole group E(F2163).
5.5 The 2-Dimensional Discrete Log Problem
In this section, we use the Gaudry-Schost Algorithm [25] to find a discrete
log using a 2-dimensional pseudorandom walk.
Definition 26. Let E(Fqm) be an elliptic curve, let Q,P1, P2 be points of E
130
5. The Frobenius Expansions DLP
and let a, b be integers of known size. The 2-dimensional discrete log problem
(2-dim DLP for short) is to find integers x, y such that Q = [x]P1 + [y]P2,
for |x| 6 a and |y| 6 b.
5.5.1 The Sample Space
We need to define the sample space in which the discrete log is supposed to
lie. By assumption the discrete log lies within a rectangular box of sizes 2a
and 2b, centered in the cartesian origin (0, 0). Therefore, we can define our
sample space:
Definition 27. Let P1 and P2 be points of an elliptic curve E(Fqm). Let
a, b be integers of some known value. We define:
X = {[x]P1 + [y]P2, such that |x| 6 a, |y| 6 b}.
We assume that there do not exist distinct (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in X such
that [x1]P1 + [y1]P2 = [x2]P1 + [y2]P2.
The number of elements of X is the area of the box in which the discrete
log is supposed to lie. In other words:
#X = (2a).(2b) = 4ab.
5.5.2 Gaudry-Schost Low-Memory Algorithm
Gaudry and Schost [25] propose an algorithm for the 2-dim DLP. They define
a pseudorandom walk in the set X of the form Ri+1 = Ri + [sφ(Ri)]P1 + P2
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(for more details, see Section 5.5.3).
They estimate the running time using simplifying assumptions. For in-
stance:
• they assume that the pseudorandom walk stays inside X ;
• they do not consider that Tame-Tame and Wild-Wild collisions may
occur;
• they also do not consider that some walks may not reach a distin-
guished point (an estimate of the probability that a walk does not
reach a distinguished point is given in [58]);
• they do not give an analysis for the success probability.
We try to fill the gaps here, giving an estimate of how many steps are
likely to be outside of the search box and analysing the success probability
of the algorithm. We also conclude that “useless” collisions, i.e., Tame-
Tame and Wild-Wild collisions do not seriously affect our analysis. As an
application, we use Gaudry-Schost Algorithm to solve the general τ -DLP
and the τ -NAF DLP.
We analyse the parallel case only, since that is the one used in practice.
Basically, in our setting, we have P processors running in parallel. One half
of them are tame kangaroos, each one starting from a random point and
walking according to a 2-dimensional pseudorandom walk, to be defined
later. The other half of the processors are wild kangaroos, each one starting
from Q+[W1]P1+[W2]P2, for known integersW1,W2 and walking according
to the same pseudorandom walk. We expect that after O˜(
√
#X ) group
operations (this is the total machine time, i.e., when we consider the total
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amount of work done by all processors), some tame kangaroo lands on one of
the footprints of one of the wild kangaroos and then they continue following
the same path until both land on a distinguished point and the DLP is
solved. Now we give the details.
5.5.3 The Pseudorandom Walk
We recall from Section 3.3.2.1 that φ(R) maps the x-coordinate of a point R
to an integer j, where j is computed modulo s (and s is the number of
partitions of our group). Let sj be a function to be defined later.
Each kangaroo starts at some random point R0 = [x0]P1 + [y0]P2 and
jumps according to the following pseudorandom walk:
x-direction: xi+1 = xi + sφ(Ri).
y-direction: yi+1 = yi + 1.
So that Ri+1 = Ri + [sφ(Ri)]P1 + P2. Notice that at each new point visited,
we have Ri = [xi]P1 + [yi]P2. The walk stops when a distinguished point
R′ = [x′]P1 + [y′]P2 is reached (see Definition 13 for distinguished point).
Then each R′ is stored by a server, who coordinates the solution of the
problem.
We remark that one advantage of choosing +1 in the y-direction is to
avoid collisions within the same walk (self-collisions).
One should question that the walk is not close to random because in the
y-direction the kangaroo always move one step to the North. We present
the following heuristic:
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Heuristic 3. Let X be a rectangular box of sides 2a and 2b. Run the above
pseudorandom walk, starting from a point chosen uniformly at random, until
a distinguished point is reached. Let P be the induced distribution on X . We
claim that the distribution of P over X is close to uniform.
Note if all points are distinguished then this heuristic is trivially true.
So, if the number of processors P is large then this heuristic is plausible.
We also give a picture where we plotted the walks of approximately
4, 000 kangaroos starting from random points in (−a, a)×(−b, b) and walking
according to the pseudorandom walk defined above. Let X be our search
area. We used a = 98304 and b = 65536 (these numbers arise in Section 5.6
with τ -adic expansions of length L = 30). Note that the area shown in the
picture is larger than X , so that we can see that some steps go outside the
search area. In Section 5.5.6 we give an estimate for the number of steps
outside X . By observing Figure 5.1 we can note that the random walks give
a good coverage of X , which supports Heuristic 3.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of 4, 000 random walks. The bounds for axis x and y are
respectively (−120000, 120000) and (−70000, 70000). The black vertical lines represent
x = −a and x = a for a = 98304 and the black horizontal lines represent y = −b and
y = b, for b = 65536.
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5.5.4 The Number of Steps in Each Walk
We recall that each kangaroo will jump according to a 2-dimensional pseu-
dorandom walk until a distinguished point is reached. By defining the dis-
tinguishing property, we can bound the number of steps in each walk. For
example, according to [58], we can classify a point as “distinguished” if its
binary representation has some fixed number of leading zeros. In our imple-
mentation, we classify a point as distinguished if its x-coordinate modulo
some value θ is equal to zero. Let 1/θ be the proportion of distinguished
points. Therefore, we expect to reach a distinguished point after θ steps.
As a practical example, van Oorschot andWiener [58] use 1θ = (0.93)2
−32.
They remark that such value is close to (234/256)2−32, which can be achieved
by defining a point as distinguished if it has 32 leading zero bits and the
next 8 bits have a binary value less than 234.
It might happen that some walk never reaches a distinguished point. To
avoid this, we must define an upper bound for the number of steps. If the
kangaroo reaches that upper bound, we abandon the walk. This idea appears
in [58]. Note that the work done on such walks is wasted for the algorithm
since a collision on such points will never be detected. Therefore, we cannot
count the steps of those walks in the analysis, but we must count them
to compute the total number of steps of the algorithm. In Section 5.5.6 we
give a theorem for the proportion of points that do not reach a distinguished
point.
Notice that, depending on the position of the starting point and also on
the size of each walk, some points can be outside the box, and therefore,
outside our sample space. Of course such walks could be useful in practice,
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but for our analysis we need to use an argument about sampling n points
from a set of size N , so we have to work within a fixed size region. Again,
the steps of such walks must be counted to compute the total number of
steps of the algorithm. In Section 5.5.6 we give an estimate for the number
of steps outside X .
5.5.5 Analysis
We recall from Chapter 3 that the success probability of Pollard-kangaroo
is estimated using the mean step size. In the analysis of their 2-dimensional
algorithm, Gaudry and Schost use the Birthday Paradox (see Section 3.3.1).
In this section, we analyse Gaudry-Schost algorithm using probability ar-
guments similar to the method used by Pollard to analyse the kangaroo
method and give an estimate for the probability of success.
5.5.5.1 Choice of Parameters
In this Section, we present the parameters used in our implementation. We
do not claim that they are the best choices, but the results obtained from
MAGMA [10] experiments showed they are satisfactory (see Section 5.6.1).
• P (number of processors), Q (number of distinguished points) and
θ (expected number of steps) - Note that Algorithm 6 is a serial
implementation of Gaudry-Schost Algorithm, so our analysis is based
on a scenario where one processor computes Q distinguished points,
and it takes, on average, θ steps to reach a distinguished point. Hence,
in Section 5.5.5.3 we consider the running time of Algorithm 6 to
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be Qθ.
In real life, the computation is performed in parallel and we usually
do not have much control in the number of processors, but it really
does not matter in practice. If we have few processors available, each
of them runs lots of walks in the lifetime of the computation and
computes a great number of distinguished points. In that case, if
we need to compute Q distinguished points, each processor computes
Q/P of them and the running time will be Qθ/P. Note that using
more processors reduces the amount of work of each processor. Since
the choice of Q and θ determines the running time, we leave that
choice to be treated separately in Section 5.5.7.
Given the size of the problem and the amount of memory available,
one determines the value of θ and therefore, t (see below). It is clear
to see that the amount of storage depends on θ. If θ is relatively small,
the walk is short, so there will be many distinguished points sent to
the server. On the other hand, if θ is large, the walks are long and
there will be less distinguished points sent to the server and therefore,
less storage.
• t (parameter used to compute the length of steps in the x-direction)
- We will see in Lemma 5.5.2 and Conjecture 3 that the expected
maximum distance travelled from the origin is a function of θ and m.
Since m depends on t, when t is very small, the mean absolute step
size m will be small and therefore the maximum distance travelled will
be small as well. As a result, we have very few steps outside the region
but the walks will not be close to uniformly distributed over X . On
the other hand, if t is too large, we will have many steps outside the
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region. We conjecture that t should be c+ log θ for some constant c+;
• si (steps in the x-direction) - We move the kangaroos in the x-direction
using powers of 2. Here, unlike standard Pollard-kangaroo, we allow
the kangaroos to move either to the East or to the West. In other
words:
si ∈ {−1, 1,−2, 2,−4, 4, . . .− 2 t2−1, 2 t2−1};
Note that for this case, the mean absolute step size is
m =
2
t
2 − 1
t/2
.
• Top (upper bound for number of steps) - It might happen that some
walk never reaches a distinguished point. To avoid this, we must define
an upper bound for the number of steps. If the kangaroo reaches that
upper bound, we abandon the walk. This idea appears in [58]. We
have chosen Top = 20θ. See Section 5.5.6 for more details;
• T1, T2 (starting points for the tame kangaroos) - Each kangaroo starts
from a random point inside X . Trivially, if we start the tame kangaroos
in (−a, a)× (−b, b), then every point in X can be potentially reached.
However, we have many steps outside X . We must define a bound
such that we ensure that the kangaroos can potentially reach every
point of X and also that we do not have too many steps outside X .
So, we start the tame kangaroos in (−da, da)×(−cb, cb), where c, d are
positive real numbers less than 1. We define the values for c and d in
Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.3. In Section 5.5.6 we analyse the probability
that steps go outside X .
• W1,W2 (starting points for the wild kangaroos) - The wild kangaroos’
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starting points are in an region of sides (−da, da)× (−cb, cb), centered
at Q. In other words, the wild kangaroos walk in the set Q + X =
{Q + P : P ∈ X}. We will see in Section 5.5.5.4 that the area of
interest for us will be the area where the wild kangaroos intersect the
tame kangaroos. In Section 5.5.6 we give an estimate of the probability
that wild steps go outside Q+ X .
Now we reduce the problem to a 1-dimensional random walk in [0, b] in order
to define the size of c.
Lemma 5.5.1. Consider a pseudorandom walk which starts between points 0
and b (without loss of generality, we assume here that b is a positive integer).
Let c × b for a positive real c < 1 be the most distant starting point from
0. Let θ be the number of steps and let the size of each step be 1. When
c = 1− θ/b, every point in (0, b) can be reached.
Proof. Since each walk has length approximately θ, we need c× b+ θ to be
at least equal to b to ensure that every point between (0, b) can be reached.
This leads to c = 1− θ/b.
Now we reduce the problem to a 1-dimensional random walk in [0, a].
Before defining the size of d, we define the average distance from the origin.
Lemma 5.5.2. Let θ be the number of steps. Let O be the starting point of
some random walk. Let m be the mean step size, to the East or to the West.
The expected distance from O after θ steps is m
√
2θ/pi.
Proof. According to [39] (see also [59]), the average distance in absolute
value from the origin in a 1-dimensional random walk when one takes θ steps
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of size 1 to the left or to the right is Davr =
√
2θ/pi. When we abandon the
restriction that the steps have size 1, it follows that the average distance
reached from 0 to the left or to the right is mDavr = m
√
2θ/pi, where m is
the mean absolute step size.
The expected maximum distance from some point is computed in [15].
They consider a random walk that starts at the origin and takes n steps uni-
formly distributed on the real interval [−1, 1]. Such value is Dmax ≈
√
2n
3pi .
Now we use that result to state the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3. Let θ be the number of steps. Let O be the starting point of
some random walk. Let m be the mean step size, to the East or to the West.
The expected maximum distance from O after θ steps is Dist = 2m√
3
√
2θ
pi .
Evidence for the conjecture: Let Dmax ≈
√
2n
3pi as above. Note that
Dmax = Davr√3 for Davr as in Lemma 5.5.2. Since to compute Dmax we take
steps distributed randomly on the real interval [−1, 1], the mean absolute
step size is 1/2. To get the mean absolute step size equals to m, we just
multiply by 2m. So it follows that Dist = 2m√
3
√
2θ
pi .
Finally we define the value of d:
Lemma 5.5.3. Consider a pseudorandom walk which starts between points
0 and a (again, without loss of generality, we assume that a is a posi-
tive integer). Let d × a for positive real d < 1 be the the most distant
starting point from 0. let θ be the number of steps. Let t be parame-
ter used to compute the length of the steps, let the size of each step be in
{−1, 1,−2, 2,−4, 4, . . . , 2 t2−1, 2 t2−1}. Let m be the mean absolute step size
and let Dist be the expected maximum distance reached from 0, according to
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Lemma 5.5.5.1. When d = 1−Dist/a, every point in (0, a) can be reached
with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Note that even if the starting point was in the centre of X some
walks could have length greater than a. However, those walks are very rare,
because we need some special combination of positive and very large steps
to reach some point beyond a. For example, if a = 217, θ = 25 and the
largest step size is 213, a walk which starts in the centre of X would have
length > a if all steps were equal to 213, since (25)(213) = 218 > a = 217. If
we choose d too far from a (in other words, too close from the centre of X ),
although it is possible that points in a or very close to a can be reached,
we will not have a distribution close to uniform as we assumed. By taking
d = 1−Dist/a we ensure that most of the points which start in or close to d
will reach a. Obviously, with such choice, some steps may go beyond a. See
Section 5.5.6 for an estimate of the probability that steps go outside X .
5.5.5.2 Algorithm
Since we could not simulate a parallel implementation, Algorithm 6 presents
a serial implementation of Gaudry-Schost Algorithm. Note that, in the
parallel version, it does not make sense to compute first the tame steps, sort
the list of distinguished points and then compute the wild steps and look for
a match using binary search. In practice, we have all processors computing
the tame and wild steps simultaneously and sending the information about
distinguished points to the server. The server stores the distinguished points
in a data structure which can be searched efficiently and when a Tame-Wild
collision is found, we are done.
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Remark 4: Notice that in Algorithm 6, we use the x-coordinates of the
tame and the wild kangaroos to get an integer, because we need an integer
to sort the list of distinguished points so that we can use Binary Search. As
a result, it may happen that we have a collision Tame = Wild but in fact,
xTame = xWild and yTame = −yWild. In this case, when we compute n =
(SD[index][2]−W1)+(SD[index][3]−W2)τ , we find the wrong value for the
DLP. The solution for that is simple: Let r be the order of point P . Let [c]P
be the point where the tame kangaroo lands after its walk and let [n+ d]P
be the point where the wild kangaroo lands after its walk (by definition, [c]P
and [n + d]P are the same distinguished point). If Algorithm 6 outputs a
solution which does not match with the DLP, we compute c′ = r − c. The
solution for the DLP will be n = c′ − d, since [c′]P = [n+ d]P ;
5.5.5.3 Running Time
Recall that the DLP is solved when we find a Tame-Wild collision. We
call this a useful collision. Note that Tame-Tame and Wild-Wild collisions
do not solve the DLP. When computing the running time for a parallel
counterpart of Algorithm 6, we need to count the number of steps needed to
find a useful collision, considering the amount of work done by all processors
in parallel. We call that the total machine time. Note that the running
time for each processor individually it is just the total machine time divided
by the number of processors, P.
Lemma 5.5.4. Let P be the number of processors, let Q be the (expected)
total number of distinguished points that need to be computed such that a
useful collision is found by the server and let 1θ be the proportion of distin-
guished points. The expected running time to solve the discrete logarithm
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Algorithm 6 Gaudry-Schost Algorithm - Serial version
Input: group E(Fq); points P1, P2, Q ∈ E(Fq); number of distinguished
points Q; proportion of distinguished points 1/θ; Top; a; b; c← 1−θ/b;
d← 1−Dist/a.
Output: integers x and y such that Q = [x]P1 + [y]P2.
1: Choose t ∈ N
2: PPi← {−1, 1,−2, 2,−4, 4, . . . , 2 t2−1, 2 t2−1}
3: PPj ← [1 : i ∈ [0 . . . t− 1]]
4: PP ← [PPi[i] ∗ P1 + PPj[i] ∗ P2 : i ∈ [0 . . . t− 1]]
5: function PollardWalk (P, Pi, Pj)
6: for length = 1 to Top do
7: u← xP mod t
8: P ← P + PP [u+ 1]
9: Pi← Pi+ PPi[u+ 1]
10: Pj ← Pj + PPj[u+ 1]
11: if xP ≡ 0 mod θ then
12: Return P, P i, P j /* Distinguished point found */
13: end if
14: end for
15: end function
16: [Tame Kangaroo]
17: for NrTame = 1 to dQ/2e do
18: T1 ← Random(d−d ∗ ae, dd ∗ ae); T2 ← Random(d−c ∗ be, dc ∗ be)
19: Tame← [T1]P1 + [T2]P2
20: Tame, T1, T2 ← PollardWalk(Tame, T1, T2)
21: [Constructing a list of distinguished points]
22: if Tame is Distinguished then
23: Store [xTame, T1, T2] in a list D
24: end if
25: end for
26: SD ← Sort(D) /* Sorting List D by its first component */
27: [Wild Kangaroo]
28: W1 ← 0; W2 ← 0
29: for NrWild = 1 to dQ/2e do
30: Wild← Q+ [W1]P1 + [W2]P2
31: Wild,W1,W2 ← PollardWalk(Wild,W1,W2)
32: if Wild is Distinguished then Binary Search xWild in SD
33: if xWild = SD[index][1] then
34: Output x = (SD[index][2]−W1), y = ±(SD[index][3]−W2)
35: end if
36: W1 ← Random(d−d ∗ ae, dd ∗ ae); W2 ← Random(d−c ∗ be, dc ∗ be)
37: end for
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problem using a parallel version of Algorithm 6 is Qθ/P group operations.
Proof. We have P/2 processors representing tame kangaroos and P/2 pro-
cessors representing wild kangaroos. Each processor computes approxi-
mately Q/P distinguished points. The expected length of a walk is θ, so
the expected running time (for each processor) is Qθ/P.
Note that Qθ/P is the running time for the parallelised Gaudry-Schost
Algorithm, not the running time of Algorithm 6. Clearly, the running time
of Algorithm 6 isQθ group operations. Experimentally, we counted the total
number of steps and we found all of them less or equal than Qθ. Obviously,
when there is a collision, the running time is usually smaller than that.
5.5.5.4 Finding a collision
Now we need to know the number of steps needed for the server to find a
useful collision. Hence, we need to compute the total machine time, con-
sidering the work done by all processors in parallel. In this section, we will
define values k, k′ and K. We assume that such values are number of steps
considering all the work done, not only number of steps taken by one proces-
sor individually. So, to make things easier, we assume in this analysis that
we have just one processor. Therefore, the final result (i.e., the value of K
needed for the server to find a useful collision, see Theorem 5.5.7) represents
the number of steps in the total machine time. When we use P processors
running in parallel, each one will compute, on average, K/P steps.
Using Heuristic 3, we assumed that the points are randomly sampled
from the sample space X . We have approximately (Q/2)θ points visited by
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tame kangaroos and approximately (Q/2)θ points visited by wild kangaroos.
The starting points for the tame kangaroos are randomly chosen from
(−da, da) × (−cb, cb) which means that the tame kangaroos nearly cover
the whole area X . Let us call T the region in which the tame kangaroos
walk (i.e., T = X ). Obviously, it can happen that some tame kangaroos go
outside T and also that some walks do not reach a distinguished point.
The first wild kangaroo starts at Q an then its starting points are shifted
in an area of sides (−da, da) × (−cb, cb), centered in Q. Let us call W
the region in which the wild kangaroos walk. Using the previous notation,
W = Q+X . Again, it can happen that some wild kangaroos go outside W
and also that some walks do not reach a distinguished point.
We call a step good if it lies in T or in W and the end of its walk reaches
a distinguished point. We call a step bad otherwise. In the rest of this
chapter we use K to denote the total number of steps taken by kangaroos,
so that K ≈ Qθ. We let k be the number of good steps. Later we will use
k′ to denote the number of good steps which lie also in the region of overlap
between the space of tame kangaroo walks and the space of wild kangaroo
walks.
Notice that it can happen that some steps of a walk go outside the
regions of interest (T or W ) but afterwards the walk returns to the region
and reaches a distinguished point inside T orW . In that case, only the steps
that go outside T or W will be counted as bad steps. All steps of such a
walk which are inside the region of interest will be counted as good steps.
We follow the approach of [25] and define A = T ∩W , i.e., the region
where the tame kangaroos footprints can overlap the wild kangaroos. Let
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k′ be the total number of good steps in A (Tame or Wild). Assuming
that the distribution of tame and wild kangaroos is close to uniform, we
have approximately k′/2 tame kangaroo steps and approximately k′/2 wild
kangaroo steps in A.
5.5.5.5 The Probability of Success
In this section we give an estimate for the probability of success of the Algo-
rithm in terms of the number of steps. This enables us to determine the total
machine time for any desired success probability. Note that until the server
detects a Tame-Wild collision, some Tame-Tame and Wild-Wild collisions
may occur. For the analysis of the success probability of the algorithm, we
do not mind whether such “useless” collisions occur. We just want to be
sure that there is a Tame-Wild collision.
Let S1 be the set of points visited by tame kangaroos which are in the
region where tame and wild kangaroos overlap (i.e., A). Perhaps there are
some Tame-Tame collisions, but not very many. For the parameters we
are considering we expect only one or two Tame-Tame collisions. Hence
#S1 ≈ k′/2. Now let S2 be the set of points visited by wild kangaroos in
the region of overlap. Again, #S2 ≈ k′/2.
Finally, what is the probability that S1 and S2 are disjoint (i.e., there
are no collisions between them)? If we think of choosing S1 first and then
choosing S2 then each element in S2 has to avoid all the elements in S1. So
the probability that S2 is disjoint from S1 is
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P1 ≈
(
1− k
′/2
#A
)k′/2
≈ e−(k′/2)2/(#A) ≈ e−(k′)2/(4#A)
Hence, the probability that there is a Tame-Wild collision is
1− e−(k′)2/(4#A). (5.2)
To get success probability 0.5 in the worst case (i.e., #A = 14(#X )) we
solve 1− e−(k′)2/(4#A) = 0.5 and so
k′ =
√
(#X ) ln 2.
5.5.6 Counting bad steps
In this section we deal with points that go outside the bounds of T and
W and walks that do not reach a distinguished point. Both cases are not
counted in the probability argument, but we need to add them to compute
the total number of steps.
Definition 28. We call N1 the total number of steps abandoned, due to the
walks that do not reach a distinguished point.
Definition 29. Let T be the region where the tame kangaroos walk and
let W be the regions where the wild kangaroos walk. We call N2 the total
number of steps that go outside T or W .
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5.5.6.1 Walks That Do Not Reach a Distinguished Point
We quote a Theorem from [58] that shows the proportion of steps that do
not reach a distinguished point. The proof of this theorem can also be found
in [58].
Lemma 5.5.5. Let K be the total number of steps. Let Top be a parameter
which determines the maximum walk length. For Top = 20θ, we have N1 <
(5× 10−8)K.
Proof. The maximum walk length is 20θ and we abandon any walk which
exceeds the maximum length. Since the probability of a distinguished point
to be reached is 1/θ, the probability that a distinguished point will not be
reached is 1− 1/θ.
After walking up to the maximum walk length the probability that some
walk length exceeds 20θ is (1 − 1/θ)20θ ≈ e−20. Each abandoned walk has
length about 20 times longer than the average θ, therefore, the proportion
of points that do not reach a distinguished point is ≈ 20e−20 < 5× 10−8.
If K is the total number of steps, it follows that
N1 < (5× 10−8)K.
5.5.6.2 Footsteps Outside T and W
We recall that the wild kangaroo footsteps are in a region called W and the
tame kangaroo footsteps are in an region called T , and they intersect in an
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region called A. Now we analyse the number of tame kangaroo footsteps
that are outside the bounds of T and the number of wild kangaroo footsteps
that are outside W . Note that T and W have the same area (i.e., the same
area as X ), because both of them have sides (−da, da), (−cb, cb). The only
difference is that T is centered in the centre of X while W is centered in Q.
Therefore, the average number of wild kangaroo footprints outside W is the
same as the average number of tame kangaroo footprints outside T .
Our analysis reduces to a 1-dimensional random walk. In the y-direction,
the average length is θ. Since the steps are always increased by 1 and the
most distant starting point from the centre of T (orW ) is cb, for c = 1−θ/b
(see Lemma 5.5.1), we can assume that the steps do not go outside T (or
W ) in the y-direction. Now we analyse the x-direction.
Conjecture 4. Let T (or W ) be the region where the tame (respectively
wild) random walks are supposed to lie and let K be the total number of steps.
We conjecture that the number of steps outside the bounds of T (respectively
W ) is N2 6 0.025K.
Evidence for the conjecture. Experimentally, we used MAGMA
[10] to perform an experiment to support our conjecture. We fixed the
starting point to be a − β(Dist) for some positive integer β and computed
the number of steps outside the bounds of T (respectively W ). We recall
from Lemma 5.5.5.1 that Dist is the expected maximum distance from the
starting point after θ steps. We repeated the experiment 1000 times for
each β in [1, a/Dist]. The results are shown in Table 5.4. We call Pβ
the probability of steps being outside X for each β (we measured that by
counting the number of points [x]P1 + [y]P2 in which |x| > a and dividing
the result by the total number of steps).
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Table 5.4: Number of steps outside T (or W )/ Total number of steps.
t = 26, θ = 25 t = 24, θ = 27 t = 22, θ = 28 t = 26, θ = 215
β Pβ Pβ Pβ Pβ
1 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.29
2 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.14
3 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08
4 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06
5 0.04 0.03 0.035 0.02
6 0.03 0.008 0.002 0.01
7 0.02 0.0004 0.002 0.003
8 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
9 0.005 0.01 0.0009 0.003
10 0.004 0.02 0 0.009
11 0.004 0.006 0 0.008
12 0.0002 0.005 0 0.001
13 0.0002 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0
Pout 0.0215 0.021 0.013 0.018
From Table 5.4, we computed the overall probability of steps outside T
(respectivelyW ). For β > 14 we always found Pβ = 0. The values used arise
from Section 5.6. For the second, third and forth columns we took L = 30
and a = 98304. For the fifth column we took L = 40 and a = 3145728. The
value of Dist depends on θ and t, since Dist ≈ m√2θ/pi.
The probability that steps are outside T (or W ) is
Pout =
Dist
a
ba/Distc∑
β=1
Pβ.
The results of the last row support our conjecture. Since the total num-
ber of steps is K, it follows that
N2 = KPout 6 0.025K.
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We performed a second experiment in that we started the walks from a
random starting point in (−da, da) × (−cb, cb) and computed the number
of steps outside the bounds. We used θ = 25 and a = 98304 and the
maximum value found in 1000 repetitions was 0.02K, which confirms the
first experiment.
From these experiments, we concluded that only walks starting very near
the bounds can cause some problems to our analysis.
5.5.7 Choice of Q and θ
We recall from Section 5.5.4 that some walks may not reach a distinguished
point and also some steps can be outside the bounds of T and W . Then
in Section 5.5.6 we estimated the values N1 and N2, which respectively
represents the number of steps abandoned when a walk does not reach a
distinguished point and the number of steps of the tame or wild kangaroos
that are outside the bounds of T or W .
Let α ∈ R be a constant such that #A = α(#X ). Gaudry and Schost [25]
give an estimate of A in relation to X . Clearly, A 6= ∅. In the worst case, Q
is in one of the corners of X , and #A = 14(#X ). In the best case, Q is close
to the centre of X , and #A ≈ #X . So, we take #A = α(#X ) for some α
in [1/4, 1].
Note that if we have k′ steps in A, assuming the distribution uniform, we
have approximately k′/2 tame footsteps and k′/2 wild footsteps in A. Also
note that the total number of good steps (i.e., k) is the sum of the good
steps in T and the good steps in W . Since T and W have the same area as
X , and #A = α(#X ), we have k′/(2α) good steps in T and k′/(2α) good
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steps in W . Therefore k = k′/α.
We computed in Section 5.5.5.4 the probability of at least one success-
ful Tame-Wild collision in an area A, which is the area in that the tame
kangaroos steps intersect the wild kangaroos steps.
Lemma 5.5.6. Let notation be as above, so α = #A#X . The required number
of good steps is k = 1α
√
(#X ) ln 2.
Proof. We cover X close to uniformly, with k kangaroo footprints. Then
the number of steps which lie in A is approximately αk. To have αk =√
(#X ) ln 2, we need k = 1α
√
(#X ) ln 2.
Finally, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 5.5.7. Let X be the sample space and let #X be the number of
elements in X . Assume Conjecture 4 above. The total number of steps of
Algorithm 6 to have success probability > 0.5 in the worst case is at most
3.51
√
#X group operations.
Proof. We know from Section 5.5.5.3 that the total number of steps of Al-
gorithm 6 is Qθ. From Lemma 5.5.6, we recall that
k =
1
α
√
(#X ) ln 2
is the total number of good steps.
To compute the total number of steps in Algorithm 6, we need to add
N1, and 2(N2) to k (remember, the number of tame steps outside T is
approximately the number of wild steps outside W ). From Lemma 5.5.5,
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we have:
N1 < (5× 10−8)K.
From Conjecture 4, we have:
N2 6 0.025K.
So:
Qθ = K 6 k + (5× 10−8)K + 2(0.025)K
K(1− 5× 10−8 − 2(0.025)) 6 k
K 6 1.05k
We consider the worst case (i.e., α = 1/4). Then:
K 6 3.51
√
#X .
Now that we know the number of steps needed to find a useful col-
lision (K), given the amount of memory available, one can compute the
number of distinguished points necessary, i.e., Q. In the parallel case, we
let each processor compute Q/P distinguished points.
Note that since we don’t know where the discrete log is, we have to
assume the worst case, that is, Q is in the corner of X and therefore, A =
1
4X . On average, the discrete log is more concentrated in the centre of X
(remember the pictures of τ -adic distribution), so usually we take more steps
than necessary. For example, in the best case, the discrete log is close to
the centre of X (i.e., α ≈ 1 and W = T = X ) and if we take K = 3.51√#X
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steps we have k = 3.51/1.05
√
#X and hence k′ = αk = 3.34√#X . Using
this value for k′ in Equation (5.2) results in a success probability ≈ 0.94.
The experimental results (see Section 5.6.1) confirm this value.
If we have any hint that α > 1/4, we can take less steps and get a smaller
constant hidden in the O( ).
5.6 Using the Gaudry-Schost Algorithm to Solve
the τ-DLP
Now that we have described and analysed the Gaudry-Schost Algorithm, it
is straightforward to use it to solve the τ -DLP. We take P1 = P for some
point P ∈ E(F2m) and P2 = τ(P ). We know from Section 4.2.4 that a τ -adic
expansion of length L can be mapped down to x + yτ , for integers x, y of
certain size. We recall from Section 5.5.7 that the total number of steps of
Algorithm 6 depends on the number of elements in X .
Using the bounds for x and y (recall Theorem 4.2.2: |x| < a = 2.81
√
2L
and |y| < b = 2
√
2L) leads to #X = 4ab = 22.48(2L). Therefore, from
Theorem 5.5.7, Section 5.5.7, the required number of group operations when
α = 1/4 is 2L/2+4.06.
Using the τ -adic distribution (see Conjecture 1, Section 4.2.6), for the
general τ -DLP we take a = 2.28
√
2L and b = 1.8
√
2L, which leads to #X =
4ab = 16.42(2L). From Theorem 5.5.7, Section 5.5.7, the required number
of group operations when α = 1/4 is 2L/2+3.83.
We can use the same algorithm for the general τ -DLP to solve the τ -NAF
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DLP. Obviously, the output will not be a τ -NAF, but will be an expression
x + yτ equivalent to the τ -NAF which represents the discrete log. Using
the bounds proved for τ -NAFs (recall Theorem 4.2.3: |x| < a = 2.20
√
2L
and |y| < b = 1.52
√
2L) results in #X = 4(2.20)(1.52)2L = 13.38(2L)). In
that case, the number of group operations according to Theorem 5.5.7 when
α = 1/4 is 2L/2+3.68.
We can get an even smaller constant implicit in the O( ) when we make
use of the τ -NAF distribution (remember, according to Conjecture 2, for
τ -NAFs we have |x| < a = 1.53
√
2L and |y| < b = 1.24
√
2L, which leads
to #X = 4(1.53)(1.24)2L = 7.59(2L)). As a consequence, we can choose a
smaller number of processors and the number of group operations becomes
2L/2+3.27 when α = 1/4.
5.6.1 Experimental Results
We implemented Algorithm 6 (which we call Aτ for short) in MAGMA [10]
and obtained the following results (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6):
Experiment 1 Run Aτ N times, each time picking a random τ -adic n of
length 6 L such that Q = [n]P .
Obs. (1) We used the values of a and b based on the distribution of
τ -adics (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3);
Obs. (2) We used the values of a and b based on the distribution of
τ -NAFs (see Figure 4.6).
Note that the success probability gets smaller when we use the τ -adic
distribution. This can be explained because when we choose a = 3
√
2L
and b = 2
√
2L (such values are an approximation to integers of the
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Table 5.5: Experimental results - type 1.
L N a b Qθ Average run time # of success Obs
30 100 3
√
2L 2
√
2L 219.10 218.56 96
30 100 3
√
2L 2
√
2L 219.10 218.65 88
30 100 3
√
2L 2
√
2L 219.10 218.57 94
30 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 218.82 218.43 84 (1)
30 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 218.82 218.44 86 (1)
30 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 218.82 218.50 77 (1)
40 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 223.82 223.42 80 (1)
30 100 1.53
√
2L 1.24
√
2L 218.27 218.06 62 (2)
results of Theorem 4.2.2) we do not expect to have the DLP very close
to the edges and therefore, the overlap region A will be large with high
probability. However, when we reduce the region based on the τ -adic
distribution, it can happen that the DLP is in the edges, so the worst
case (i.e., the discrete log close to one of the corners of X and hence a
smaller A) is more likely to occur.
Experiment 2 Pick a random τ -adic n of length 6 L such that Q = [n]P
and afterwards run Aτ N times, for the same Q.
Table 5.6: Experimental results - type 2.
L N a b Qθ Average run time # of success Obs
30 100 3
√
2L 2
√
2L 219.10 218.58 94
30 100 3
√
2L 2
√
2L 219.10 218.57 96
30 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 218.82 218.51 72 (1)
30 100 2.28
√
2L 1.8
√
2L 218.82 218.42 86 (1)
30 100 1.53
√
2L 1.24
√
2L 218.27 218.11 61 (2)
The same Obs. of Table 5.5 hold for Table 5.6.
Experiment 3 We fixed Q in one of the corners of X (i.e., we took Q =
a+ bτ) and ran Aτ 100 times. We got 59 successes, which is close to
the expected theoretical probability of success. We recall that we had
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assumed that Q is in one of the corners to compute the theoretical
probability of success. In practice, however, the discrete log is more
likely to be close to the centre of X (see distribution of τ -adics, Sec-
tion 4.2.6), which explains why we got high probabilities with random
choices, because we took more steps than necessary.
5.6.2 Further Remarks
Remark 5: If memory is available, then for some problems (e.g., τ -NAF
DLP) it is better to do BSGS using τ -adics than to use the x+ yτ represen-
tation, because the hidden constants are smaller.
Remark 6: Comparing the running time of Gaudry-Schost algorithm (Sec-
tion 5.6) for the general τ -DLP with the running time of van Oorschot
and Wiener algorithm for the weight-w τ -DLP (Table 5.3, Section 5.4) we
conclude that depending on the value of w, it will be better to use the
Gaudry-Schost 2-dimensional algorithm for the general τ -DLP to solve also
the weight-w τ -DLP. For example, for L = 140 and w = 24, the required
number of steps for solving the τ -DLP using van Oorschot and Wiener al-
gorithm is approximately 277.4 group operations and the required number
of steps using 2-dim Gaudry-Schost algorithm with the same parameters
is approximately 274.06 group operations, when using the proved values
a = 2.81
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L and even smaller when using sizes of a and
b based on the τ -adic distribution. Remember, using Pollard-rho in the
whole group E(F2163) takes 277.6 group operations, hence in this case, the
Gaudry-Schost for the general τ -DLP is the best choice.
Remark 7: We do not believe that the Gaudry-Schost algorithm can take
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into account extra knowledge about the discrete logarithm (i.e., that it has
Hamming weight w). This is analogous to the fact that there is no low mem-
ory algorithm better than [57] for the standard low Hamming weight DLP.
Remark 8: The improvement to Pollard methods using equivalence classes
under Frobenius (see [24, 60]) does not seem to apply in this case since
our small interval typically contains only one solution within a Frobenius
orbit of Q.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we defined three variants of the Frobenius expansion DLP,
namely, the general τ -DLP, the τ -NAF DLP and the weight-w τ -DLP and
presented algorithms to solve them. We are particularly interested in cases
when the length L of the Frobenius expansion is much smaller than the field
size, which means that solving the standard DLP and then, if necessary,
computing the Frobenius expansion, is not considered, since the standard
DLP is believed to be hard.
In particular, we used the Gaudry-Schost algorithm to solve the general
τ -DLP and the τ -NAF DLP in 2L/2+ε group operations with a theoretical
success probability around 0.54. The value of ε varies according to the posi-
tion of the discrete log and can be improved if we consider the distributions
of τ -adics and τ -NAFs. We experimented in practice using small parameters
and achieved a success probability bigger than 0.8.
Such difference between theory and practice can be explained because in
the computation of the theoretical probability of success, we have to assume
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the worst case, that is, Q is in the corner of X and therefore, the overlap
region is minimal. On average, the discrete log is more concentrated in the
centre of X , so for random choices we usually take more steps than necessary
and hence the success probability in practice is bigger than the probability
expected in theory. If we have any hint that α > 1/4, we can take less steps
and get a smaller constant hidden in the O( ). We experimented fixing Q
in one of the corners of X and got a success probability around 0.59, as
expected.
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In this chapter we present an application of Frobenius expansions with
the GPS identification scheme. We begin recalling the original scheme,
proposed by M. Girault and proved secure by G. Poupard and J. Stern.
We also remark that a natural implementation is to use the scheme over
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a Koblitz curve and convert integers into Frobenius expansions to perform
faster scalar multiplication. Then, we present τ -GPS, using an idea pro-
posed by H. Lenstra, in that scalars are replaced by Frobenius expansions in
protocols. We also present a security analysis of τ -GPS and describe a sta-
tistical attack over the τ -GPS protocol if the randomisation step proposed
in Section 4.3 is not used.
6.1 Motivation
The GPS1 identification protocol was the starting point of our entire project.
At the beginning, we were tempted to use Frobenius expansions with short
exponents in the GPS protocol, which would lead to smaller parameters,
compared with the usual integer case, because we believed, at that point,
that low-memory counterparts for the τ -DLP did not exist, or at least, did
not have a square-root behaviour.
We were proven wrong, as we showed in Chapter 5, but the τ -GPS
protocol may still have some advantages. One can speed up the oﬄine
operations on Koblitz curves significantly by using Frobenius expansions
to compute the required point multiplications. However, to implement the
GPS protocol would require conversion between Frobenius expansions and
integers and this would lead to extra code on the device (i.e., silicon area)
and extra computational cost.
Hence, the motivation of the present chapter is to develop a GPS system
which uses Frobenius expansions throughout. This will lead to fast and
1The abbreviation “GPS” stands for its authors names, Girault, Poupard and Stern,
so there is no connections at all with GPS, the Global Positioning System.
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simple oﬄine operations while still keeping the online operation fast (though
the arithmetic of the online operation is more complicated than standard
integer arithmetic and so is not as fast as standard GPS).
Since the study of τ -DLP showed that we cannot use shorter parame-
ters, the main advantage of using Frobenius expansions is that it does not
require conversion between integers and Frobenius expansions, being useful
to applications with limited oﬄine computation time and limited code area.
6.2 The GPS Identification Scheme
The GPS public key identification scheme is a three move challenge-response
protocol based on the Schnorr signature scheme (see Section 2.9 and [46]).
It was first described by Girault [26] and later developed by Poupard and
Stern [43] (also see [28]).
Recall that a public key identification scheme allows a prover to convince
a verifier that she possess the private key. In a three move protocol, the
prover sends a commitment (which can be computed in advance, i.e. oﬄine),
then receives a challenge and answers with a response (this is the “online
step”, which must be performed in realtime). The verifier then performs a
computation involving the commitment, challenge, response and public key
and outputs either accept or reject.
The idea of the GPS scheme is to make the online phase as fast and
simple as possible, so that it can be easily performed by very low power
devices. Further improvements to speed up the online phase were proposed
by Girault and Lefranc [27]. Okamoto, Katsuno and Okamoto [40] give an
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approach to reduce the bandwidth of the online step at the expense of the
size of the public key.
A typical application of GPS (see [28]) is “on-the-fly” authentication at a
road toll. Each car has a low cost smart card in which a GPS protocol runs.
The time required to transmit data and to perform online calculations is very
small, hence the car does not need to stop at the toll to be authenticated.
The oﬄine operations may be calculated while the car is driving along. Note
that we assume that the verifier (i.e., toll gate) has significant computational
resources, so that the verification step can be done quickly.
The original proposals for the GPS scheme suggested working in the
group (Z/NZ)∗ where N is an RSA modulus, or F∗p where p is a large prime.
However, since the computational device has extremely limited power it is
more natural to work with elliptic curves, especially Koblitz curves over
finite fields of small characteristic. The GPS protocol as described in [28]
can be implemented with such elliptic curves, and the security results apply
to this case. Using elliptic curves can give a significant speed-up to the
oﬄine generation of the commitment and the verification step, as well as
having lower memory and power consumption requirements. Due to the
nature of the GPS protocol, using elliptic curves does not have any effect
on the running time of the online step.
6.3 The Original GPS Scheme
We recall from Section 2.9 that a modular reduction is needed in the Schnorr
scheme. The main idea of the GPS protocol is to eliminate the modular
reduction performed during the response step. In other words, the response
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is just y = r + sc. This makes the computation more efficient, and it
reduces the code footprint on the device (since there is no need to implement
arithmetic modulo r).
The modular reduction in the computation of y is used to prove the zero
knowledge property of Schnorr signatures, hence a new proof of security is re-
quired for GPS and the parameters have to be carefully chosen (see [28, 43]).
In [28] the interactive protocol is proven to have statistical zero knowledge.
The original proposal by Girault [26] used the group (Z/NZ)∗ where N is
an RSA modulus. Later work [28] proposed any cyclic group for which the
discrete logarithm problem is hard.
An improvement to the original scheme, for which the online step is just
a single addition, was presented by Girault and Lefranc [27]. It requires that
the challenge (or alternatively, the private key) have a specific sparse form.
Table 6.1 gives the reader an idea of the bitlengths of the integers (s, c, r)
for an 80-bit security level of the private key and probability of successful
forgery at most 1/235. For more details see [27, 28].
Table 6.1: Numerical example of GPS scheme.
Scheme bitlength of s bitlength of c bitlength of y
Standard GPS 160 35 275
Girault-Lefranc 160 940 1180
6.4 GPS on Koblitz Curves With Fast Scalar Mul-
tiplication
The GPS scheme can be implemented using elliptic curves over a finite field.
In particular, one can use a Koblitz curve and convert integers into Frobe-
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nius expansions to perform fast scalar multiplications. We briefly give the
details:
Take a public point P and generate the key pair {s, I = [−s]P}. For sim-
plicity of notation, let us denote a τ -adic representation of an integer x by
x˜. The prover picks a random integer r, converts it into τ -adic r˜, computes
the commitment X = [r˜]P and sends X to verifier. Then, the verifier picks
a random integer c and returns it to prover. The answer step is the same
as the standard GPS (i.e., compute y = r + sc ∈ Z) and the verification
becomes to check if X = [y]P + [c]I. Again, to increase performance, the
verification step can be computed as [y˜]P + [c˜]I.
This method is very efficient, however there is the additional cost of
converting an integer to a Frobenius expansion (plus the extra code footprint
this requires). As noted by Solinas [50, 51], in any cryptographic protocol,
instead of choosing a random integer and converting to a τ -adic expansion
one can directly choose a τ -adic. This idea could be used for r in the
standard GPS protocol, but one would still need to convert back to an
integer for the computation y = r+sc ∈ Z in the online step. As mentioned
earlier, the conversion algorithm requires modular arithmetic which is not
otherwise needed as part of the GPS protocol. This results in additional
overhead in running time and code on the device. We will see in the next
section that these additional costs can be avoided if we use random τ -adics
instead of random integers.
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6.5 τ-GPS
When using τ -adic expansions instead of integers, we will get much faster
computations for I = [−s]P , X = [r]P and, in the verification step, for
X = [y]P + [c]I. Figure 6.1 shows the τ -GPS scheme. We recall from
Definition 17 (Section 4.2) that Tn =
{ n−1∑
i=0
xiτ
i | xj ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
}
. We can
repeat the protocol l times (though usually l = 1). We represent an element
x picked at random from a set X by: x r←− X .
System Parameters: S, R, C ∈ N, P ∈ E(F2m)
Private key: s r←− TS
Public key: I = [−s]P
PROVER VERIFIER
Commitment
r
r←− TR
X = [r]P X //
Challenge
coo c
r←− TC
Response
if c 6∈ TC then abort
compute y = r + sc
if y 6∈ TΦ,R then abort y //
if y 6∈ TΦ,R then reject
if X = [y]P + [c]I then accept
else reject.
Figure 6.1: τ -GPS
As with the original GPS protocol it is essential for the prover to perform
a size check on the challenge c (otherwise, a dishonest verifier can send, for
example, c = τR and recover the prover’s secret). The size check on y does
not seem to be essential for security, but we include it to ease the security
analysis. Heuristics 1 and 2 (see Section 4.4) imply that the probability of
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aborting in the protocol is negligible.
Note that the computation of s × c can be performed using the non-
randomised version of Algorithm 4 (see Section 4.3). We recall from Sec-
tion 4.3.1 that K′ is a security parameter. We will show in Section 6.6.3.1
that the extra randomisation of the K′ lowest order coefficients is only re-
quired when performing the addition with r. For further implementation
details see Chapter 7.
6.6 Security Analysis
We closely follow [28] for our security analysis. In particular, we use the
same security model as in [28]. We first consider attacks which recover
the private key (i.e., solve the discrete log). Then, our analysis follows the
approach of [22] and proves completeness, soundness and zero knowledge.
6.6.1 Discrete Logarithms
Given (P, I) it must be infeasible for an attacker to compute the private
key s (similarly, given (P,X) to compute r). One could solve the DLP to get
λ ∈ N such that −I = [λ]P and then convert λ to a Frobenius expansion.
Hence, we require the DLP in 〈P 〉 to be hard. As we are working with
Koblitz curves (see Chapter 4), we can take, in practice, m = 163. It is easy
to check that our curve over F2163 has a nearly prime order, as needed.
Alternatively, one could try to solve the τ -DLP (see Section 5.2), i.e.,
compute s ∈ TS directly from (P, I). More precisely:
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We assume that PP(ωPP , k) is a randomised algorithm that generates
public parameters P and I = [−s]P for s ∈ TS under a random tape ωPP
and with the security parameter k as an input. We recall the τ -adic Discrete
Logarithm Problem as: given inputs P , Q and S, to find x ∈ TS (if it exists)
such that Q = [x]P .
Definition 30. The τ -DLP Assumption is that for every polynomial Q1
and every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) Turing Machine A running
on random tape ωA, for sufficiently large k,
Pr
[A(P,S, Q) = x] < 1Q1(k)
where (P,S, Q)← PP(ωPP , k), Q = [x]P and x ∈ TS .
6.6.2 Completeness
We want to show that GPS with τ -adic expansions is complete. We recall
from Section 4.4 that Φ = S + C + 3.
Theorem 6.6.1 (Completeness). Suppose R > Φ+K, for sufficiently large
K ∈ N. Then, a prover who possess a valid key pair (s, I = [−s]P ) is
accepted with overwhelming probability by a verifier.
Proof. Clearly, the prover can compute y = r+ sc. The verification step is:
[y]P + [c]I = [r + sc]P + [c][−s]P = [r]P + [sc]P + [−sc]P = [r]P = X,
which is successful. Finally, since R > Φ+K, from Heuristic 1 (Section 4.4)
we expect that y ∈ TR with overwhelming probability.
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6.6.3 The Zero Knowledge Proof
As with any public key identification or signature scheme it is important to
show that runs of the protocol do not leak information about the private
key. For the original GPS scheme it is proved in [28] that the protocol has
statistical zero knowledge.
The security of the τ -GPS scheme is more subtle than the integer case.
First we present an attack on the basic scheme. The attack does not have an
analogue in the standard GPS setting. This motivates the extra randomi-
sation in the computation of y = r + sc.
We have not been able to prove statistical zero knowledge of our scheme;
instead, we prove computational zero knowledge with respect to a compu-
tational assumption.
6.6.3.1 Obtaining Information About the Private Key
Before proving zero knowledge, we remark that the τ -GPS protocol does
leak information about s if one omits the extra randomisation step in the
computation y = r + sc (see Section 4.3.1).
We give a brief sketch of the idea. Suppose a dishonest verifier inspects
the constant coefficients of all polynomials, and always chooses c such that
c0 = 1. Then y0 = r0 + s0, where + is addition using Algorithm 4, so
y0 is reduced to the set {−1, 0, 1}. If r0 is uniformly distributed then the
distribution of y0 depends on the value of s0. Table 6.2 shows the possi-
ble outcomes for y0 if the optional randomisation step is not used and the
adversary always chooses c0 = 1 (similar tables can be constructed if the
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adversary always chooses c0 = −1).
Table 6.2: Statistical attack to recover s0.
s0 r0 y0 = s0 + r0
−1 −1 0
0 −1
1 0
0 −1 −1
0 0
1 1
1 −1 0
0 1
1 0
More precisely, if s0 = −1 then the output distribution of y0 in this
case (c0 = 1) is 0 with probability 2/3 and −1 with probability 1/3; if
s0 = 0 then y0 has uniform distribution in {−1, 0, 1}; if s0 = 1 then y0 = 0
with probability 2/3 and 1 with probability 1/3. After a sufficient number
of repetitions, an adversary finds the coefficient s0 of the private key by
observing the distribution of y0.
We now explain how the attack can be continued to obtain more infor-
mation about the private key. Assume s0 is known. Again, the adversary
chooses c0 = c1 = 1. From y = sc+ r, we have y1 = s0+ s1+ r1+ ε, where ε
is the carry produced from computing s0 + r0. We recall that y0 is reduced
to the set {−1, 0, 1}, so if r0 = s0 = 1, then y0 = 2 and we have to add
−τ2 + tτ − 2 (remember, τ2 − tτ + 2 ≡ 0), which produces a carry ε = t; if
r0 = s0 = −1, then y0 = −2 and ε = −t.
We stress that the addition is computed using Algorithm 4 and therefore,
it is not associative (e.g., (1 + 1) + (−1) = 0 + (−1) = −1 and 1 + (1 +
(−1)) = 1 + 0 = 1). Hence, we assume that one first computes (s0 + s1)
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and then computes r1 + (s0 + s1) and finally, if there is a carry ε, computes
(r1 + (s0 + s1)) + ε.
The attack proceeds in the same way the adversary did to recover s0,
i.e., he runs the algorithm many times, always choosing a challenge c such
that c0 = c1 = 1 and then he constructs a table with all values of y1. After
a sufficient number of repetitions, the adversary analyses the distribution
of y1. If necessary, he chooses other values for c0 and c1 and repeats the
attack, until he is be able to recover s1.
Note that in the attack to recover s0, the adversary does not recover
the value of r0. If from the first attack, the adversary knows that s0 = 0,
then clearly there is no carry to the next coefficient. We now analyse that
case: the adversary knows s0 = 0, then he chooses c0 = c1 = 1 and after a
number of repetitions, he analyses the distribution of y1. Table 6.3 shows
the distribution of y1 when s0 = 0, c0 = c1 = 1.
Table 6.3: Statistical attack to recover s1 - in this case, the adversary knows that s0 = 0
and chooses c0 = c1 = 1.
s0 s1 r1 y1 = (s0 + s1) + r1
0 −1 −1 0
0 −1
1 0
0 −1 −1
0 0
1 1
1 −1 0
0 1
1 0
From Table 6.3, if the output distribution of y1 is 0 with probability 2/3
and −1 with probability 1/3 then s1 = −1; if y1 has distribution close to
uniform then s1 = 0; if y1 is 0 with probability 2/3 and 1 with probability
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1/3 then s1 = 1.
Now we consider the cases when it is possible that a carry ε 6= 0 occurs in
the computation of y1, i.e., the cases when s0 = −1 or s0 = 1. We begin with
s0 = −1. The adversary knows that when s0 = −1, if r0 = 1 or r0 = −1, the
output y0 (remember y0 = s0 + r0) will be 0. So, he learns nothing about
r0. However, he knows that when y0 = −1 (which happens with probability
1/3 from Table 6.2) then r0 = 0 and there will be no carry to y1. Hence, the
adversary throws away all cases with y0 = 0 and only analyses the outputs
y1 when y0 = −1. The distribution of such y1 is in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Statistical attack to recover s1 - in this case, the adversary knows that
s0 = −1 and analyses only the cases when y0 = −1. Again, he chooses c0 = c1 = 1.
s0 s1 r1 y1 = (s0 + s1) + r1
−1 −1 −1 −1
0 0
1 1
0 −1 0
0 −1
1 0
1 −1 −1
0 0
1 1
From Table 6.4, if the output distribution of y1 is 0 with probability
2/3 and −1 with probability 1/3 then s1 = 0; if y1 has distribution close to
uniform then s1 can be either 1 or −1 and the adversary needs to construct
another table using different values for c0 and/or c1, as we now show.
Table 6.5 shows the new distribution of y1 if the adversary, after ob-
serving that the distribution of y1 is close to uniform in Table 6.4, chooses
c0 = 1 and c1 = 0. The output distribution of y1 will be 0 with probability
2/3 and −1 with probability 1/3 if s1 = −1 and will be 0 with probability
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2/3 and 1 with probability 1/3 if s1 = 1. Hence, after a sufficient number
of repetitions, the adversary will be able to determine the coefficient s1.
Table 6.5: Statistical attack to recover s1 – part 2.
s1 r1 y1 = s1 + r1
−1 −1 0
0 −1
−1 0
1 −1 0
0 1
1 0
Now we analyse for s0 = 1. Again, the adversary knows that when
s0 = 1, if r0 = 1 or r0 = −1, the output y0 (remember y0 = s0 + r0) will
be 0. So, he learns nothing about r0. However, he knows that when y0 = 1
(which will occur with probability 1/3 from Table 6.2) then r0 = 0 and there
will be no carry to y1. Hence, the adversary analyses only the outputs y1 for
which y0 = 1. The distribution of such y1 is very similar to the distribution
of y1 in Table 6.4, so we do not give a table.
If the output distribution of y1 is 0 with probability 2/3 and 1 with
probability 1/3 then s1 = 0; if y1 has distribution close to uniform then s1
can be either 1 or −1 and the adversary needs to construct another table
(very similar to Table 6.5) using different values for c0 and/or c1.
The above method can be extended to recover the first few coefficients
of s. However, the randomisation of the first K′ coefficients destroys the
attack if K′ is sufficiently large. Similarly, it seems hard to mount the attack
on the K′-th coefficient, since that is influenced by carry values propagating
from addition of lower-degree terms (for example, y2 = r2 + s2c0 + s0c2 +
s1c1+ ε1+ ε2, where ε1 is the possible carry that comes from s0+ r0 and ε2
is the possible carry that comes from ((s1 + s0) + r1) + ε1).
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6.6.3.2 Trying to Prove Statistical Zero Knowledge
Our first attempt was to prove the statistical zero knowledge property of
our scheme, depending on the heuristics listed earlier, but due to the non
canonical arithmetic of Frobenius expansions, we were unable to obtain such
a proof. In this subsection we explain what went wrong.
Let K and K′ be security parameters and defineR = max{Φ+K,m+K′}.
Assume Heuristics 1 and 2 from Section 4.4. We tried to prove that the GPS
protocol is statistically zero-knowledge if l and 3C are polynomial and if K
and K′ are sufficiently large.
We closely followed the proof of Theorem 2 of [28], but we could not use
exactly the same proof due to the strange properties of addition of Frobenius
expansions. Let A1 be a dishonest verifier, who instead of picking challenges
at random, chooses them based on previous iterations with a legitimate
prover, in order to try to obtain some knowledge about the private key.
Following [28] we denote by c(X,hist, ωA) the challenge chosen, depending
on the commitment X, the history hist of the protocol so far, and the
random tape ωA.
We now define an algorithm which simulates a round, using a random
tape ωA. We recall from Section 4.4 that Φ = S + C + 3 and the definition
of TΦ,R. Note that #TΦ,R = 3R − 3Φ. The simulation is:
Step 1. Use ωA to choose random values c¯ ∈ TC and y¯ ∈ TΦ,R.
Step 2. Compute X¯ = [y¯]P + [c¯]I
Step 3. If c(X¯, hist, ωA) 6= c¯ then return to Step 1, else return (X¯, c¯, y¯).
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We should prove that for any fixed random tape ωA, the triples (X¯, c¯, y¯)
output by the simulation are statistically indistinguishable from the real
triples (X, c, y), even when c is controlled by a dishonest verifier.
When we say that triple (X¯, c¯, y¯) is statistically indistinguishable from
the real triple (X, c, y), it means that no algorithm which given a polynomial
number of triples of both distributions can distinguish, with non-negligible
advantage, which of the two distributions a triple belongs to, even when
unlimited computational power is available.
Let M = E(F2m)× TC × TR. Fix a private key s ∈ TS and a public key
I = [−s]P . Formally, we want to prove that
Σ1 =
∑
(α,β,γ)∈M
∣∣∣PrωP [(X, c, y) = (α, β, γ)−PrωM(X¯, c¯, y¯) = (α, β, γ)]∣∣∣
is negligible.
First, we consider the simulation. Define M2 = {(α = y¯P + c¯I, β =
c¯, γ = y¯) : c¯ ∈ TC , y¯ ∈ TΦ,R and c¯ = c(y¯P + c¯I, hist, ωA)} ⊂ M. Note that
the same triple (α, β, γ) cannot arise from more that one pair (c¯, y¯) (since
the β and γ components fix (c¯, y¯) and hence the α components are equal.
Clearly, the distribution on M arising from the simulation is the uniform
distribution supported on M2 ⊂M.
Now, we consider triples (α, β, γ) ∈ M coming from genuine runs of
the τ -GPS protocol. Define M1 = {(α = [r]P, β = c([r]P, hist, ωA), γ =
r + βs) : r ∈ TR and r + βs ∈ TR} ⊂ M. Note that the same value α
above can arise from more than one value of r ∈ TR. To continue with
the proof, we expected that the exact same triple (α, β, γ) could not arise
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from two different values of r but this is not true in general as there can be
equivalent but not equal r1 and r2 such that r1 + sc = r2 + sc under the
addition in Algorithm 4. Even without the randomisation this can happen,
e.g., r1 = −1, r2 = 1− τ + τ2 and sc = 1 but the randomisation also gives
further opportunities for it to happen.
Because of this, we need to know, for example, how often this can happen.
The question is then for how many pairs (r1, r2) in the equivalence class of
r can we have r1 + sc = r2 + sc using Algorithm 4 with randomisation.
Do solutions (r1, r2) exist for every equivalence class or only some of them?
When it does happen, how many pairs of solutions can one get?
We performed an experiment using MAGMA[10] to count for each r1,
and fixed sc, how many ri 6= r1 are there such that r1 + sc = ri + sc.
The results showed that the distribution of frequencies is quite irregular,
varying, for example, from zero up to 14 distinct ri for r1 of length 10.
Hence, it would be easy to distinguish uniformly chosen triples as used in
the simulation from the real ones, with a simple frequency analysis, which
spoiled our attempt to prove statistical zero knowledge.
We stress that these statistical irregularities do not seem to lead to an
attack on the τ -GPS scheme.
We leave as an open problem to modify the τ -GPS scheme in order to
make it statistical or even perfect zero knowledge.
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6.6.3.3 Proving Computational Zero Knowledge
We now state the computational assumption on which our security result
relies.
Definition 31. Let C,S,K and K′ be parameters. Define Φ = S+C+3 and
R = max{Φ+K,m+K′}. Let s ∈ TS and I = [−s]P . Let M = E(F2m)×
TC ×TR. Let f : E(F2m)→ TC be a function. Define the distribution on M
Ms,f,1 = {(α = [r]P, β = f(α), γ = r + sβ) : r ∈ TR}
where r is selected from TR uniformly at random and where the computation
r + sβ is performed using Algorithm 4 with randomisation of the first K′
coefficients. Define the distribution on M
MI,f,2 = {(α, β, γ) : γ ∈ TΦ,R, α = [γ]P + [β]I, β = f(α)}
where γ is selected uniformly at random.
We stress that these distributions are not the same. For example, in
MI,f,2 there can be points α ∈ E(F2m) which are not of the form [r]P
for some r ∈ TR (though they will typically be of the form [r′]P for some
r′ ∈ TR′ where R′ − R is small). More importantly, the distributions on
γ are not the same in both cases: in the latter case γ is uniform in TΦ,R
whereas due to the properties of addition using Algorithm 4 it is not clear
whether the distribution of γ in the former case is close to uniform.
We now make a computational assumption regarding these distributions.
Assumption 1. Let A be an algorithm running in polynomial time which is
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given I (but not s) and which samples elements from the distributionsMs,f,1
and MI,f,2. Then we claim that A cannot distinguish the two distributions,
namely that it does not have non-negligible advantage in being able to identify
whether a given triple (α, β, γ) was drawn from Ms,f,1 or MI,f,2.
Theorem 6.6.2 (Zero Knowledge). Let C,S,K and K′ be security param-
eters and define Φ = C + S + 3 and R = max{Φ + K,m + K′}. Assume
Heuristics 1, 2 from Section 4.4 and Assumption 1 above. Then the τ -GPS
protocol has computational zero-knowledge if l and 3C are polynomial and if
K and K′ are sufficiently large.
Proof. We use exactly the same arguments used in Section 6.6.3.2, i.e., A1
is a dishonest verifier, who instead of picking challenges at random, chooses
them based on previous iterations of the protocol, in order to try to ob-
tain some knowledge about the private key. Following [28] we denote by
c(X,hist, ωA) the challenge chosen, depending on the commitment X, the
history hist of the protocol so far, and the random tape ωA.
The algorithm which simulates a round, using a random tape ωA, with-
out any knowledge of the secret s is also the same stated in Section 6.6.3.2
(see steps 1, 2 and 3). The protocol is said to be computational zero knowl-
edge if the (computationally bounded) adversary A cannot distinguish be-
tween the simulation and runs of the real protocol.
We must show that, for any fixed random tape ωA, it is computationally
infeasible to distinguish the simulation from genuine runs of the protocol.
This is exactly the computational assumption stated above, where f(X) is
the function c(X,hist, ωA).
In other words, if the adversary A can distinguish between the simu-
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lation and the real protocol then it immediately solves the computational
assumption. This completes the proof.
In practice we conjecture that K = 136 and K′ = 51 are sufficient to
obtain 80 bits of security. The motivation for this choice is as follows. First,
3K′ ≈ 280, so the probability of guessing the randomness used in line 12 of
Algorithm 4 is negligible. Second, 3Φ+0.63K/3Φ+K = 3−0.37K ≈ 2−80, where
3Φ+0.63K comes from Heuristic 1 and 3Φ+K = 3R is the total number of
possibilities for r in TR, so the probability of learning anything about sc
from r + sc seems to be negligible.
6.6.4 Soundness
The last task is to prove soundness of the scheme. We want to show that
an adversary (which does not know the prover’s private key s) is only able
to impersonate the prover (i.e., she runs the protocol and is accepted by
the verifier) with very small probability. To do this we will show that if an
adversary is accepted by a verifier with non-small probability and if she is
able to rewind the verifier, then she must know (or she can easily compute)
the private key.
An adversary who does not know the private key can predict c with
probability 1
3Cl . If she picks a random y, then compute X = [y]P + [c]I and
send X to the verifier, after receiving c′, if c′ = c, she answers with y and
the verifier will accept. We call probability of cheating the probability of a
dishonest prover being successfully accepted by the verifier.
Now, let us suppose that the adversary can do better than this, i.e., she
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can predict c with probability exceeding 1
3Cl . We will use the adversary to
solve the discrete log for the public key. The idea is to use the adversary
to produce y1 for a challenge c1 on commitment X. We then repeat the
experiment using the same randomness but a different challenge c2, to obtain
a response y2 of the challenge c2 on the same commitment X. We will show
that if we can correctly answer to challenges c1 6= c2 with y1 6= y2, then we
can recover the private key s.
Theorem 6.6.3 (Soundness). An adversary who does not know the private
key is only accepted by a verifier with very small probability.
Proof. Let us suppose that an adversary A is accepted with probability
ε > 1
3Cl . Following the standard rewinding argument presented in [28,
Appendix B] (inspired by [45]), we write Succ(ωA, c1, c2, . . . , cl) = true if an
adversary A, using random tape ωA is successfully identified by the verifier
when successive challenges c1, c2, . . . , cl are used.
We run the following algorithm:
step 1 Pick tuples c of l τ -adic expansions (c1, c2, . . . , cl) ∈ TC and run A
with these challenges under a random tape ωA until Succ(ωA, c) =
true. Call u the number of probes;
step 2 Try up to u l-tuples c′ (different from c) and run A under the same
random tape ωA until Succ(ωA, c′) = true. Output “fail” if a success-
ful l-tuple c′ is not found after u probes;
step 3 Output y¯ = |yj − y′j | and c¯ = |c′j − cj | where j is the first index such
that cj 6= c′j and yj and y′j are the corresponding correct responses
of A.
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If the algorithm does not fail and such an adversary A, given the same
commitment Xj , is able to answer to two different challenges, cj and c′j with
yj and y′j , it follows that [yj ]P + [cj ]I = Xj = [y
′
j ]P + [c
′
j ]I, and hence,
[(yj − y′j)]P = [(c′j − cj)]I. Using the output of the above algorithm, the
adversary can solve the DLP of I to the base P .
Note that as we are working with elliptic curves the curve order is known,
so there is no difficulty with solving this equation. Roughly speaking, we
can say that if an adversary is able to impersonate a prover than this is
equivalent to say that she knows the prover’s private key.
6.7 τ-GPS vs. Standard GPS
We now briefly compare τ -GPS with the elliptic curve GPS variant of sec-
tion 6.4. The standard GPS has lower bandwidth than τ -GPS and the online
computations are simpler and we expect them to be faster for standard GPS
(we did not evaluate the impact of τ -adic multiplication). The oﬄine com-
putations are quite efficient in both cases (especially when compared with
GPS over an RSA modulus). A further advantage of standard GPS is that
the security assurance is statistical zero knowledge rather than computa-
tional zero knowledge. The advantage of τ -GPS is that it does not require
conversion between integers and Frobenius expansions.
6.8 Choosing the Right Protocol
We now give our recommendations on efficient identification protocols for
constrained devices. Our suggestions are based on known results, commonly
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found in the Literature. For a more precise comparison, a implementation
of the protocols is needed.
First, since the resources on the device are limited we recommend using
Koblitz elliptic curves (rather than RSA moduli as proposed in [26, 27]).
If there are no constraints on the oﬄine computation time then we suggest
using the standard GPS protocol or Girault-Lefranc. If the oﬄine compu-
tation time is also limited then it is natural to improve the performance of
the oﬄine steps using Frobenius expansions. The precise choice of protocol
then depends on the application:
• If bandwidth is the most precious resource then we recommend the
Schnorr identification protocol.
• If computation time of the online stage is the most precious resource
then we recommend the Girault-Lefranc method [27].
• If both bandwidth and computation time are precious then we recom-
mend the standard GPS scheme [28].
• If code area and/or power consumption are the most precious resources
then we recommend τ -GPS.
Table 6.6 summarises the above options.
Table 6.6: Choosing the right protocol.
Most precious resource Our recommendation
Bandwidth Schnorr identification protocol
Computation time of the online step Girault-Lefranc method
Bandwidth and computation time standard GPS scheme
Code area and/or power consumption τ -GPS
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6.9 Summary
In this chapter we presented the GPS identification scheme using τ -adic ex-
pansions. This speeds up the running time of the oﬄine steps compared with
standard GPS. We showed that cryptographic protocols can be made to op-
erate with Frobenius expansions instead of integers, and this idea may have
wider applications. The main advantage is that one does not need to convert
between τ -adics and integers, saving code area and power consumption.
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We analysed in Chapter 5 the complexity of attacks on variants of the
Frobenius expansion DLP and in Chapter 6 the use of Frobenius expansions
with GPS identification scheme. In this chapter we use this knowledge to
determine parameters for efficient elliptic curve cryptography.
184
7. Suggested Parameters
7.1 τ-DLP
We studied the τ -DLP in Chapter 5 and concluded that it can be solved
with a low-memory algorithm in O˜(2L/2) group operations. In the same
chapter we determined the constant ε hidden in the O( ), so now we can
calculate the minimum lengths required for the τ -adics to resist to τ -DLP
algorithms.
We assume that the DLP is intractable if it needs more than 278 group
operations to solve it. When we have a general τ -adic or a τ -NAF, we have
showed that we can use Gaudry-Schost algorithm to find a solution for an
equivalent τ -adic x+ yτ , |x| < a and |y| < b, to solve the τ -DLP in 2L/2+ε
group operations. Then we suggest the following lengths for a τ -adic to be
resistant against τ -DLP algorithms:
• General τ -adic - When the proved values a = 2.81
√
2L and b = 2
√
2L
are used, the expected value for ε is 4.06 so one can take a τ -adic of
length L > 148. If we use the values for a and b considering the τ -adic
distribution (i.e., a = 2.28
√
2L and b = 1.8
√
2L), the expected value
for ε is 3.82 so a τ -adic of length L > 149 is required;
• τ -NAF - The distribution of τ -NAFs show that the expected value for
ε is 3.27, so one should take a τ -NAF of length L > 150;
When we have a Low Hamming weight τ -adic, we showed in Section 5.4
that the weight-w τ -DLP can be solved using van Oorschot and Wiener par-
allel collision search in 2w/2
7(L/2w/2)
3/2
√
w
group operations. Taking N = 2w
(
L
w
)
we end up with O˜(N3/4). Obviously, since the number of group operations
also depends on the weight w, we cannot suggest a minimum bound for L.
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7.2 Parameters Sizes for the τ-GPS
We presented the τ -GPS scheme in Chapter 6 and proved that it is com-
putational zero-knowledge secure. Now, we analyse the sizes of the random
τ -adic expansions used for representing the τ -GPS parameters such that the
τ -GPS scheme be a zero knowledge proof of the private key.
7.2.1 Private Key s
We showed in Chapter 5 that one can use a square-root low-memory algo-
rithm to solve the τ -DLP in O(2
S
2 ) group operations. It is usual to choose s
to be a τ -NAF, so we have fewer nonzeros and therefore, faster point multi-
plication. The Gaudry-Schost algorithm for τ -NAFs needs 2L/2+3.27 group
operations to solve the DLP (see Section 5.6), hence we require S > 150.
If enough memory is available, one can use BSGS over τ -NAF and solve
the DLP in 83
√
2L group operations. Hence, we require S > 158. Note that
using Pollard-rho using equivalence classes in E(F2163) needs ≈ 277.6 group
operations to solve the DLP. Therefore, using τ -adic expansions of degree
> 150 (or > 158 if enough memory is available) is no less secure than using
integers.
7.2.2 Challenge c
From Section 6.6.4, we need C to be large enough such that the probability
of cheating is very small. In practice, more than 235 possibilities is enough
to prevent an online attacker from guessing the right value for c.
186
7. Suggested Parameters
Since c can be written as x+ yτ for integers x and y and from Conjec-
ture ??, we have |x| < 3
√
2C and |y| < 2
√
2C , we need 24(2C) > 235 and
therefore, C > 30.4. Here, it does not make difference if we use the τ -adic
distribution, since when the bounds for x and y are respectively 2.28
√
2L
and 1.8
√
2L, we need 16.416(2C) > 235 and therefore, C > 30.9, so we can
take C > 31 for both cases. If c is a τ -NAF, one should take C > 32.
7.2.3 Commitment Source r
One can take m = 163 (see Section 6.6.1), C = 32 (see Section 7.2.2),
S = 150 (see Section 7.2.1), K = 136 and K′ = 51 (see Section 6.6.3).
This gives R = max{Φ + K,m + K′} = max{321, 214} = 321 (recall that
Φ = S + C + 3).
7.3 Structure of the Random τ-adics Used in τ-
GPS
We recall that point multiplication is very efficient when we use τ -adic ex-
pansions and since τ -NAF expansions have the minimum number of nonzero
coefficients (see [4]), it is natural to choose random τ -NAFs to represent a
parameter.
There are no restrictions with respect to the structure of the private
key and the challenge, i.e., s and c can be a general τ -adic, a τ -NAF or a
low-hamming weight τ -adic. We recommend to take s in non-adjacent form
to improve performance in point multiplication with no loss of security.
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We assumed in the zero knowledge part of the proof of security (Sec-
tion 6.6.3), that the simulator picks γ uniformly and random in TΦ,R. There-
fore, we cannot assume that r is a τ -NAF or r has low Hamming-weight,
otherwise, the proof of security does not hold. Hence, we must use a general
τ -adic to represent r.
We remark that for many cryptographic systems one would have to re-
prove the security if using random short τ -NAF expansions instead of ran-
dom integers. For instance, it can be a bad idea to choose “random” values
with some structure. In other words, the work of an attacker can become
easier if he or she knows in advance that the τ -adic expansion is a τ -NAF
for example.
7.4 τ-GPS Parameters
We summarise τ -GPS Parameters in Table 7.1 (compare with Table 6.1).
The first number in each column is the value of the parameter and the second
number (between parenthesis) is the number of bits needed to represent an
element of the set (using 5L3 bits to represent a τ -adic of length L and L+1
bits if it can be chosen in non-adjacent form). We remark that, in principle,
it should be possible to find better binary encodings for τ -adic expansions
which require fewer than 5L3 bits.
Table 7.1: Numerical example of GPS scheme with τ -adic expansions.
S C R
150 (151) 32 (33) 321 (535)
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7.5 τ-GPS Using the Girault-Lefranc Idea
To speed up the computation of s× c we can use the Girault-Lefranc trick
(see [27] for details). In other words, we insist that challenges c have at
least S − 1 zero coefficients between each pair of nonzero coefficients. It
follows that computing s× c does not require Algorithm 4. This transforms
the online step y = r + sc into a single addition using Algorithm 4 with
randomisation of the first K′ coefficients.
In order to define C in this case we need to know how many τ -adic
expansions with degree less than C, Hamming weight w and at least S − 1
zero coefficients between each pair of nonzero coefficients exist.
Theorem 7.5.1. The number of possible τ -adic expansions of degree less
than C, Hamming weight w and at least S − 1 zero coefficients between each
pair of nonzero coefficients is:
ZC,w,S = 2w
[(C − w(S − 1)
w
)
+
S−1∑
i=1
(C − i− (w − 1)(S − 1)
w − 1
)]
(7.1)
Proof. We prove the theorem using combinatorics. For simplicity of nota-
tion, we call the nonzero coefficients “b”, i.e. b ∈ {−1,+1}. We are required
to have at least S − 1 zero coefficients between each pair of nonzero coeffi-
cients; we use the word “block” for a configuration [00 · · · 0b] with exactly
S − 1 zeros before a nonzero b. Our problem is to count the number of ways
to place w blocks of size S in C places. By viewing each block as a single
bit our problem resumes to count the number of ways to place w blocks of
size 1 in C − w(S − 1) places.
We need to give a special attention to the leftmost block, which can be
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complete (i.e. with exactly S − 1 zeros before b) or not (i.e. with i zeros
before b, where 0 ≤ i ≤ S − 2). So, we divide our problem into two parts:
1. Leftmost block complete.
We want to locate w blocks (remember, each block with S − 1 zeros
before b) in C −w(S − 1) places. So, we have (C−w(S−1)w ). As b can be
either −1 or +1, we have:
2w
(C − w(S − 1)
w
)
(7.2)
2. Leftmost nonzero coefficient in position i from the left, where i ∈
{1,S − 1}.
Now, our problem is to locate w − 1 blocks in the remaining C − i
places. As each block was reduced from size S to size 1, our free space
now has C − i− (w − 1)(S − 1) places. So, we have:
2w
S−1∑
i=1
(C − i− (w − 1)(S − 1)
w − 1
)
. (7.3)
Now, just add (7.2) and (7.3) and the proof is complete.
Hence, the total number of possible τ -adic expansions of degree less
than C and with at least S − 1 zero coefficients between each pair of non
zero coefficients is
ZC,S =
bC+S−1S c∑
w=1
2w
[(C − w(S − 1)
w
)
+
S−1∑
i=1
(C − i− (w − 1)(S − 1)
w − 1
)]
(7.4)
It follows (see Table 7.2 and compare with Table 6.1) that if S = 150 then we
need C = 759 to get ZC,S > 235. This results in R = max{Φ+K,m+K′} =
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max{1048, 214} = 1048. Note that one can transmit/store c using much
fewer than 760 bits. However, r and y are not sparse, so would need around
1747 bits to represent.
Table 7.2: Parameters for the Girault-Lefranc variant of τ−GPS.
S C R
150 (151) 759 (760) 1048 (1747)
Now we have a fast online computation of c × s, at the cost of a very
large y to be transmitted, which can be a serious drawback due to memory
restrictions. Although c is also very large, it has very few nonzero coeffi-
cients, and therefore, the bit representation of c can be much more efficient
than simply C + 1 bits, if the verifier transmit c by using only the nonzero
positions. However as y is expected to be dense, the same cannot be done
when sending y.
7.5.1 Performance analysis
We give more detail about how to efficiently compute each of the three steps
of the GPS protocol.
Step 1: We are supposed to choose a random element r ∈ TR (where R
may be 321 or 1048) and compute X = [r]P . Note that R is larger
than m. In practice it would be more efficient to reduce r modulo
τm − 1 before performing the computation of X (this may lead to
coefficients outside the set {−1, 0, 1}).
A more efficient alternative is as follows. Choose a random r′ ∈ Tm
and compute X = [r′]P . It is only necessary to store r′, requiring
≈ 5m/3 bits. Indeed, one could choose r′ in non-adjacent form, in
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which case at most m+ 1 bits are required.
When the long value r is needed in the online step we can simply
choose the coefficients rj randomly subject to the constraint that for
0 6 i < m we have
b(R−i)/mc∑
j=0
rjm+i = r′i
which can be done efficiently. Note that this variant is not covered by
our security analysis since not all possible values of r ∈ TR can arise.
A security analysis of this case is a topic for future research.
Step 2: The computation of r + sc is done using repeated calls to Algo-
rithm 4. One could also use the Karatsuba idea to speed-up the poly-
nomial multiplication. For more details of improvements see [27].
Step 3: To compute [y]P + [c]I one can reduce y (and c if necessary) mod-
ulo τm − 1. One can also use the standard multiexponentiation and
precomputation techniques to speed this up (see [2]).
7.6 Summary
In this chapter we gave some suggestions of parameters sizes based on the re-
sults of Chapters 5 and 6. We also presented some efficient ways to compute
each of the three steps of the GPS protocol.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Paths
This is the end of our journey, and it is time to look back of what we have
done. The job here is simplified because we have already summarised each
chapter at its end. But now we emphasize the main ideas.
As we had said before, we started this project proposing a problem (“Can
we use shorter parameters if we run the GPS identification protocol with
Frobenius expansions in the place of integers ?”). To answer this question,
we needed first to study Koblitz curves and Frobenius expansions, to know
how they behave. So we did that in Chapter 4. Then, a natural question
arose: “Are there low-memory algorithms for the τ -DLP ?”. The response
came with Chapter 5, which also solved our first question, i.e., since there are
low-memory algorithms for the τ -DLP, we cannot use small parameters with
the τ -GPS. However, the τ -GPS protocol yet has some attractiveness, being
useful to applications with limited oﬄine computation time and limited code
area. So we studied the τ -GPS in Chapter 6 and gave a security analysis
for the protocol using τ -adics.
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8.1 Future Paths
Inspired by a famous song: “And now, the end is near and so I face the final
curtain” we can look further and pose some future paths for our journey.
• We proved bounds for integers x and y when a τ -adic with coefficients
in {−1, 0, 1} is mapped to x+ yτ and conjecture that we can shorten
those bounds using the τ -adic distribution.
This leads to three open problems:
– prove the exact bounds for x and y, which would open the doors
for more efficient low-memory algorithms;
– understand better the pictures that show the τ -adic distribution.
– generalise this approach and determine the sizes of bounds a′ and
b′ for integers x 6 a′ and y 6 b′, when working with a general
coefficient set;
• We showed that the weight-w τ -DLP can be solved using van Oorschot
and Wiener parallel collision search in expected time O(N3/4) for some
measure N of the size of the problem. We leave as a challenge to al-
gorithm designers to ‘close the gap’ with time/memory tradeoff algo-
rithms and propose a low-memory algorithm which solves the weight-w
τ -DLP in expected time O(N1/2);
• We proved that our τ -GPS protocol is computational zero knowledge.
We left as an open problem to modify the τ -GPS scheme in order to
make it statistical or even perfect zero knowledge.
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Naturally, the suggestions for future paths are not limited by this list,
since Frobenius expansions have a large potential to be explored. We hope
that this thesis can draw attention to the use of τ -adic expansions in Cryp-
tography, and many other applications can derive from that.
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